Store authorization timestamps as timestamptz and normalize Unix expiry
inputs to UTC so tenant/platform API keys expire at the intended instant
even when the app process timezone differs from the PostgreSQL session.
Introduce platform API keys with capability-based access to tenant management,
system settings, runtime queues, and audit logs, plus admin UI for key lifecycle
and system audit log viewing.
Enhance the tenant API key service by introducing asynchronous throttling for the last_used_at updates during API key authentication. This change reduces database write frequency under high request rates, improving performance. Additionally, update tests to validate the throttling behavior, ensuring that last_used_at is only updated once per key within the defined interval. This implementation aligns with the goal of optimizing API key management and maintaining system efficiency.
Eliminate the POST /tenants/{id}/api-key endpoint for resetting tenant API keys, transitioning to a more granular API key management approach. Update related documentation and API specifications to reflect the new structure, including changes to the tenant API key management paths. Adjust frontend code and internationalization files to remove references to the deprecated API key reset functionality, enhancing clarity and consistency across the application.
Redesign tenant API key authorization around one dimension (role) plus a
central default-deny gate, replacing the previous role + KB-scoped flag model.
- Add APIKeyGate as the single authority for API-key authorization: routes
declare one policy (MinRole) via apiKeyGroup/apiKeyRoute helpers; undeclared
routes are denied by default. JWT principals short-circuit the gate and the
JWT-centric RBAC guards short-circuit for API-key principals.
- Roles: viewer/contributor/admin are knowledge-base data-plane only (KB scope
is a pure downstream data filter); owner is a full-access tenant tier that
unlocks tenant-level infrastructure routes and is required for every method.
- Drop the KBScoped policy flag and the KB-restricted-vs-tenant branching.
- Security hardening: never disclose HMAC secret (return presence only), abort
writes on API-key encryption failure, deny KB-restricted keys on /files, and
backfill legacy key hashes at startup instead of O(N) plaintext scans.
- Frontend: two-level create dialog (access type -> permission level), rename
role labels to reflect actual scope, sync en/zh/ko/ru locales.
- Fix startup self-check false-positive on trailing-slash routes and normalize
gin paths before comparison; add regression tests.
Replace scopes JSON with a viewer/contributor/admin role column, move
unsafe-method authorization from path-prefix middleware to declarative
APIKey* guards on routes, and close remaining KB-scope gaps in handlers.
Revoke existing keys on reset, unify scope enforcement, default empty
scopes to read-only, map API key scopes to tenant roles, and remove dead
key-generation helpers left over from the tenant api_key column removal.