96de7e3976
Three more mutating routes were ungated: - POST /shared-agents/disabled — sets the "disabled by me" preference for a shared agent. Despite the "by me" naming this writes a tenant-level row (tenant_disabled_shared_agents) that hides the agent from every member of the tenant's chat dropdown. So a Viewer could silently nuke an agent for the entire tenant. Now Admin+ only. - POST /knowledge-bases/:id/shares — sharing a KB to an organization exposes its content to every member of that org. The service layer only checked "is this KB inside the caller's tenant", so any Viewer could share any tenant KB. Gate matches the KB-update matrix: OwnedKBOrAdmin (creator OR Admin+). - POST /agents/:id/shares — same problem, same fix: OwnedAgentOrAdmin. PUT /shares/:share_id and DELETE /shares/:share_id for both KB and agent share routes get the same matrix — changing permission or revoking a share is at least as sensitive as creating one. GET /knowledge-bases/:id/shares and GET /agents/:id/shares stay Viewer+ since they're read-only. The /organizations/* routes are intentionally left unchanged: they implement organization-level RBAC (org owner / admin / editor / viewer) inside the service layer, which is a different matrix from tenant RBAC and not in scope for this PR.