refactor(api-keys): simplify authorization to a single-role gate
Redesign tenant API key authorization around one dimension (role) plus a central default-deny gate, replacing the previous role + KB-scoped flag model. - Add APIKeyGate as the single authority for API-key authorization: routes declare one policy (MinRole) via apiKeyGroup/apiKeyRoute helpers; undeclared routes are denied by default. JWT principals short-circuit the gate and the JWT-centric RBAC guards short-circuit for API-key principals. - Roles: viewer/contributor/admin are knowledge-base data-plane only (KB scope is a pure downstream data filter); owner is a full-access tenant tier that unlocks tenant-level infrastructure routes and is required for every method. - Drop the KBScoped policy flag and the KB-restricted-vs-tenant branching. - Security hardening: never disclose HMAC secret (return presence only), abort writes on API-key encryption failure, deny KB-restricted keys on /files, and backfill legacy key hashes at startup instead of O(N) plaintext scans. - Frontend: two-level create dialog (access type -> permission level), rename role labels to reflect actual scope, sync en/zh/ko/ru locales. - Fix startup self-check false-positive on trailing-slash routes and normalize gin paths before comparison; add regression tests.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -38,6 +38,21 @@ const bootstrapEnvVar = "WEKNORA_BOOTSTRAP_SYSTEM_ADMIN_EMAIL"
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// here as additional dig.Invoke calls.
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func runStartupBootstrap(c *dig.Container) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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// One-shot: backfill SHA-256 key_hash for legacy tenant API keys that
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// migration 000065 seeded with a placeholder. Without this, the first
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// authentication of each migrated key falls back to an O(n) plaintext
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// scan of the tenant's keys. Best-effort: warn, never abort startup.
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if err := c.Invoke(func(apiKeySvc interfaces.TenantAPIKeyService) {
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if n, err := apiKeySvc.BackfillMissingKeyHashes(ctx); err != nil {
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logger.Warnf(ctx, "[bootstrap] tenant api key hash backfill failed: %v", err)
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} else if n > 0 {
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logger.Infof(ctx, "[bootstrap] backfilled %d legacy tenant api key hash(es)", n)
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}
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}); err != nil {
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logger.Warnf(ctx, "[bootstrap] failed to resolve TenantAPIKeyService: %v", err)
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}
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email := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(bootstrapEnvVar))
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if email == "" {
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return
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@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ export interface APIPrincipalConfig {
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direct_header_name: string
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signed_token_header_name: string
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require_direct_header: boolean
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// The server never returns the plaintext secret; only its presence.
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has_hmac_secret: boolean
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hmac_secret?: string
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}
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export interface UpdateAPIPrincipalConfigPayload {
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@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ export interface APIPrincipalTestToken {
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external_user_id: string
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}
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export type TenantAPIKeyRole = 'viewer' | 'contributor' | 'admin'
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export type TenantAPIKeyRole = 'viewer' | 'contributor' | 'admin' | 'owner'
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export interface TenantAPIKey {
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id: number
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@@ -5768,15 +5768,23 @@ export default {
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apiKeyNameRequired: 'Enter an API key name',
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toggleApiKeyVisible: 'Show or hide API key',
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apiKeyAccessRole: "Access role",
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apiKeyAccessRoleHint: "Matches tenant member roles; requests are authorized by the selected role.",
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accessRoleViewer: "Viewer",
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accessRoleContributor: "Contributor",
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accessRoleAdmin: "Admin",
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apiKeyAccessType: "Access type",
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apiKeyAccessTypeHint: "\"Knowledge base\" operates within the KB scope at the permission level below; \"Tenant full\" additionally unlocks every tenant-level API such as models and data sources.",
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accessTypeKnowledgeBase: "Knowledge base",
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accessTypeTenantFull: "Tenant full",
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apiKeyPermissionLevel: "Permission level",
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apiKeyAccessRoleHint: "The first three roles are limited to knowledge-base operations; \"Tenant Full\" also unlocks tenant-level APIs such as models and data sources.",
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accessRoleViewer: "KB Read",
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accessRoleContributor: "KB Write",
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accessRoleAdmin: "KB Admin",
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accessRoleOwner: "Tenant Full",
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accessRoleViewerDesc: "Query, search, and chat without modifying knowledge-base content.",
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accessRoleContributorDesc: "Create, update, or delete knowledge-base content within the selected scope.",
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accessRoleAdminDesc: "Manage tenant-level settings and integrations; cannot create, rotate, or delete API keys.",
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accessRoleAdminDesc: "Manage knowledge bases, including destructive operations like clearing a KB, within the selected scope; no tenant-level configuration.",
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accessRoleOwnerDesc: "Full access, equivalent to a tenant owner: may call every tenant-level API (models, vector stores, data sources, channels, ...). Not limited by knowledge-base scope.",
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apiKeyKnowledgeScope: 'Knowledge bases',
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apiKeyKnowledgeScopePlaceholder: 'Leave empty to allow all knowledge bases',
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apiKeyKnowledgeScopeOwnerHint: 'Owner is a full-access key; the knowledge-base scope does not apply to it.',
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allKnowledgeBases: 'All knowledge bases',
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createdAt: 'Created',
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actions: 'Actions',
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@@ -5779,15 +5779,23 @@ export default {
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apiKeyNameRequired: "API Key 이름을 입력하세요",
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toggleApiKeyVisible: "API Key 표시 또는 숨기기",
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apiKeyAccessRole: "접근 역할",
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apiKeyAccessRoleHint: "워크스페이스 멤버 역할과 동일하며, 요청 시 선택한 역할로 인증됩니다.",
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accessRoleViewer: "뷰어",
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accessRoleContributor: "편집",
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accessRoleAdmin: "관리자",
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apiKeyAccessType: "접근 유형",
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apiKeyAccessTypeHint: "\"지식베이스\"는 아래 권한 수준에 따라 지식베이스 범위 내에서 작동합니다. \"테넌트 전체 접근\"은 모델, 데이터 소스 등 모든 테넌트 수준 API를 추가로 사용할 수 있습니다.",
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accessTypeKnowledgeBase: "지식베이스",
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accessTypeTenantFull: "테넌트 전체 접근",
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apiKeyPermissionLevel: "권한 수준",
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apiKeyAccessRoleHint: "앞의 세 역할은 지식베이스 범위 내 작업으로 제한되며, \"테넌트 전체 접근\"은 모델, 데이터 소스 등 테넌트 수준 API도 추가로 사용할 수 있습니다.",
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accessRoleViewer: "지식베이스 읽기",
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accessRoleContributor: "지식베이스 읽기·쓰기",
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accessRoleAdmin: "지식베이스 관리자",
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accessRoleOwner: "테넌트 전체 접근",
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accessRoleViewerDesc: "조회, 검색 및 대화만 가능하며 지식베이스 내용은 수정하지 않습니다.",
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accessRoleContributorDesc: "선택한 범위 내에서 지식베이스 콘텐츠를 생성, 수정 또는 삭제합니다.",
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accessRoleAdminDesc: "테넌트 수준 설정 및 통합을 관리합니다. API Key 생성, 교체 또는 삭제는 불가합니다.",
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accessRoleAdminDesc: "선택한 범위 내에서 지식베이스를 관리하며, 지식베이스 비우기 등 파괴적 작업을 포함합니다. 테넌트 수준 설정은 다루지 않습니다.",
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accessRoleOwnerDesc: "전체 접근, 테넌트 소유자와 동일: 모델, 벡터 스토어, 데이터 소스, 채널 등 모든 테넌트 수준 API를 호출할 수 있으며 지식베이스 범위의 제한을 받지 않습니다.",
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apiKeyKnowledgeScope: "지식베이스 범위",
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apiKeyKnowledgeScopePlaceholder: "비워 두면 모든 지식베이스 접근 허용",
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apiKeyKnowledgeScopeOwnerHint: "소유자는 전체 접근 키이므로 지식베이스 범위가 적용되지 않습니다.",
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allKnowledgeBases: "모든 지식베이스",
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createdAt: "생성일",
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actions: "작업",
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@@ -5600,15 +5600,23 @@ export default {
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apiKeyNameRequired: 'Введите название API key',
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toggleApiKeyVisible: 'Показать или скрыть API key',
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apiKeyAccessRole: 'Роль доступа',
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apiKeyAccessRoleHint: 'Соответствует роли участника workspace; запросы авторизуются по выбранной роли.',
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accessRoleViewer: 'Наблюдатель',
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accessRoleContributor: 'Редактор',
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accessRoleAdmin: 'Администратор',
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apiKeyAccessType: 'Тип доступа',
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apiKeyAccessTypeHint: '«База знаний» работает в пределах области БЗ на выбранном ниже уровне прав; «Полный доступ арендатора» дополнительно открывает все API уровня арендатора, такие как модели и источники данных.',
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accessTypeKnowledgeBase: 'База знаний',
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accessTypeTenantFull: 'Полный доступ арендатора',
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apiKeyPermissionLevel: 'Уровень прав',
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apiKeyAccessRoleHint: 'Первые три роли ограничены операциями с базами знаний; «Полный доступ арендатора» дополнительно открывает API уровня арендатора, такие как модели и источники данных.',
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accessRoleViewer: 'Чтение БЗ',
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accessRoleContributor: 'Чтение и запись БЗ',
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accessRoleAdmin: 'Администратор БЗ',
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accessRoleOwner: 'Полный доступ арендатора',
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accessRoleViewerDesc: 'Запросы, поиск и диалог без изменения содержимого баз знаний.',
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accessRoleContributorDesc: 'Создание, обновление или удаление записей в выбранном диапазоне баз знаний.',
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accessRoleAdminDesc: 'Управление настройками арендатора и интеграциями; нельзя создавать, ротировать или удалять API keys.',
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accessRoleAdminDesc: 'Управление базами знаний в выбранном диапазоне, включая деструктивные операции, такие как очистка базы знаний; настройки уровня арендатора недоступны.',
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accessRoleOwnerDesc: 'Полный доступ, эквивалент владельца арендатора: доступны все API уровня арендатора (модели, векторные хранилища, источники данных, каналы, ...). Не ограничивается диапазоном баз знаний.',
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apiKeyKnowledgeScope: 'Базы знаний',
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apiKeyKnowledgeScopePlaceholder: 'Оставьте пустым, чтобы разрешить доступ ко всем базам знаний',
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apiKeyKnowledgeScopeOwnerHint: 'Владелец — это ключ с полным доступом; диапазон баз знаний к нему не применяется.',
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allKnowledgeBases: 'Все базы знаний',
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createdAt: 'Создано',
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actions: 'Действия',
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@@ -5781,15 +5781,23 @@ export default {
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apiKeyNameRequired: "请输入 API Key 名称",
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toggleApiKeyVisible: "显示或隐藏 API Key",
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apiKeyAccessRole: "访问角色",
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apiKeyAccessRoleHint: "与空间成员角色一致,请求时按所选角色鉴权。",
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accessRoleViewer: "访客",
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accessRoleContributor: "编辑",
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accessRoleAdmin: "管理员",
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apiKeyAccessType: "访问类型",
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apiKeyAccessTypeHint: "「知识库」按下方权限级别在知识库范围内操作;「租户完全访问」额外开放模型、数据源等全部租户级接口。",
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accessTypeKnowledgeBase: "知识库",
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accessTypeTenantFull: "租户完全访问",
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apiKeyPermissionLevel: "权限级别",
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apiKeyAccessRoleHint: "前三档仅限知识库范围内操作;「租户完全访问」额外开放模型、数据源等租户级接口。",
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accessRoleViewer: "知识库只读",
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accessRoleContributor: "知识库读写",
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accessRoleAdmin: "知识库管理员",
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accessRoleOwner: "租户完全访问",
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accessRoleViewerDesc: "查询、检索和对话,不修改知识库内容。",
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accessRoleContributorDesc: "创建、更新或删除知识库内容,受知识库范围限制。",
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accessRoleAdminDesc: "管理租户级配置与集成设置;不能创建、轮换或删除 API 密钥。",
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accessRoleAdminDesc: "知识库管理,包含清空知识库等破坏性操作,受知识库范围限制;不涉及租户级配置。",
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accessRoleOwnerDesc: "完全访问,等同租户所有者:可调用模型、向量库、数据源、渠道等全部租户级接口,不受知识库范围限制。",
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apiKeyKnowledgeScope: "知识库范围",
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apiKeyKnowledgeScopePlaceholder: "留空表示允许访问全部知识库",
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apiKeyKnowledgeScopeOwnerHint: "所有者为完全访问密钥,知识库范围对其不生效。",
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allKnowledgeBases: "全部知识库",
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createdAt: "创建时间",
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actions: "操作",
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@@ -460,21 +460,34 @@
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<div class="api-key-dialog-row">
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<div class="api-key-dialog-row__label">
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<label>{{ $t('integrations.api.apiKeyAccessRole') }}</label>
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<label>{{ $t('integrations.api.apiKeyAccessType') }}</label>
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</div>
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<t-radio-group v-model="apiKeyAccessType" class="mode-radio api-key-role-radio">
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<t-radio-button value="kb">{{ $t('integrations.api.accessTypeKnowledgeBase') }}</t-radio-button>
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<t-radio-button value="tenant">{{ $t('integrations.api.accessTypeTenantFull') }}</t-radio-button>
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</t-radio-group>
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<p class="scope-role-hint">{{ $t('integrations.api.apiKeyAccessTypeHint') }}</p>
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</div>
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<div v-if="!apiKeyRoleIsOwner" class="api-key-dialog-row">
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<div class="api-key-dialog-row__label">
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<label>{{ $t('integrations.api.apiKeyPermissionLevel') }}</label>
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</div>
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<t-radio-group v-model="apiKeyForm.role" class="mode-radio api-key-role-radio">
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<t-radio-button value="viewer">{{ $t('integrations.api.accessRoleViewer') }}</t-radio-button>
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<t-radio-button value="contributor">{{ $t('integrations.api.accessRoleContributor') }}</t-radio-button>
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<t-radio-button value="admin">{{ $t('integrations.api.accessRoleAdmin') }}</t-radio-button>
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</t-radio-group>
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<p class="scope-role-hint">{{ $t('integrations.api.apiKeyAccessRoleHint') }}</p>
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</div>
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<div class="api-key-dialog-row api-key-dialog-row--help">
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<div class="scope-help scope-help--role">
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<p class="scope-help__role">{{ formatApiKeyAccessRoleLabel(apiKeyForm.role) }}</p>
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<p class="scope-help__desc">{{ apiKeyFormRoleDesc }}</p>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div class="api-key-dialog-row">
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<div v-if="!apiKeyRoleIsOwner" class="api-key-dialog-row">
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<div class="api-key-dialog-row__label">
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<label>{{ $t('integrations.api.apiKeyKnowledgeScope') }}</label>
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</div>
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@@ -545,7 +558,6 @@ const apiKeyCreating = ref(false)
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const knowledgeBasesLoading = ref(false)
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const knowledgeBases = ref<Array<{ id: string; name: string }>>([])
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const secretInput = ref('')
|
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const savedHMACSecret = ref('')
|
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const exampleTab = ref<'jwt' | 'curl'>('curl')
|
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const agents = ref<CustomAgent[]>([])
|
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const agentsLoading = ref(false)
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@@ -568,7 +580,7 @@ const form = reactive({
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require_direct_header: false,
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})
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|
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type ApiKeyAccessRole = 'viewer' | 'contributor' | 'admin'
|
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type ApiKeyAccessRole = 'viewer' | 'contributor' | 'admin' | 'owner'
|
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|
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const apiKeyForm = reactive({
|
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name: '',
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@@ -576,18 +588,50 @@ const apiKeyForm = reactive({
|
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knowledge_base_ids: [] as string[],
|
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})
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|
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// The role picker is presented as two levels: a top-level access type
|
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// (knowledge-base vs. full tenant) and, for knowledge-base keys, a permission
|
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// level (viewer/contributor/admin). Owner is a full-access key, for which the
|
||||
// KB scope is meaningless and hidden.
|
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const apiKeyRoleIsOwner = computed(() => apiKeyForm.role === 'owner')
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type ApiKeyAccessType = 'kb' | 'tenant'
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const apiKeyAccessType = ref<ApiKeyAccessType>('kb')
|
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// Remember the last knowledge-base permission level so toggling back from
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// "tenant full" restores the user's previous choice instead of resetting.
|
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let lastKbRole: ApiKeyAccessRole = 'viewer'
|
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|
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watch(apiKeyAccessType, (type) => {
|
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if (type === 'tenant') {
|
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apiKeyForm.role = 'owner'
|
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apiKeyForm.knowledge_base_ids = []
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} else if (apiKeyForm.role === 'owner') {
|
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apiKeyForm.role = lastKbRole === 'owner' ? 'viewer' : lastKbRole
|
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}
|
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})
|
||||
|
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watch(
|
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() => apiKeyForm.role,
|
||||
(role) => {
|
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if (role !== 'owner') {
|
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lastKbRole = role
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||||
}
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},
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)
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function formatApiKeyAccessRoleLabel(role: ApiKeyAccessRole | TenantAPIKeyRole | undefined): string {
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const normalized = (role ?? 'viewer') as ApiKeyAccessRole
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const labels: Record<ApiKeyAccessRole, string> = {
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viewer: t('integrations.api.accessRoleViewer'),
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contributor: t('integrations.api.accessRoleContributor'),
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admin: t('integrations.api.accessRoleAdmin'),
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owner: t('integrations.api.accessRoleOwner'),
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}
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return labels[normalized] ?? labels.viewer
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}
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const apiKeyFormRoleDesc = computed(() => {
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switch (apiKeyForm.role) {
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case 'owner':
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return t('integrations.api.accessRoleOwnerDesc')
|
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case 'admin':
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return t('integrations.api.accessRoleAdminDesc')
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case 'contributor':
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@@ -665,7 +709,10 @@ const directHeaderName = computed(() => DEFAULT_DIRECT_HEADER_NAME)
|
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const canAutoSave = computed(() => {
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if (!tenantId.value) return false
|
||||
if (form.mode === 'signed_token') {
|
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return secretInput.value.trim() !== ''
|
||||
// Either a secret is already stored server-side, or the user has just
|
||||
// typed a new one. The plaintext secret is never returned by the API,
|
||||
// so we rely on the has_hmac_secret presence flag.
|
||||
return config.value?.has_hmac_secret === true || secretInput.value.trim() !== ''
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
})
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||||
@@ -686,7 +733,9 @@ const hasUnsavedPrincipalChanges = computed(() => {
|
||||
return (
|
||||
form.mode !== cfg.mode
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||||
|| form.require_direct_header !== cfg.require_direct_header
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||||
|| secretInput.value.trim() !== savedHMACSecret.value.trim()
|
||||
// A non-empty input always means the user intends to set a new secret;
|
||||
// the existing secret is never echoed back so any typed value is a change.
|
||||
|| secretInput.value.trim() !== ''
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -831,8 +880,9 @@ async function load() {
|
||||
form.direct_header_name = DEFAULT_DIRECT_HEADER_NAME
|
||||
form.signed_token_header_name = DEFAULT_TOKEN_HEADER_NAME
|
||||
form.require_direct_header = cfgResp.data.require_direct_header === true
|
||||
savedHMACSecret.value = cfgResp.data.hmac_secret || ''
|
||||
secretInput.value = savedHMACSecret.value
|
||||
// The plaintext secret is never returned; start with an empty input and
|
||||
// rely on config.has_hmac_secret to reflect whether one is configured.
|
||||
secretInput.value = ''
|
||||
ensurePlaygroundAgent()
|
||||
} catch (err: any) {
|
||||
error.value = err?.message || t('integrations.api.loadFailed')
|
||||
@@ -956,7 +1006,9 @@ async function saveIfNeeded(options: { showSuccess?: boolean } = {}) {
|
||||
signed_token_header_name: DEFAULT_TOKEN_HEADER_NAME,
|
||||
require_direct_header: form.require_direct_header,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (secretInput.value.trim() !== savedHMACSecret.value.trim()) {
|
||||
// Only send the secret when the user typed a new one; otherwise the
|
||||
// backend keeps the stored value untouched.
|
||||
if (secretInput.value.trim() !== '') {
|
||||
payload.hmac_secret = secretInput.value.trim()
|
||||
}
|
||||
const resp = await updateAPIPrincipalConfig(tenantId.value, payload)
|
||||
@@ -964,8 +1016,7 @@ async function saveIfNeeded(options: { showSuccess?: boolean } = {}) {
|
||||
throw new Error(resp.message || t('integrations.api.saveFailed'))
|
||||
}
|
||||
config.value = resp.data
|
||||
savedHMACSecret.value = resp.data.hmac_secret || payload.hmac_secret || ''
|
||||
secretInput.value = savedHMACSecret.value
|
||||
secretInput.value = ''
|
||||
if (options.showSuccess) {
|
||||
MessagePlugin.success(t('integrations.api.saveSuccess'))
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1121,6 +1172,8 @@ function openCreateAPIKeyDialog() {
|
||||
apiKeyForm.name = ''
|
||||
apiKeyForm.role = 'viewer'
|
||||
apiKeyForm.knowledge_base_ids = []
|
||||
apiKeyAccessType.value = 'kb'
|
||||
lastKbRole = 'viewer'
|
||||
apiKeyDialogVisible.value = true
|
||||
void loadKnowledgeBaseOptions()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1135,7 +1188,8 @@ async function createScopedAPIKey() {
|
||||
const resp = await createTenantAPIKey(tenantId.value, {
|
||||
name: apiKeyForm.name.trim(),
|
||||
role: apiKeyForm.role,
|
||||
knowledge_base_ids: apiKeyForm.knowledge_base_ids,
|
||||
// Owner keys are full-access; KB scoping does not apply to them.
|
||||
knowledge_base_ids: apiKeyRoleIsOwner.value ? [] : apiKeyForm.knowledge_base_ids,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if (!resp.success || !resp.data?.api_key) {
|
||||
throw new Error(resp.message || t('integrations.api.createApiKeyFailed'))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -77,6 +77,24 @@ func (r *tenantAPIKeyRepository) UpdateAPIKeyHash(ctx context.Context, id uint64
|
||||
Update("key_hash", hash).Error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// placeholderKeyHashPrefix mirrors the value written by migration
|
||||
// 000065_tenant_api_keys.up.sql ('migrated-tenant-' || id). Rows still
|
||||
// carrying it have never been authenticated since the upgrade, so their
|
||||
// key_hash is not the real SHA-256 of the API key yet.
|
||||
const placeholderKeyHashPrefix = "migrated-tenant-"
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *tenantAPIKeyRepository) ListKeysWithPlaceholderHash(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
) ([]*types.TenantAPIKey, error) {
|
||||
var keys []*types.TenantAPIKey
|
||||
// AfterFind decrypts api_key, so callers get the plaintext token needed
|
||||
// to compute the real hash.
|
||||
err := r.db.WithContext(ctx).
|
||||
Where("key_hash LIKE ? AND revoked_at IS NULL", placeholderKeyHashPrefix+"%").
|
||||
Find(&keys).Error
|
||||
return keys, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *tenantAPIKeyRepository) UpdateAPIKeyLastUsed(ctx context.Context, id uint64, at time.Time) error {
|
||||
return r.db.WithContext(ctx).
|
||||
Model(&types.TenantAPIKey{}).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -134,6 +134,28 @@ func (s *tenantAPIKeyService) RevokeAllAPIKeys(ctx context.Context, tenantID uin
|
||||
return s.repo.RevokeAllAPIKeys(ctx, tenantID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *tenantAPIKeyService) BackfillMissingKeyHashes(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
|
||||
keys, err := s.repo.ListKeysWithPlaceholderHash(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return 0, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
backfilled := 0
|
||||
for _, key := range keys {
|
||||
if key == nil || strings.TrimSpace(key.APIKey) == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
hash := hashTenantAPIKey(key.APIKey)
|
||||
if key.KeyHash == hash {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := s.repo.UpdateAPIKeyHash(ctx, key.ID, hash); err != nil {
|
||||
return backfilled, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
backfilled++
|
||||
}
|
||||
return backfilled, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func generateTenantAPIKeyToken() (string, error) {
|
||||
var b [32]byte
|
||||
if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -107,6 +107,17 @@ func (r *fakeTenantAPIKeyRepo) UpdateAPIKeyHash(_ context.Context, id uint64, ha
|
||||
return apprepo.ErrTenantAPIKeyNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *fakeTenantAPIKeyRepo) ListKeysWithPlaceholderHash(_ context.Context) ([]*types.TenantAPIKey, error) {
|
||||
out := []*types.TenantAPIKey{}
|
||||
for _, key := range r.byHash {
|
||||
if key.RevokedAt == nil && strings.HasPrefix(key.KeyHash, "migrated-tenant-") {
|
||||
cp := *key
|
||||
out = append(out, &cp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *fakeTenantAPIKeyRepo) UpdateAPIKeyLastUsed(_ context.Context, id uint64, at time.Time) error {
|
||||
for _, key := range r.byHash {
|
||||
if key.ID == id && key.RevokedAt == nil {
|
||||
@@ -126,7 +137,7 @@ func TestTenantAPIKeyServiceAuthenticateTenantAPIKeyRepairsMigratedHash(t *testi
|
||||
Name: "Tenant API key",
|
||||
KeyHash: "migrated-tenant-42",
|
||||
APIKey: token,
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleAdmin,
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleAdmin,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := repo.CreateAPIKey(ctx, key); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("CreateAPIKey returned error: %v", err)
|
||||
@@ -143,6 +154,40 @@ func TestTenantAPIKeyServiceAuthenticateTenantAPIKeyRepairsMigratedHash(t *testi
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTenantAPIKeyServiceBackfillMissingKeyHashes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
repo := newFakeTenantAPIKeyRepo()
|
||||
svc := NewTenantAPIKeyService(repo)
|
||||
|
||||
token := "sk-legacy-token-value"
|
||||
legacy := &types.TenantAPIKey{
|
||||
TenantID: 7,
|
||||
Name: "legacy",
|
||||
KeyHash: "migrated-tenant-7",
|
||||
APIKey: token,
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleAdmin,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := repo.CreateAPIKey(ctx, legacy); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("CreateAPIKey returned error: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
n, err := svc.BackfillMissingKeyHashes(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("BackfillMissingKeyHashes returned error: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if n != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("backfilled = %d, want 1", n)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// After backfill the key authenticates via the fast hash path.
|
||||
if _, err := svc.AuthenticateAPIKey(ctx, token); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("AuthenticateAPIKey after backfill returned error: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Idempotent: a second run finds nothing to do.
|
||||
if n, err := svc.BackfillMissingKeyHashes(ctx); err != nil || n != 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("second BackfillMissingKeyHashes = (%d, %v), want (0, nil)", n, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTenantAPIKeyServiceRevokeAllAPIKeys(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
repo := newFakeTenantAPIKeyRepo()
|
||||
@@ -151,7 +196,7 @@ func TestTenantAPIKeyServiceRevokeAllAPIKeys(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
first, err := svc.CreateAPIKey(ctx, interfaces.TenantAPIKeyCreateRequest{
|
||||
TenantID: 42,
|
||||
Name: "first",
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleViewer,
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleViewer,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("CreateAPIKey first returned error: %v", err)
|
||||
@@ -159,7 +204,7 @@ func TestTenantAPIKeyServiceRevokeAllAPIKeys(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
second, err := svc.CreateAPIKey(ctx, interfaces.TenantAPIKeyCreateRequest{
|
||||
TenantID: 42,
|
||||
Name: "second",
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleViewer,
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleViewer,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("CreateAPIKey second returned error: %v", err)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -116,8 +116,9 @@ type apiPrincipalConfigResponse struct {
|
||||
DirectHeaderName string `json:"direct_header_name"`
|
||||
SignedTokenHeaderName string `json:"signed_token_header_name"`
|
||||
RequireDirectHeader bool `json:"require_direct_header"`
|
||||
HasHMACSecret bool `json:"has_hmac_secret"`
|
||||
HMACSecret string `json:"hmac_secret,omitempty"`
|
||||
// HasHMACSecret reports whether a signing secret is configured. The
|
||||
// plaintext secret is NEVER returned — clients only learn presence.
|
||||
HasHMACSecret bool `json:"has_hmac_secret"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type apiPrincipalTestTokenRequest struct {
|
||||
@@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ const (
|
||||
defaultAPIPrincipalTestTokenTTL = 15 * time.Minute
|
||||
maxAPIPrincipalTestTokenTTL = time.Hour
|
||||
maxAPIPrincipalExternalUserIDLen = 128
|
||||
// apiPrincipalSecretRedacted is the placeholder an update request may
|
||||
// send in place of the HMAC secret to signal "leave the stored secret
|
||||
// unchanged". The plaintext secret is never returned by GET, so the
|
||||
// client cannot echo the real value back.
|
||||
apiPrincipalSecretRedacted = "***"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// defaultMaxOwnedTenantsPerUser is the cap applied when
|
||||
@@ -705,7 +711,7 @@ func validateTenantAPIKeyRequest(
|
||||
return errors.NewValidationError("name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if role := types.NormalizeTenantAPIKeyRole(types.TenantRole(strings.TrimSpace(req.Role))); req.Role != "" && role == "" {
|
||||
return errors.NewValidationError("role must be viewer, contributor, or admin")
|
||||
return errors.NewValidationError("role must be one of viewer, contributor, admin, or owner")
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, kbID := range req.KnowledgeBaseIDs {
|
||||
kbID = strings.TrimSpace(kbID)
|
||||
@@ -737,7 +743,6 @@ func apiPrincipalConfigForResponse(cfg *types.APIPrincipalConfig) apiPrincipalCo
|
||||
SignedTokenHeaderName: defaultAPIPrincipalTokenHeader,
|
||||
RequireDirectHeader: cfg.RequireDirectHeader,
|
||||
HasHMACSecret: strings.TrimSpace(cfg.HMACSecret) != "",
|
||||
HMACSecret: strings.TrimSpace(cfg.HMACSecret),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -826,7 +831,14 @@ func (h *TenantHandler) UpdateAPIPrincipalConfig(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
hmacSecret := existingSecret
|
||||
if req.HMACSecret != nil {
|
||||
hmacSecret = strings.TrimSpace(*req.HMACSecret)
|
||||
provided := strings.TrimSpace(*req.HMACSecret)
|
||||
// GET no longer discloses the plaintext secret, so a client that
|
||||
// edits the config re-submits the redaction placeholder to mean
|
||||
// "keep the existing secret". Treat it as a no-op instead of
|
||||
// overwriting the real secret with "***".
|
||||
if provided != apiPrincipalSecretRedacted {
|
||||
hmacSecret = provided
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
cfg := &types.APIPrincipalConfig{
|
||||
Mode: req.Mode,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package middleware
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
stderrors "errors"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types"
|
||||
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var errTenantAPIKeyScopeForbidden = stderrors.New("tenant api key scope forbidden")
|
||||
|
||||
// isTenantAPIKeyManagementPath reports tenant API-key lifecycle endpoints that
|
||||
// no scoped key may call, regardless of role.
|
||||
func isTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(path string) bool {
|
||||
for _, marker := range []string{"/api-keys", "/api-principal"} {
|
||||
if strings.Contains(path, marker) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Legacy reset endpoint: POST /tenants/:id/api-key (singular).
|
||||
return strings.HasSuffix(path, "/api-key")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath is a defense-in-depth guard in auth: API keys
|
||||
// must never reach key-management routes even if a route forgets APIKeyDeny().
|
||||
// Role and KB checks are enforced by per-route APIKey* guards and types helpers.
|
||||
func rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(ctx context.Context, path string) error {
|
||||
if _, ok := types.TenantAPIKeyScopeFromContext(ctx); !ok {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(path) {
|
||||
return errTenantAPIKeyScopeForbidden
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RequireAPIKeyDeny rejects all X-API-Key callers. JWT sessions pass through.
|
||||
func RequireAPIKeyDeny() gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
if _, ok := types.TenantAPIKeyScopeFromContext(c.Request.Context()); ok {
|
||||
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
|
||||
"error": "Forbidden: API key scope does not allow this operation",
|
||||
})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RequireAPIKeyMinRole enforces minRole for X-API-Key callers on every HTTP
|
||||
// method. JWT sessions pass through.
|
||||
func RequireAPIKeyMinRole(minRole types.TenantRole) gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
if err := requireTenantAPIKeyMinRole(c.Request.Context(), minRole); err != nil {
|
||||
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
|
||||
"error": "Forbidden: API key scope does not allow this operation",
|
||||
})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafe enforces minRole for X-API-Key callers on
|
||||
// POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE only. Safe reads (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS) pass through so
|
||||
// group-level guards can cover mixed read/write route trees.
|
||||
func RequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafe(minRole types.TenantRole) gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
if isSafeHTTPMethod(c.Request.Method) {
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := requireTenantAPIKeyMinRole(c.Request.Context(), minRole); err != nil {
|
||||
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
|
||||
"error": "Forbidden: API key scope does not allow this operation",
|
||||
})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func requireTenantAPIKeyMinRole(ctx context.Context, minRole types.TenantRole) error {
|
||||
scope, ok := types.TenantAPIKeyScopeFromContext(ctx)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
role := scope.Role
|
||||
if role == "" {
|
||||
role = types.TenantRoleViewer
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !role.HasPermission(minRole) {
|
||||
return errTenantAPIKeyScopeForbidden
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func isSafeHTTPMethod(method string) bool {
|
||||
switch method {
|
||||
case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package middleware
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
stderrors "errors"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types"
|
||||
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctx := types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(context.Background(), types.TenantAPIKeyScope{
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleAdmin,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
for _, path := range []string{
|
||||
"/api/v1/tenants/1/api-keys",
|
||||
"/api/v1/tenants/1/api-key",
|
||||
"/api/v1/tenants/1/api-principal-config",
|
||||
"/api/v1/tenants/1/api-principal-test-token",
|
||||
} {
|
||||
err := rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(ctx, path)
|
||||
if !stderrors.Is(err, errTenantAPIKeyScopeForbidden) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("management path %s error = %v, want errTenantAPIKeyScopeForbidden", path, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(ctx, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("non-management path should pass: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(context.Background(), "/api/v1/tenants/1/api-keys"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("non-api-key principal should pass: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequireAPIKeyDenyBlocksAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
ctx := types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(context.Background(), types.TenantAPIKeyScope{
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleAdmin,
|
||||
})
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
|
||||
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases", nil)
|
||||
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
RequireAPIKeyDeny()(c)
|
||||
if !c.IsAborted() {
|
||||
t.Fatal("expected API key request to be aborted")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", w.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequireAPIKeyDenyAllowsJWT(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
|
||||
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
RequireAPIKeyDeny()(c)
|
||||
if c.IsAborted() {
|
||||
t.Fatal("expected JWT request to pass RequireAPIKeyDeny")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafeSkipsSafeMethods(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctx := types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(context.Background(), types.TenantAPIKeyScope{
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleViewer,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err := requireTenantAPIKeyMinRole(ctx, types.TenantRoleAdmin); !stderrors.Is(err, errTenantAPIKeyScopeForbidden) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("viewer should not satisfy admin min role: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
|
||||
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/models", nil)
|
||||
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
RequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafe(types.TenantRoleAdmin)(c)
|
||||
if c.IsAborted() {
|
||||
t.Fatal("safe GET should skip unsafe min-role guard")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequireAPIKeyMinRoleEnforcesOnPost(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctx := types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(context.Background(), types.TenantAPIKeyScope{
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleViewer,
|
||||
})
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
|
||||
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/knowledge-search", nil)
|
||||
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
RequireAPIKeyMinRole(types.TenantRoleViewer)(c)
|
||||
if c.IsAborted() {
|
||||
t.Fatal("viewer key should pass viewer min role on POST")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafeAllowsContributorKnowledgeWrite(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctx := types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(context.Background(), types.TenantAPIKeyScope{
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleContributor,
|
||||
KnowledgeBaseIDs: types.StringArray{"kb-1"},
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err := requireTenantAPIKeyMinRole(ctx, types.TenantRoleContributor); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("scoped knowledge write should pass route guard: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
|
||||
package middleware
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
stderrors "errors"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types"
|
||||
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var errTenantAPIKeyScopeForbidden = stderrors.New("tenant api key scope forbidden")
|
||||
|
||||
// APIKeyRoutePolicy declares how an X-API-Key caller may use a single route.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Design: API-key authorization is a SEPARATE authority from the JWT
|
||||
// role/ownership guards. Ownership ("creator OR Admin+") is a human concept
|
||||
// and never applies to a machine principal; instead every API-key-accessible
|
||||
// route declares one policy here, and the APIKeyGate is the single place that
|
||||
// enforces it. Routes that declare no policy are denied for API keys by
|
||||
// default (fail-closed), which removes the old "remember to add APIKeyDeny"
|
||||
// footgun.
|
||||
type APIKeyRoutePolicy struct {
|
||||
// MinRole is the minimum tenant role an API key needs for this route.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Data-plane routes (knowledge bases and their content) use Viewer /
|
||||
// Contributor / Admin; for those, safe reads (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS) only
|
||||
// require Viewer while writes require the declared role. Tenant-level
|
||||
// infrastructure routes (models, vector stores, MCP, data sources,
|
||||
// channels, tenant KV, ...) use Owner, which is required for EVERY
|
||||
// method — reading tenant configuration is itself a privileged action.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// KB scoping is NOT enforced here: a key's knowledge_base_ids allow-list
|
||||
// is a pure data filter applied by the KBAccess guards and the handler
|
||||
// scope checks on data-plane routes. Tenant-level routes are simply
|
||||
// gated behind the Owner role instead of being reachable by a narrow key.
|
||||
MinRole types.TenantRole
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// APIKeyRouteAuthorizer is the registry of per-route API-key policies. It is
|
||||
// populated at router-construction time (single-threaded) and only read at
|
||||
// request time, so it needs no locking.
|
||||
type APIKeyRouteAuthorizer struct {
|
||||
// policies is keyed by HTTP method, then by the gin full-path
|
||||
// template (e.g. "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge/file").
|
||||
policies map[string]map[string]APIKeyRoutePolicy
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewAPIKeyRouteAuthorizer returns an empty authorizer.
|
||||
func NewAPIKeyRouteAuthorizer() *APIKeyRouteAuthorizer {
|
||||
return &APIKeyRouteAuthorizer{policies: map[string]map[string]APIKeyRoutePolicy{}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Register records the API-key policy for (method, fullPath). fullPath MUST be
|
||||
// the same string gin reports via c.FullPath() for the route, otherwise the
|
||||
// gate lookup will miss and the route will be denied for API keys. Router-side
|
||||
// helpers build fullPath from the group's BasePath so the two stay in sync.
|
||||
func (a *APIKeyRouteAuthorizer) Register(method, fullPath string, policy APIKeyRoutePolicy) {
|
||||
method = strings.ToUpper(strings.TrimSpace(method))
|
||||
fullPath = normalizeRoutePath(fullPath)
|
||||
if a.policies[method] == nil {
|
||||
a.policies[method] = map[string]APIKeyRoutePolicy{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
a.policies[method][fullPath] = policy
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Lookup returns the policy for (method, fullPath) if one was declared.
|
||||
func (a *APIKeyRouteAuthorizer) Lookup(method, fullPath string) (APIKeyRoutePolicy, bool) {
|
||||
byPath, ok := a.policies[strings.ToUpper(method)]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return APIKeyRoutePolicy{}, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
policy, ok := byPath[normalizeRoutePath(fullPath)]
|
||||
return policy, ok
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RegisteredRoutes returns every (method, fullPath) pair the authorizer knows
|
||||
// about. Used by the router startup self-check to detect stale path templates.
|
||||
func (a *APIKeyRouteAuthorizer) RegisteredRoutes() map[string][]string {
|
||||
out := make(map[string][]string, len(a.policies))
|
||||
for method, byPath := range a.policies {
|
||||
paths := make([]string, 0, len(byPath))
|
||||
for path := range byPath {
|
||||
paths = append(paths, path)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out[method] = paths
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Middleware returns the gate middleware. It runs as the first handler on the
|
||||
// authenticated API group, after routing (so c.FullPath() is populated). JWT
|
||||
// principals pass straight through; API-key principals are authorized purely
|
||||
// from the declared policy table.
|
||||
func (a *APIKeyRouteAuthorizer) Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
scope, ok := types.TenantAPIKeyScopeFromContext(c.Request.Context())
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := a.authorize(scope, c.Request.Method, c.FullPath()); err != nil {
|
||||
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
|
||||
"error": "Forbidden: API key scope does not allow this operation",
|
||||
})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// authorize applies the declared policy to an API-key scope. Absent policy =>
|
||||
// default deny.
|
||||
func (a *APIKeyRouteAuthorizer) authorize(scope types.TenantAPIKeyScope, method, fullPath string) error {
|
||||
policy, ok := a.Lookup(method, fullPath)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return errTenantAPIKeyScopeForbidden
|
||||
}
|
||||
role := scope.Role
|
||||
if role == "" {
|
||||
role = types.TenantRoleViewer
|
||||
}
|
||||
required := policy.MinRole
|
||||
if required == "" {
|
||||
required = types.TenantRoleViewer
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Data-plane safe reads only need a Viewer floor. Tenant-level (Owner)
|
||||
// routes require the full role even for reads, so they are never lowered.
|
||||
if isSafeHTTPMethod(method) && required != types.TenantRoleOwner {
|
||||
required = types.TenantRoleViewer
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !role.HasPermission(required) {
|
||||
return errTenantAPIKeyScopeForbidden
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func isSafeHTTPMethod(method string) bool {
|
||||
switch method {
|
||||
case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// normalizeRoutePath collapses duplicate slashes and trims a trailing slash so
|
||||
// helper-built paths (BasePath()+rel) match gin's c.FullPath() exactly.
|
||||
func normalizeRoutePath(p string) string {
|
||||
if p == "" {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
for strings.Contains(p, "//") {
|
||||
p = strings.ReplaceAll(p, "//", "/")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(p) > 1 {
|
||||
p = strings.TrimSuffix(p, "/")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return p
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
|
||||
package middleware
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types"
|
||||
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func newTestAuthorizer() *APIKeyRouteAuthorizer {
|
||||
a := NewAPIKeyRouteAuthorizer()
|
||||
// Data-plane routes (Viewer read, Contributor write, Admin destructive)
|
||||
// plus one tenant-level Owner route.
|
||||
a.Register(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id", policyMinRole(types.TenantRoleViewer))
|
||||
a.Register(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge/file", policyMinRole(types.TenantRoleContributor))
|
||||
a.Register(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge", policyMinRole(types.TenantRoleAdmin))
|
||||
a.Register(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/models", policyMinRole(types.TenantRoleOwner))
|
||||
a.Register(http.MethodPut, "/api/v1/tenants/kv/:key", policyMinRole(types.TenantRoleOwner))
|
||||
return a
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func policyMinRole(r types.TenantRole) APIKeyRoutePolicy {
|
||||
return APIKeyRoutePolicy{MinRole: r}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// runGate exercises the gate middleware with a given scope, method and route
|
||||
// full-path, returning whether the request was allowed to proceed.
|
||||
func runGate(t *testing.T, a *APIKeyRouteAuthorizer, scope *types.TenantAPIKeyScope, method, fullPath string) bool {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
engine := gin.New()
|
||||
engine.Use(func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
if scope != nil {
|
||||
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(c.Request.Context(), *scope))
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
})
|
||||
engine.Use(a.Middleware())
|
||||
allowed := false
|
||||
engine.Handle(method, fullPath, func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
allowed = true
|
||||
c.Status(http.StatusOK)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
engine.ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest(method, concretePath(fullPath), nil))
|
||||
return allowed && w.Code == http.StatusOK
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// concretePath substitutes gin :params with literals so httptest can hit it.
|
||||
func concretePath(tmpl string) string {
|
||||
switch tmpl {
|
||||
case "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id":
|
||||
return "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/kb-1"
|
||||
case "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge/file":
|
||||
return "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/kb-1/knowledge/file"
|
||||
case "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge":
|
||||
return "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/kb-1/knowledge"
|
||||
case "/api/v1/tenants/kv/:key":
|
||||
return "/api/v1/tenants/kv/some-key"
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return tmpl
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestGateJWTPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
a := newTestAuthorizer()
|
||||
// No scope => JWT principal => always allowed, even on an Owner route.
|
||||
if !runGate(t, a, nil, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/models") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("JWT principal must pass the gate")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestGateDefaultDeny(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
a := newTestAuthorizer()
|
||||
owner := &types.TenantAPIKeyScope{Role: types.TenantRoleOwner}
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
engine := gin.New()
|
||||
engine.Use(func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(c.Request.Context(), *owner))
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
})
|
||||
engine.Use(a.Middleware())
|
||||
engine.POST("/api/v1/agents", func(c *gin.Context) { c.Status(http.StatusOK) })
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
engine.ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/agents", nil))
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("undeclared route should default-deny even an Owner key: status=%d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestGateDataPlaneRoleLadder(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
a := newTestAuthorizer()
|
||||
viewer := &types.TenantAPIKeyScope{Role: types.TenantRoleViewer}
|
||||
contributor := &types.TenantAPIKeyScope{Role: types.TenantRoleContributor}
|
||||
admin := &types.TenantAPIKeyScope{Role: types.TenantRoleAdmin}
|
||||
|
||||
// Safe read: any data-plane key (Viewer) passes.
|
||||
if !runGate(t, a, viewer, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("viewer key should read a declared KB route")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Contributor write.
|
||||
if runGate(t, a, viewer, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge/file") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("viewer key must not perform a contributor write")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !runGate(t, a, contributor, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge/file") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("contributor key should perform a contributor write")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Admin destructive.
|
||||
if runGate(t, a, contributor, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("contributor key must not perform an admin destructive op")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !runGate(t, a, admin, http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("admin key should perform an admin destructive op")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestGateTenantRoutesRequireOwner(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
a := newTestAuthorizer()
|
||||
admin := &types.TenantAPIKeyScope{Role: types.TenantRoleAdmin}
|
||||
owner := &types.TenantAPIKeyScope{Role: types.TenantRoleOwner}
|
||||
|
||||
// Even a safe GET on a tenant-level route requires Owner (no Viewer floor).
|
||||
if runGate(t, a, admin, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/models") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("admin key must NOT read a tenant-level route")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !runGate(t, a, owner, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/models") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("owner key should read a tenant-level route")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Unsafe tenant write also requires Owner.
|
||||
if runGate(t, a, admin, http.MethodPut, "/api/v1/tenants/kv/:key") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("admin key must NOT write a tenant-level route")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !runGate(t, a, owner, http.MethodPut, "/api/v1/tenants/kv/:key") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("owner key should write a tenant-level route")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestGateKBScopeDoesNotBlockDataPlane(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
a := newTestAuthorizer()
|
||||
// A KB-restricted key is NOT blocked by the gate on data-plane routes;
|
||||
// its KB allow-list is enforced downstream by KBAccess/handler checks.
|
||||
restricted := &types.TenantAPIKeyScope{
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleContributor,
|
||||
KnowledgeBaseIDs: types.StringArray{"kb-1"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !runGate(t, a, restricted, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge/file") {
|
||||
t.Fatal("KB-restricted contributor key should pass the gate on a data-plane write")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNormalizeRoutePath(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cases := map[string]string{
|
||||
"/api/v1//models": "/api/v1/models",
|
||||
"/api/v1/models/": "/api/v1/models",
|
||||
"/": "/",
|
||||
"/api/v1/agents": "/api/v1/agents",
|
||||
}
|
||||
for in, want := range cases {
|
||||
if got := normalizeRoutePath(in); got != want {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("normalizeRoutePath(%q)=%q want %q", in, got, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package middleware
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types"
|
||||
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTenantAPIKeyRouteScopeManifest(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
readCtx := types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(context.Background(), types.TenantAPIKeyScope{
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleViewer,
|
||||
})
|
||||
writeCtx := types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(context.Background(), types.TenantAPIKeyScope{
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleContributor,
|
||||
})
|
||||
adminCtx := types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(context.Background(), types.TenantAPIKeyScope{
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleAdmin,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
baselineCases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
ctx context.Context
|
||||
path string
|
||||
allowed bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{name: "read get kb list", ctx: readCtx, path: "/api/v1/knowledge-bases", allowed: true},
|
||||
{name: "read get wiki page", ctx: readCtx, path: "/api/v1/knowledgebase/kb-1/wiki/pages", allowed: true},
|
||||
{name: "admin reset api key blocked", ctx: adminCtx, path: "/api/v1/tenants/1/api-key", allowed: false},
|
||||
{name: "admin api principal blocked", ctx: adminCtx, path: "/api/v1/tenants/1/api-principal-config", allowed: false},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range baselineCases {
|
||||
t.Run("baseline/"+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
err := rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(tc.ctx, tc.path)
|
||||
got := err == nil
|
||||
if got != tc.allowed {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(%s) allowed=%v, want %v (err=%v)",
|
||||
tc.path, got, tc.allowed, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
guardCases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
ctx context.Context
|
||||
method string
|
||||
guard gin.HandlerFunc
|
||||
allowed bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{name: "read delete kb", ctx: readCtx, method: http.MethodDelete, guard: RequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafe(types.TenantRoleContributor), allowed: false},
|
||||
{name: "write put kb", ctx: writeCtx, method: http.MethodPut, guard: RequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafe(types.TenantRoleContributor), allowed: true},
|
||||
{name: "write create kb", ctx: writeCtx, method: http.MethodPost, guard: RequireAPIKeyDeny(), allowed: false},
|
||||
{name: "write batch delete", ctx: writeCtx, method: http.MethodPost, guard: RequireAPIKeyDeny(), allowed: false},
|
||||
{name: "write faq upsert", ctx: writeCtx, method: http.MethodPost, guard: RequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafe(types.TenantRoleContributor), allowed: true},
|
||||
{name: "write semantic search post", ctx: writeCtx, method: http.MethodPost, guard: RequireAPIKeyMinRole(types.TenantRoleViewer), allowed: true},
|
||||
{name: "read semantic search post", ctx: readCtx, method: http.MethodPost, guard: RequireAPIKeyMinRole(types.TenantRoleViewer), allowed: true},
|
||||
{name: "read knowledge chat post", ctx: readCtx, method: http.MethodPost, guard: RequireAPIKeyMinRole(types.TenantRoleViewer), allowed: true},
|
||||
{name: "admin tenant kv", ctx: adminCtx, method: http.MethodPut, guard: RequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafe(types.TenantRoleAdmin), allowed: true},
|
||||
{name: "contributor tenant kv", ctx: writeCtx, method: http.MethodPut, guard: RequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafe(types.TenantRoleAdmin), allowed: false},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range guardCases {
|
||||
t.Run("guard/"+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
got := runAPIKeyGuard(t, tc.ctx, tc.method, tc.guard)
|
||||
if got != tc.allowed {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("guard allowed=%v, want %v", got, tc.allowed)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func runAPIKeyGuard(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, method string, guard gin.HandlerFunc) bool {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
|
||||
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest(method, "/api/v1/test", nil)
|
||||
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
guard(c)
|
||||
return !c.IsAborted() && w.Code != http.StatusForbidden
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -260,11 +260,9 @@ func authenticateAPIKeyRequest(
|
||||
if c.IsAborted() {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(c.Request.Context(), c.Request.URL.Path); err != nil {
|
||||
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "Forbidden: API key scope does not allow this operation"})
|
||||
c.Abort()
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Per-route API-key authorization (role + KB scope + default-deny) is
|
||||
// enforced by middleware.APIKeyRouteAuthorizer on the /api/v1 group.
|
||||
// Key-management and any other undeclared route is denied there.
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package middleware
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types"
|
||||
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAuthenticateAPIKeyScopeUsesRequestContextAfterAttach verifies the
|
||||
// rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath call in authenticateAPIKeyRequest reads
|
||||
// scope from c.Request.Context() after attachAPIKeyAuthContext.
|
||||
func TestAuthenticateAPIKeyScopeUsesRequestContextAfterAttach(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
|
||||
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
|
||||
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/knowledge-bases/kb-1", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
preAttach := c.Request.Context()
|
||||
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(preAttach, types.TenantAPIKeyScope{
|
||||
KeyID: 1,
|
||||
Role: types.TenantRoleViewer,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
if err := rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(preAttach, c.Request.URL.Path); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("pre-attach ctx should not carry scope and must not block: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(c.Request.Context(), c.Request.URL.Path); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("non-management path should pass auth baseline: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := requireTenantAPIKeyMinRole(c.Request.Context(), types.TenantRoleContributor); err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("viewer key must not satisfy contributor route guard on DELETE")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -68,6 +68,13 @@ func RequireRole(min types.TenantRole, cfg *config.Config) gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
warnOnNilConfig(cfg)
|
||||
return func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
||||
// API-key principals are authorized solely by the APIKeyGate
|
||||
// (role + KB scope + default-deny). The JWT role ladder does not
|
||||
// apply to a machine principal, so short-circuit here.
|
||||
if _, ok := types.TenantAPIKeyScopeFromContext(ctx); ok {
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
role := types.TenantRoleFromContext(ctx)
|
||||
if role.HasPermission(min) {
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
@@ -121,6 +128,15 @@ func RequireSystemAdmin(cfg *config.Config) gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
warnOnNilConfig(cfg)
|
||||
return func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
||||
// API-key principals never gain system-admin authority, but the
|
||||
// APIKeyGate is the single place that decides which routes they may
|
||||
// reach. System routes are simply not declared there, so an API key
|
||||
// is already rejected by default-deny before this guard runs. Short-
|
||||
// circuit to avoid a misleading "system administrator required" 403.
|
||||
if _, ok := types.TenantAPIKeyScopeFromContext(ctx); ok {
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if types.IsSystemAdminFromContext(ctx) {
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
return
|
||||
@@ -169,6 +185,15 @@ func RequireOwnershipOrRole(min types.TenantRole, lookup CreatorLookup, cfg *con
|
||||
warnOnNilConfig(cfg)
|
||||
return func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
ctx := c.Request.Context()
|
||||
// API-key principals are authorized solely by the APIKeyGate.
|
||||
// Ownership ("creator OR Admin+") is a human concept that cannot
|
||||
// apply to a machine principal (its synthetic system-user never
|
||||
// matches creator_id), so short-circuit here. KB-scope for API
|
||||
// keys is still enforced by the KBAccess guards + handler checks.
|
||||
if _, ok := types.TenantAPIKeyScopeFromContext(ctx); ok {
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
role := types.TenantRoleFromContext(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
// 1. Fast path: role meets the bar.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
|
||||
package middleware
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/config"
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types"
|
||||
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// apiKeyRBACHarness seeds an API-key scope (as attachAPIKeyAuthContext would)
|
||||
// plus a deliberately-insufficient TenantRole, then runs the guard. It
|
||||
// asserts the JWT guard short-circuits for API-key principals so that
|
||||
// per-route API-key authorization is left entirely to the APIKeyGate.
|
||||
func apiKeyRBACHarness(scope types.TenantAPIKeyScope, role types.TenantRole, mw gin.HandlerFunc) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
r := gin.New()
|
||||
r.Use(func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(c.Request.Context(), types.TenantRoleContextKey, role)
|
||||
ctx = types.WithTenantAPIKeyScope(ctx, scope)
|
||||
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
})
|
||||
r.GET("/protected", mw, func(c *gin.Context) { c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true}) })
|
||||
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
r.ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil))
|
||||
return w
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequireRole_ShortCircuitsAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Viewer-role API key against an Admin gate would 403 under the JWT
|
||||
// ladder; the short-circuit lets it through (the gate handles it).
|
||||
w := apiKeyRBACHarness(
|
||||
types.TenantAPIKeyScope{Role: types.TenantRoleViewer},
|
||||
types.TenantRoleViewer,
|
||||
RequireRole(types.TenantRoleAdmin, cfgRBAC(true)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("API-key principal should short-circuit RequireRole, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRequireSystemAdmin_ShortCircuitsAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
w := apiKeyRBACHarness(
|
||||
types.TenantAPIKeyScope{Role: types.TenantRoleAdmin},
|
||||
types.TenantRoleAdmin,
|
||||
RequireSystemAdmin(cfgRBAC(true)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("API-key principal should short-circuit RequireSystemAdmin, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRequireOwnershipOrRole_ShortCircuitsAPIKeyContributor is the core
|
||||
// regression for review #1: a Contributor API key writing to a KB it does not
|
||||
// "own" (synthetic system user never matches creator_id) must not be 403'd by
|
||||
// the OwnedKBOrAdmin guard when EnableRBAC=true. The lookup deliberately
|
||||
// returns a foreign creator to prove the guard never runs it.
|
||||
func TestRequireOwnershipOrRole_ShortCircuitsAPIKeyContributor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
lookupCalled := false
|
||||
lookup := func(_ *gin.Context) (string, error) {
|
||||
lookupCalled = true
|
||||
return "some-other-human-user", nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
w := apiKeyRBACHarness(
|
||||
types.TenantAPIKeyScope{Role: types.TenantRoleContributor, KnowledgeBaseIDs: types.StringArray{"kb-1"}},
|
||||
types.TenantRoleContributor,
|
||||
RequireOwnershipOrRole(types.TenantRoleAdmin, lookup, cfgRBAC(true)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Contributor API-key write should short-circuit OwnedKBOrAdmin, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if lookupCalled {
|
||||
t.Fatal("ownership lookup must not run for API-key principals")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sanity: a real JWT Viewer is still rejected by the Admin gate — the
|
||||
// short-circuit must be scoped to API-key principals only.
|
||||
func TestRequireRole_JWTViewerStillDenied(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
r := gin.New()
|
||||
r.Use(func(c *gin.Context) {
|
||||
ctx := context.WithValue(c.Request.Context(), types.TenantRoleContextKey, types.TenantRoleViewer)
|
||||
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx)
|
||||
c.Next()
|
||||
})
|
||||
r.GET("/p", RequireRole(types.TenantRoleAdmin, &config.Config{Tenant: &config.TenantConfig{EnableRBAC: boolPtr(true)}}),
|
||||
func(c *gin.Context) { c.Status(http.StatusOK) })
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
r.ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/p", nil))
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("JWT Viewer must still be denied by Admin gate, got %d", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func boolPtr(b bool) *bool { return &b }
|
||||
+139
-15
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
|
||||
package router
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"path"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/config"
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/handler"
|
||||
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/middleware"
|
||||
@@ -122,10 +126,10 @@ type rbacGuards struct {
|
||||
// Contributor who owns the KB can edit/delete its sub-resources
|
||||
// (documents, chunks, wiki pages); a Contributor who merely belongs
|
||||
// to the tenant gets 403 unless they're also Admin+.
|
||||
knowledgeKBCreator middleware.CreatorLookup
|
||||
chunkKBCreator middleware.CreatorLookup
|
||||
chunkKBCreatorFromID middleware.CreatorLookup // chunk routes that address chunks by :id (no knowledge id in URL)
|
||||
wikiKBCreator middleware.CreatorLookup
|
||||
knowledgeKBCreator middleware.CreatorLookup
|
||||
chunkKBCreator middleware.CreatorLookup
|
||||
chunkKBCreatorFromID middleware.CreatorLookup // chunk routes that address chunks by :id (no knowledge id in URL)
|
||||
wikiKBCreator middleware.CreatorLookup
|
||||
|
||||
// Services for the KB-access guard (own / org-shared / via shared
|
||||
// agent). Captured here so route lines can reference g.KBAccess()
|
||||
@@ -136,6 +140,12 @@ type rbacGuards struct {
|
||||
chunkService middleware.ChunkLookup
|
||||
kbShareService interfaces.KBShareService
|
||||
agentShareService interfaces.AgentShareService
|
||||
|
||||
// apiKeyAuthorizer is the single source of truth for which routes an
|
||||
// X-API-Key principal may call. Routes opt in via the apiKeyGroup
|
||||
// helpers below; anything not declared is denied by the gate. See
|
||||
// middleware.APIKeyRouteAuthorizer.
|
||||
apiKeyAuthorizer *middleware.APIKeyRouteAuthorizer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newRBACGuards wires the guards from the live configuration and the
|
||||
@@ -153,7 +163,7 @@ func newRBACGuards(
|
||||
kbShareService interfaces.KBShareService,
|
||||
agentShareService interfaces.AgentShareService,
|
||||
) *rbacGuards {
|
||||
g := &rbacGuards{cfg: cfg}
|
||||
g := &rbacGuards{cfg: cfg, apiKeyAuthorizer: middleware.NewAPIKeyRouteAuthorizer()}
|
||||
if kbHandler != nil {
|
||||
g.kbCreator = kbHandler.KBCreatorLookup
|
||||
g.kbCreatorFromKbIDParam = kbHandler.KBCreatorLookupFromKbIDParam
|
||||
@@ -198,23 +208,137 @@ func (g *rbacGuards) Owner() gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return middleware.RequireRole(types.TenantRoleOwner, g.cfg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// API-key guards — orthogonal to JWT role guards. They only constrain
|
||||
// X-API-Key principals; bearer sessions pass through unchanged.
|
||||
// API-key authorization — a SEPARATE authority from the JWT role/ownership
|
||||
// guards above. Instead of stacking a per-route guard that also had to know
|
||||
// the caller's ownership, every API-key-accessible route declares one
|
||||
// APIKeyRoutePolicy via the apiKeyGroup helpers; the gate on /api/v1 enforces
|
||||
// it and denies any undeclared route by default. JWT sessions ignore all of
|
||||
// this (they short-circuit the gate).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Policy constructors. A single dimension — the minimum role — decides
|
||||
// access; the key's knowledge_base_ids allow-list is a pure data filter
|
||||
// applied downstream (KBAccess guards + handler scope checks), never here.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - apiKeyViewer : data-plane reads/searches (Viewer floor).
|
||||
// - apiKeyContributor : data-plane content writes (Contributor+).
|
||||
// - apiKeyAdmin : destructive data-plane ops, e.g. clearing a KB (Admin+).
|
||||
// - apiKeyOwner : tenant-level infrastructure (models, vector stores,
|
||||
// MCP, data sources, channels, tenant KV, ...). Requires the Owner role
|
||||
// for EVERY method, mirroring the original full-access tenant key. A key
|
||||
// below Owner can only ever touch knowledge-base data.
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *rbacGuards) APIKeyDeny() gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return middleware.RequireAPIKeyDeny()
|
||||
func apiKeyViewer() middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy {
|
||||
return middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy{MinRole: types.TenantRoleViewer}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *rbacGuards) APIKeyViewer() gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return middleware.RequireAPIKeyMinRole(types.TenantRoleViewer)
|
||||
func apiKeyContributor() middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy {
|
||||
return middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy{MinRole: types.TenantRoleContributor}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *rbacGuards) APIKeyContributor() gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return middleware.RequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafe(types.TenantRoleContributor)
|
||||
func apiKeyAdmin() middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy {
|
||||
return middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy{MinRole: types.TenantRoleAdmin}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *rbacGuards) APIKeyAdmin() gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return middleware.RequireAPIKeyMinRoleForUnsafe(types.TenantRoleAdmin)
|
||||
func apiKeyOwner() middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy {
|
||||
return middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy{MinRole: types.TenantRoleOwner}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// apiKeyRouteGroup wraps a *gin.RouterGroup so route registration also records
|
||||
// the route's API-key policy into the authorizer. Use g.apiKeyGroup(grp,
|
||||
// policy) then register the API-key-accessible routes through it; register
|
||||
// API-key-denied routes on the raw *gin.RouterGroup so they stay undeclared
|
||||
// (default-deny). Per-route overrides use With().
|
||||
type apiKeyRouteGroup struct {
|
||||
g *rbacGuards
|
||||
grp *gin.RouterGroup
|
||||
policy middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ensureAPIKeyAuthorizer lazily allocates the authorizer so route
|
||||
// registration is safe even when rbacGuards is built directly in tests
|
||||
// (bypassing newRBACGuards). In production it is always pre-allocated.
|
||||
func (g *rbacGuards) ensureAPIKeyAuthorizer() *middleware.APIKeyRouteAuthorizer {
|
||||
if g.apiKeyAuthorizer == nil {
|
||||
g.apiKeyAuthorizer = middleware.NewAPIKeyRouteAuthorizer()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return g.apiKeyAuthorizer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// apiKeyGroup returns a wrapper that declares `policy` for every route
|
||||
// registered through it (unless overridden via With).
|
||||
func (g *rbacGuards) apiKeyGroup(grp *gin.RouterGroup, policy middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy) *apiKeyRouteGroup {
|
||||
g.ensureAPIKeyAuthorizer()
|
||||
return &apiKeyRouteGroup{g: g, grp: grp, policy: policy}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// With returns a sibling wrapper on the same gin group but with a different
|
||||
// policy, for the odd route that differs from its group default (e.g. a read
|
||||
// search inside an otherwise contributor-gated group).
|
||||
func (a *apiKeyRouteGroup) With(policy middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy) *apiKeyRouteGroup {
|
||||
return &apiKeyRouteGroup{g: a.g, grp: a.grp, policy: policy}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *apiKeyRouteGroup) handle(method, rel string, handlers ...gin.HandlerFunc) gin.IRoutes {
|
||||
full := path.Join(a.grp.BasePath(), rel)
|
||||
a.g.ensureAPIKeyAuthorizer().Register(method, full, a.policy)
|
||||
return a.grp.Handle(method, rel, handlers...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *apiKeyRouteGroup) GET(rel string, h ...gin.HandlerFunc) gin.IRoutes {
|
||||
return a.handle(http.MethodGet, rel, h...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *apiKeyRouteGroup) POST(rel string, h ...gin.HandlerFunc) gin.IRoutes {
|
||||
return a.handle(http.MethodPost, rel, h...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *apiKeyRouteGroup) PUT(rel string, h ...gin.HandlerFunc) gin.IRoutes {
|
||||
return a.handle(http.MethodPut, rel, h...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *apiKeyRouteGroup) DELETE(rel string, h ...gin.HandlerFunc) gin.IRoutes {
|
||||
return a.handle(http.MethodDelete, rel, h...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// apiKeyRoute declares a single API-key-accessible route directly on a gin
|
||||
// group (for routes registered outside an apiKeyGroup, e.g. top-level r.POST).
|
||||
func (g *rbacGuards) apiKeyRoute(
|
||||
grp *gin.RouterGroup, method, rel string, policy middleware.APIKeyRoutePolicy, handlers ...gin.HandlerFunc,
|
||||
) gin.IRoutes {
|
||||
full := path.Join(grp.BasePath(), rel)
|
||||
g.ensureAPIKeyAuthorizer().Register(method, full, policy)
|
||||
return grp.Handle(method, rel, handlers...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// assertAPIKeyPoliciesMatchRoutes verifies every declared API-key policy
|
||||
// resolves to a real registered route. gin's c.FullPath() must match the
|
||||
// authorizer key verbatim or the gate silently 403s the route for API keys;
|
||||
// panicking here turns that latent misconfiguration into a startup failure.
|
||||
func (g *rbacGuards) assertAPIKeyPoliciesMatchRoutes(engine *gin.Engine) {
|
||||
registered := map[string]struct{}{}
|
||||
for _, ri := range engine.Routes() {
|
||||
// Authorizer keys are stored normalized (trailing slash trimmed), so
|
||||
// normalize gin's reported path the same way. Otherwise a route
|
||||
// registered with a "/" rel (gin path ".../evaluation/") would look
|
||||
// missing against the normalized key (".../evaluation") even though
|
||||
// the gate — which also normalizes c.FullPath() — matches it fine.
|
||||
p := ri.Path
|
||||
if len(p) > 1 {
|
||||
p = strings.TrimRight(p, "/")
|
||||
}
|
||||
registered[ri.Method+" "+p] = struct{}{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
var missing []string
|
||||
for method, paths := range g.apiKeyAuthorizer.RegisteredRoutes() {
|
||||
for _, p := range paths {
|
||||
if _, ok := registered[method+" "+p]; !ok {
|
||||
missing = append(missing, method+" "+p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(missing) > 0 {
|
||||
panic("api-key policy declared for non-existent route(s): " + strings.Join(missing, ", "))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *rbacGuards) SystemAdmin() gin.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
||||
package router
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAssertAPIKeyPoliciesMatchRoutes_TrailingSlash guards the class of bug
|
||||
// where a route registered with a "/" rel (gin path ".../x/") was flagged as
|
||||
// missing against the normalized policy key (".../x"), panicking at startup.
|
||||
func TestAssertAPIKeyPoliciesMatchRoutes_TrailingSlash(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
engine := gin.New()
|
||||
v1 := engine.Group("/api/v1")
|
||||
|
||||
g := &rbacGuards{}
|
||||
noop := func(c *gin.Context) {}
|
||||
|
||||
// Register through the apiKey helpers using both "" and "/" rel plus a
|
||||
// nested path, mirroring real route declarations.
|
||||
empty := g.apiKeyGroup(v1.Group("/knowledge-bases"), apiKeyViewer())
|
||||
empty.GET("", noop)
|
||||
|
||||
slash := g.apiKeyGroup(v1.Group("/evaluation"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
slash.POST("/", noop)
|
||||
slash.GET("/", noop)
|
||||
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(v1, http.MethodGet, "/tenants", apiKeyOwner(), noop)
|
||||
|
||||
// Must not panic: every declared policy resolves to a real route despite
|
||||
// the trailing-slash difference on /evaluation.
|
||||
g.assertAPIKeyPoliciesMatchRoutes(engine)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAssertAPIKeyPoliciesMatchRoutes_Missing verifies the self-check still
|
||||
// panics when a policy points at a genuinely non-existent route.
|
||||
func TestAssertAPIKeyPoliciesMatchRoutes_Missing(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
|
||||
engine := gin.New()
|
||||
|
||||
g := &rbacGuards{}
|
||||
// Declare a policy for a path that is never registered on the engine.
|
||||
g.ensureAPIKeyAuthorizer().Register(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/does-not-exist", apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
|
||||
defer func() {
|
||||
if recover() == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("expected panic for policy on non-existent route")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
g.assertAPIKeyPoliciesMatchRoutes(engine)
|
||||
}
|
||||
+137
-93
@@ -202,6 +202,13 @@ func NewRouter(params RouterParams) *gin.Engine {
|
||||
params.AgentShareService,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// API-key gate: single authority for X-API-Key principals. Runs
|
||||
// first on every /api/v1 route (JWT sessions pass straight
|
||||
// through) and denies any route not explicitly declared via the
|
||||
// apiKeyGroup helpers. Must be attached BEFORE the Register* calls
|
||||
// so that sub-groups inherit it.
|
||||
v1.Use(rbacGuards.apiKeyAuthorizer.Middleware())
|
||||
|
||||
RegisterAuthRoutes(v1, params.AuthHandler)
|
||||
RegisterTenantRoutes(v1, params.TenantHandler, params.TenantMemberHandler, params.TenantInvitationHandler, params.AuditLogHandler, rbacGuards)
|
||||
RegisterMyInvitationRoutes(v1, params.TenantInvitationHandler)
|
||||
@@ -232,6 +239,12 @@ func NewRouter(params RouterParams) *gin.Engine {
|
||||
RegisterWeKnoraCloudRoutes(v1, params.WeKnoraCloudHandler, rbacGuards)
|
||||
RegisterWikiPageRoutes(v1, params.WikiPageHandler, rbacGuards)
|
||||
RegisterChunkerDebugRoutes(v1, rbacGuards)
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail fast if any declared API-key policy points at a route
|
||||
// template that does not actually exist (typo / path drift). A
|
||||
// stale template would silently 403 every API key on that route,
|
||||
// so we panic at startup instead of shipping a dead policy.
|
||||
rbacGuards.assertAPIKeyPoliciesMatchRoutes(r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return r
|
||||
@@ -245,7 +258,7 @@ func NewRouter(params RouterParams) *gin.Engine {
|
||||
// has not yet expired are kept out by the role check, matching the
|
||||
// rest of the RBAC matrix in this file.
|
||||
func RegisterChunkerDebugRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
r.POST("/chunker/preview", g.Viewer(), g.APIKeyViewer(), handler.PreviewChunking)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/chunker/preview", apiKeyViewer(), g.Viewer(), handler.PreviewChunking)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RegisterChunkRoutes 注册分块相关的路由
|
||||
@@ -255,8 +268,8 @@ func RegisterChunkerDebugRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
// shared with RegisterKnowledgeRoutes via OwnedChunkKBOrAdmin so the
|
||||
// same "creator-of-the-KB OR Admin+" rule applies to chunk edits.
|
||||
func RegisterChunkRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.ChunkHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
// 分块路由组
|
||||
chunks := r.Group("/chunks", g.APIKeyContributor())
|
||||
// 分块路由组。API key 策略:内容级写入 Contributor+ 且限定 KB 范围。
|
||||
chunks := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/chunks"), apiKeyContributor())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// 获取分块列表 — Viewer+ 且对父 KB 有 read 权限(own / shared / via shared agent)
|
||||
chunks.GET("/:knowledge_id", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessReadFromKnowledgeIDParam("knowledge_id"), handler.ListKnowledgeChunks)
|
||||
@@ -288,8 +301,8 @@ func RegisterChunkRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.ChunkHandler, g *r
|
||||
// Cross-:id batch operations stay Contributor-gated — they don't have
|
||||
// a single owning KB to check against.
|
||||
func RegisterKnowledgeRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.KnowledgeHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
// 知识库下的知识路由组(URL :id is the KB id)
|
||||
kb := r.Group("/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge", g.APIKeyContributor())
|
||||
// 知识库下的知识路由组(URL :id is the KB id)。API key 默认 Contributor+ 且限 KB 范围。
|
||||
kb := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/knowledge-bases/:id/knowledge"), apiKeyContributor())
|
||||
{
|
||||
kb.POST("/file", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), handler.CreateKnowledgeFromFile)
|
||||
kb.POST("/url", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), handler.CreateKnowledgeFromURL)
|
||||
@@ -297,11 +310,12 @@ func RegisterKnowledgeRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.KnowledgeHandl
|
||||
kb.GET("", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("id"), handler.ListKnowledge)
|
||||
// Clearing all contents under a KB is a destructive op; gate
|
||||
// behind Admin instead of Contributor.
|
||||
kb.DELETE("", g.Admin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.ClearKnowledgeBaseContents)
|
||||
kb.With(apiKeyAdmin()).DELETE("", g.Admin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), handler.ClearKnowledgeBaseContents)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 知识路由组(URL :id is a knowledge id; the guard walks it to the parent KB)
|
||||
k := r.Group("/knowledge", g.APIKeyContributor())
|
||||
kgrp := r.Group("/knowledge")
|
||||
k := g.apiKeyGroup(kgrp, apiKeyContributor())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Cross-knowledge endpoints (no :id) can't be gated on a single
|
||||
// KB — they accept arbitrary knowledge IDs and the handler must
|
||||
@@ -319,16 +333,15 @@ func RegisterKnowledgeRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.KnowledgeHandl
|
||||
k.GET("/:id/download", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessReadFromKnowledgeIDParam("id"), handler.DownloadKnowledgeFile)
|
||||
k.GET("/:id/preview", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessReadFromKnowledgeIDParam("id"), handler.PreviewKnowledgeFile)
|
||||
k.PUT("/image/:id/:chunk_id", g.OwnedKnowledgeKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWriteFromKnowledgeIDParam("id"), handler.UpdateImageInfo)
|
||||
// Batch / cross-KB ops stay Contributor-gated: there is no
|
||||
// single owning KB to walk back to. A future PR could add a
|
||||
// "must own every targeted KB" guard if the requirement
|
||||
// surfaces.
|
||||
k.PUT("/tags", g.Contributor(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.UpdateKnowledgeTagBatch)
|
||||
k.POST("/batch-reparse", g.Contributor(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.BatchReparseKnowledge)
|
||||
k.GET("/search", g.Viewer(), handler.SearchKnowledge)
|
||||
k.POST("/batch-delete", g.Contributor(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.BatchDeleteKnowledge)
|
||||
k.POST("/move", g.Contributor(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.MoveKnowledge)
|
||||
k.GET("/move/progress/:task_id", g.Viewer(), handler.GetKnowledgeMoveProgress)
|
||||
// Batch / cross-KB write ops stay Contributor-gated for JWT and are
|
||||
// NOT declared for API keys (default-deny): they fan out to arbitrary
|
||||
// KBs with no single owning KB to bound a key's scope against.
|
||||
kgrp.PUT("/tags", g.Contributor(), handler.UpdateKnowledgeTagBatch)
|
||||
kgrp.POST("/batch-reparse", g.Contributor(), handler.BatchReparseKnowledge)
|
||||
kgrp.POST("/batch-delete", g.Contributor(), handler.BatchDeleteKnowledge)
|
||||
kgrp.POST("/move", g.Contributor(), handler.MoveKnowledge)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -345,7 +358,7 @@ func RegisterFAQRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.FAQHandler, g *rbacG
|
||||
// 等价于修改 KB 内容,必须遵循 KB 的"creator OR Admin+"矩阵 ——
|
||||
// 跟 chunks / wiki pages 保持一致。Viewer+ 可以读,Contributor 不能
|
||||
// 改不属于自己的 KB 的 FAQ。
|
||||
faq := r.Group("/knowledge-bases/:id/faq", g.APIKeyContributor())
|
||||
faq := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/knowledge-bases/:id/faq"), apiKeyContributor())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// KBAccessRead/Write resolve own/shared/agent-visible access and
|
||||
// rewrite the request's tenant context — handler no longer
|
||||
@@ -361,7 +374,9 @@ func RegisterFAQRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.FAQHandler, g *rbacG
|
||||
faq.PUT("/entries/fields", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), handler.UpdateEntryFieldsBatch)
|
||||
faq.PUT("/entries/tags", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), handler.UpdateEntryTagBatch)
|
||||
faq.DELETE("/entries", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), handler.DeleteEntries)
|
||||
faq.POST("/search", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("id"), g.APIKeyViewer(), handler.SearchFAQ)
|
||||
// Search is a read: Viewer keys may call it even though the group
|
||||
// default is Contributor (POST is otherwise an unsafe method).
|
||||
faq.With(apiKeyViewer()).POST("/search", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("id"), handler.SearchFAQ)
|
||||
// FAQ import result display status
|
||||
faq.PUT("/import/last-result/display", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), handler.UpdateLastImportResultDisplayStatus)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -374,19 +389,21 @@ func RegisterFAQRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.FAQHandler, g *rbacG
|
||||
|
||||
// RegisterKnowledgeBaseRoutes 注册知识库相关的路由
|
||||
func RegisterKnowledgeBaseRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.KnowledgeBaseHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
// 知识库路由组
|
||||
kb := r.Group("/knowledge-bases")
|
||||
// 知识库路由组。API key 默认可读(Viewer,限 KB 范围);写入 Contributor+;
|
||||
// 创建/拷贝 KB 不对 API key 开放(注册在原始 group 上,默认拒绝)。
|
||||
kbgrp := r.Group("/knowledge-bases")
|
||||
kb := g.apiKeyGroup(kbgrp, apiKeyViewer())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// 创建知识库 — Contributor+ (no :id, role-only floor); API keys may not create KBs.
|
||||
kb.POST("", g.Contributor(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.CreateKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
kbgrp.POST("", g.Contributor(), handler.CreateKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
// 获取知识库列表 — Viewer+ (no :id, role-only floor)
|
||||
kb.GET("", g.Viewer(), handler.ListKnowledgeBases)
|
||||
// 获取知识库详情 — Viewer+ 且对 KB 有 read 权限
|
||||
kb.GET("/:id", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("id"), handler.GetKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
// 更新知识库 — 创建者本人 OR Admin+ 且对 KB 有 write 权限
|
||||
kb.PUT("/:id", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), g.APIKeyContributor(), handler.UpdateKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
kb.With(apiKeyContributor()).PUT("/:id", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), handler.UpdateKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
// 删除知识库 — 创建者本人 OR Admin+ 且对 KB 有 write 权限
|
||||
kb.DELETE("/:id", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), g.APIKeyContributor(), handler.DeleteKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
kb.With(apiKeyContributor()).DELETE("/:id", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), g.KBAccessWrite("id"), handler.DeleteKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
// 置顶/取消置顶知识库 — 创建者本人 OR Admin+ 且对 KB 有 write 权限
|
||||
// Pin state is now per-(user, kb) (migration 000050). Anyone with
|
||||
// at least Viewer-level read access to the KB — including users
|
||||
@@ -394,13 +411,13 @@ func RegisterKnowledgeBaseRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.KnowledgeB
|
||||
// no edit permission is required. The OwnedKBOrAdmin guard was
|
||||
// removed accordingly. The route still requires KB read access
|
||||
// so callers can't poke at KBs they can't see.
|
||||
kb.PUT("/:id/pin", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("id"), g.APIKeyContributor(), handler.TogglePinKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
kb.With(apiKeyContributor()).PUT("/:id/pin", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("id"), handler.TogglePinKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
// 混合搜索 — Viewer+ 且对 KB 有 read 权限 (read-only)
|
||||
// POST is preferred; GET with JSON body is kept for backward compatibility (#1727).
|
||||
kb.POST("/:id/hybrid-search", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("id"), g.APIKeyViewer(), handler.HybridSearch)
|
||||
kb.POST("/:id/hybrid-search", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("id"), handler.HybridSearch)
|
||||
kb.GET("/:id/hybrid-search", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("id"), handler.HybridSearch)
|
||||
// 拷贝知识库 — Contributor+ (副本归调用者所有;不需要原 KB 的所有权)
|
||||
kb.POST("/copy", g.Contributor(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.CopyKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
kbgrp.POST("/copy", g.Contributor(), handler.CopyKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
// 获取知识库复制进度 — Viewer+
|
||||
kb.GET("/copy/progress/:task_id", g.Viewer(), handler.GetKBCloneProgress)
|
||||
// 获取可移动目标知识库列表 — Viewer+ 且对 KB 有 read 权限
|
||||
@@ -420,7 +437,7 @@ func RegisterKnowledgeTagRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, tagHandler *handler.TagHandl
|
||||
// Tags 是 KB 的子资源 — 创建/编辑/删除标签会改变 KB 内容的检索分类
|
||||
// 行为,应该与 KB 主体的"creator OR Admin+"矩阵一致,避免一个无
|
||||
// 关 Contributor 在他人 KB 里乱建/删标签影响 KB owner 的内容组织。
|
||||
kbTags := r.Group("/knowledge-bases/:id/tags", g.APIKeyContributor())
|
||||
kbTags := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/knowledge-bases/:id/tags"), apiKeyContributor())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// KBAccessRead/Write resolve own/shared/agent-visible access and
|
||||
// rewrite the request's tenant context to the effective tenant
|
||||
@@ -440,12 +457,15 @@ func RegisterKnowledgeTagRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, tagHandler *handler.TagHandl
|
||||
// (e.g. revoked accounts retained in the tenant for audit) cannot
|
||||
// reach the endpoints at all once RBAC is on.
|
||||
func RegisterMessageRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.MessageHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
messages := r.Group("/messages")
|
||||
// Message history is tenant-wide and not attributable to a KB, so it is
|
||||
// a tenant-level (Owner) surface for API keys — only a full-access key
|
||||
// may read or delete it.
|
||||
messages := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/messages"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
messages.POST("/search", g.Viewer(), g.APIKeyViewer(), handler.SearchMessages)
|
||||
messages.POST("/search", g.Viewer(), handler.SearchMessages)
|
||||
messages.GET("/chat-history-stats", g.Viewer(), handler.GetChatHistoryKBStats)
|
||||
messages.GET("/:session_id/load", g.Viewer(), handler.LoadMessages)
|
||||
messages.DELETE("/:session_id/:id", g.Viewer(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.DeleteMessage)
|
||||
messages.DELETE("/:session_id/:id", g.Viewer(), handler.DeleteMessage)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -457,7 +477,7 @@ func RegisterMessageRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.MessageHandler,
|
||||
// per-session ownership in the middleware layer the same way KB/agent
|
||||
// routes do today.
|
||||
func RegisterSessionRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *session.Handler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
sessions := r.Group("/sessions", g.Viewer(), g.APIKeyContributor())
|
||||
sessions := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/sessions", g.Viewer()), apiKeyContributor())
|
||||
{
|
||||
sessions.POST("", handler.CreateSession)
|
||||
sessions.DELETE("/batch", handler.BatchDeleteSessions)
|
||||
@@ -483,19 +503,19 @@ func RegisterSessionRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *session.Handler, g *rbac
|
||||
// surfaces; Viewer+ is sufficient because per-session/per-agent
|
||||
// authorisation is enforced inside the handlers.
|
||||
func RegisterChatRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *session.Handler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
knowledgeChat := r.Group("/knowledge-chat", g.Viewer(), g.APIKeyViewer())
|
||||
knowledgeChat := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/knowledge-chat", g.Viewer()), apiKeyViewer())
|
||||
{
|
||||
knowledgeChat.POST("/:session_id", handler.KnowledgeQA)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Agent-based chat
|
||||
agentChat := r.Group("/agent-chat", g.Viewer(), g.APIKeyViewer())
|
||||
agentChat := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/agent-chat", g.Viewer()), apiKeyViewer())
|
||||
{
|
||||
agentChat.POST("/:session_id", handler.AgentQA)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 新增知识检索接口,不需要session_id
|
||||
knowledgeSearch := r.Group("/knowledge-search", g.Viewer(), g.APIKeyViewer())
|
||||
knowledgeSearch := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/knowledge-search", g.Viewer()), apiKeyViewer())
|
||||
{
|
||||
knowledgeSearch.POST("", handler.SearchKnowledge)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -555,29 +575,34 @@ func RegisterTenantRoutes(
|
||||
// 安全说明:这里不挂 g.CrossTenant(),因为 self-service 创建
|
||||
// 不需要跨租户特权;handler 也不读写 X-Tenant-ID 指向的现有
|
||||
// 租户,所以越过 PathTenantMatch 守卫不会扩大攻击面。
|
||||
tenantRoutes.POST("", g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.CreateTenant)
|
||||
tenantRoutes.GET("", handler.ListTenants)
|
||||
// 创建租户不对 API key 开放(注册在原始 group,默认拒绝)。
|
||||
tenantRoutes.POST("", handler.CreateTenant)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(tenantRoutes, http.MethodGet, "", apiKeyOwner(), handler.ListTenants)
|
||||
|
||||
// Generic KV configuration management (tenant-level). Tenant ID
|
||||
// is obtained from authentication context; the URL :key is a
|
||||
// config key, not a tenant ID, so these stay outside the
|
||||
// PathTenantMatch group.
|
||||
tenantRoutes.GET("/kv/:key", g.Viewer(), handler.GetTenantKV)
|
||||
tenantRoutes.PUT("/kv/:key", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.UpdateTenantKV)
|
||||
// PathTenantMatch group. Tenant-level surface: only a full-access
|
||||
// (Owner) API key may read or write it.
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(tenantRoutes, http.MethodGet, "/kv/:key", apiKeyOwner(), g.Viewer(), handler.GetTenantKV)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(tenantRoutes, http.MethodPut, "/kv/:key", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.UpdateTenantKV)
|
||||
|
||||
// Per-tenant endpoints share PathTenantMatch at the group level.
|
||||
// None of the /tenants/:id/* endpoints are declared for API keys,
|
||||
// so scoped keys are denied by default — tenant lifecycle, member
|
||||
// management and key/principal management are JWT-only.
|
||||
tenantByID := tenantRoutes.Group("/:id", g.PathTenantMatch())
|
||||
{
|
||||
tenantByID.GET("", g.Viewer(), handler.GetTenant)
|
||||
tenantByID.PUT("", g.Owner(), handler.UpdateTenant)
|
||||
tenantByID.DELETE("", g.Owner(), handler.DeleteTenant)
|
||||
tenantByID.POST("/api-key", g.Owner(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.ResetAPIKey)
|
||||
tenantByID.GET("/api-keys", g.Owner(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.ListAPIKeys)
|
||||
tenantByID.POST("/api-keys", g.Owner(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.CreateAPIKey)
|
||||
tenantByID.DELETE("/api-keys/:key_id", g.Owner(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.DeleteAPIKey)
|
||||
tenantByID.GET("/api-principal-config", g.Owner(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.GetAPIPrincipalConfig)
|
||||
tenantByID.PUT("/api-principal-config", g.Owner(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.UpdateAPIPrincipalConfig)
|
||||
tenantByID.POST("/api-principal-test-token", g.Owner(), g.APIKeyDeny(), handler.CreateAPIPrincipalTestToken)
|
||||
tenantByID.POST("/api-key", g.Owner(), handler.ResetAPIKey)
|
||||
tenantByID.GET("/api-keys", g.Owner(), handler.ListAPIKeys)
|
||||
tenantByID.POST("/api-keys", g.Owner(), handler.CreateAPIKey)
|
||||
tenantByID.DELETE("/api-keys/:key_id", g.Owner(), handler.DeleteAPIKey)
|
||||
tenantByID.GET("/api-principal-config", g.Owner(), handler.GetAPIPrincipalConfig)
|
||||
tenantByID.PUT("/api-principal-config", g.Owner(), handler.UpdateAPIPrincipalConfig)
|
||||
tenantByID.POST("/api-principal-test-token", g.Owner(), handler.CreateAPIPrincipalTestToken)
|
||||
|
||||
// Tenant member management (PR 3 of #1303). Listing is
|
||||
// Viewer+ so any active member can see the roster; mutation
|
||||
@@ -634,8 +659,8 @@ func RegisterModelRoutes(
|
||||
credHandler *handler.ModelCredentialsHandler,
|
||||
g *rbacGuards,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
// 模型路由组
|
||||
models := r.Group("/models", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
// 模型路由组。租户级基础设施:仅完全访问(Owner)API key 可访问。
|
||||
models := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/models"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// 获取模型厂商列表 — Viewer+
|
||||
models.GET("/providers", g.Viewer(), handler.ListModelProviders)
|
||||
@@ -662,10 +687,10 @@ func RegisterModelRoutes(
|
||||
// tenant; gate to Admin+ until product asks for a finer-grained
|
||||
// matrix.
|
||||
func RegisterEvaluationRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.EvaluationHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
evaluationRoutes := r.Group("/evaluation")
|
||||
evaluationRoutes := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/evaluation"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
evaluationRoutes.POST("/", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.Evaluation)
|
||||
evaluationRoutes.GET("/", g.Viewer(), handler.GetEvaluationResult)
|
||||
evaluationRoutes.POST("", g.Admin(), handler.Evaluation)
|
||||
evaluationRoutes.GET("", g.Viewer(), handler.GetEvaluationResult)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -723,33 +748,36 @@ func RegisterAuthRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.AuthHandler) {
|
||||
|
||||
func RegisterInitializationRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.InitializationHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
// 初始化接口
|
||||
// GetCurrentConfigByKB 是只读,Viewer+ 即可。
|
||||
r.GET("/initialization/config/:kbId", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("kbId"), handler.GetCurrentConfigByKB)
|
||||
// GetCurrentConfigByKB 是只读,Viewer+ 即可(KB 受限 key 可读其范围内的 KB)。
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodGet, "/initialization/config/:kbId",
|
||||
apiKeyViewer(), g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("kbId"), handler.GetCurrentConfigByKB)
|
||||
// InitializeByKB / UpdateKBConfig 都是改 KB 的核心模型/storage 配置 —
|
||||
// 跟 PUT /knowledge-bases/:id 同等敏感,挂同款 OwnedKB 矩阵。
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/initialize/:kbId", g.OwnedKBOrAdminFromKbIDParam(), g.APIKeyContributor(), handler.InitializeByKB)
|
||||
r.PUT("/initialization/config/:kbId", g.OwnedKBOrAdminFromKbIDParam(), g.APIKeyContributor(), handler.UpdateKBConfig)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/initialize/:kbId",
|
||||
apiKeyContributor(), g.OwnedKBOrAdminFromKbIDParam(), handler.InitializeByKB)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPut, "/initialization/config/:kbId",
|
||||
apiKeyContributor(), g.OwnedKBOrAdminFromKbIDParam(), handler.UpdateKBConfig)
|
||||
|
||||
// Ollama / 远程 API / 抽取等系统级检测/下载操作。这些不绑某个 KB,
|
||||
// 但会改租户级模型配置或拉远端模型 — 一律 Admin+。Viewer+ 的检测
|
||||
// 入口已经在 settings 页面隐藏,但服务端仍要兜底。
|
||||
r.GET("/initialization/ollama/status", g.Viewer(), handler.CheckOllamaStatus)
|
||||
r.GET("/initialization/ollama/models", g.Viewer(), handler.ListOllamaModels)
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/ollama/models/check", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.CheckOllamaModels)
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/ollama/models/download", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.DownloadOllamaModel)
|
||||
r.GET("/initialization/ollama/download/progress/:taskId", g.Viewer(), handler.GetDownloadProgress)
|
||||
r.GET("/initialization/ollama/download/tasks", g.Viewer(), handler.ListDownloadTasks)
|
||||
// 会改租户级模型配置或拉远端模型;JWT 侧只读探测 Viewer+、变更 Admin+。
|
||||
// 对 API key 均为租户级:仅完全访问(Owner)key 可用。
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodGet, "/initialization/ollama/status", apiKeyOwner(), g.Viewer(), handler.CheckOllamaStatus)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodGet, "/initialization/ollama/models", apiKeyOwner(), g.Viewer(), handler.ListOllamaModels)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/ollama/models/check", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.CheckOllamaModels)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/ollama/models/download", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.DownloadOllamaModel)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodGet, "/initialization/ollama/download/progress/:taskId", apiKeyOwner(), g.Viewer(), handler.GetDownloadProgress)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodGet, "/initialization/ollama/download/tasks", apiKeyOwner(), g.Viewer(), handler.ListDownloadTasks)
|
||||
|
||||
// 远程API相关接口
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/remote/check", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.CheckRemoteModel)
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/embedding/test", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.TestEmbeddingModel)
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/rerank/check", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.CheckRerankModel)
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/asr/check", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.CheckASRModel)
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/multimodal/test", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.TestMultimodalFunction)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/remote/check", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.CheckRemoteModel)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/embedding/test", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.TestEmbeddingModel)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/rerank/check", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.CheckRerankModel)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/asr/check", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.CheckASRModel)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/multimodal/test", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.TestMultimodalFunction)
|
||||
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/extract/text-relation", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.ExtractTextRelations)
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/extract/fabri-tag", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.FabriTag)
|
||||
r.POST("/initialization/extract/fabri-text", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.FabriText)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/extract/text-relation", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.ExtractTextRelations)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/extract/fabri-tag", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.FabriTag)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/initialization/extract/fabri-text", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.FabriText)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RegisterSystemRoutes registers system information routes
|
||||
@@ -760,7 +788,7 @@ func RegisterInitializationRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.Initializ
|
||||
// remote services with tenant credentials and could trigger network
|
||||
// fanout, so they're Admin+.
|
||||
func RegisterSystemRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.SystemHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
systemRoutes := r.Group("/system", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
systemRoutes := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/system"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
systemRoutes.GET("/info", g.Viewer(), handler.GetSystemInfo)
|
||||
systemRoutes.GET("/parser-engines", g.Viewer(), handler.ListParserEngines)
|
||||
@@ -853,7 +881,7 @@ func RegisterMCPServiceRoutes(
|
||||
// redirect carries no WeKnora bearer — the single-use state authenticates.
|
||||
r.GET("/mcp-oauth/callback", oauthHandler.Callback)
|
||||
|
||||
mcpServices := r.Group("/mcp-services", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
mcpServices := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/mcp-services"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Create MCP service — Admin+
|
||||
mcpServices.POST("", g.Admin(), handler.CreateMCPService)
|
||||
@@ -886,7 +914,9 @@ func RegisterMCPServiceRoutes(
|
||||
mcpServices.DELETE("/:id/oauth/token", g.Viewer(), oauthHandler.Revoke)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
agentTool := r.Group("/agent", g.APIKeyDeny())
|
||||
// /agent tool-approval + OAuth resolution are interactive human flows;
|
||||
// not declared for API keys (default-deny).
|
||||
agentTool := r.Group("/agent")
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Resolving a pending tool-approval is gated to tenant members
|
||||
// (Viewer+). The approval card surfaces inside an agent chat the
|
||||
@@ -923,7 +953,7 @@ func RegisterWebSearchProviderRoutes(
|
||||
credHandler *handler.WebSearchProviderCredentialsHandler,
|
||||
g *rbacGuards,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
providers := r.Group("/web-search-providers", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
providers := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/web-search-providers"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// List available provider types (metadata for UI forms) — Viewer+
|
||||
providers.GET("/types", g.Viewer(), h.ListProviderTypes)
|
||||
@@ -949,7 +979,7 @@ func RegisterWebSearchProviderRoutes(
|
||||
// writes (and connection tests, which probe external systems with stored
|
||||
// credentials) are Admin+.
|
||||
func RegisterVectorStoreRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.VectorStoreHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
stores := r.Group("/vector-stores", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
stores := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/vector-stores"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// List available engine types (metadata for UI forms) — Viewer+
|
||||
stores.GET("/types", g.Viewer(), h.ListStoreTypes)
|
||||
@@ -973,7 +1003,7 @@ func RegisterVectorStoreRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.VectorStoreHandler
|
||||
// (IsBuiltin=true) have an empty creator and are always Admin+. Reads
|
||||
// are Viewer+, copy is Contributor+ (the copy is owned by the caller).
|
||||
func RegisterCustomAgentRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, agentHandler *handler.CustomAgentHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
agents := r.Group("/agents", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
agents := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/agents"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Get placeholder definitions (must be before /:id to avoid conflict) — Viewer+
|
||||
agents.GET("/placeholders", g.Viewer(), agentHandler.GetPlaceholders)
|
||||
@@ -993,7 +1023,7 @@ func RegisterCustomAgentRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, agentHandler *handler.CustomA
|
||||
agents.POST("/:id/copy", g.Contributor(), agentHandler.CopyAgent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Registered outside the group to avoid Gin route conflict with /agents/:id/shares in organization routes
|
||||
r.GET("/agents/:id/suggested-questions", g.Viewer(), agentHandler.GetSuggestedQuestions)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodGet, "/agents/:id/suggested-questions", apiKeyOwner(), g.Viewer(), agentHandler.GetSuggestedQuestions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RegisterUserFavoriteRoutes wires the per-user starred-resource endpoints.
|
||||
@@ -1004,7 +1034,8 @@ func RegisterCustomAgentRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, agentHandler *handler.CustomA
|
||||
// don't follow the OwnedXOrAdmin pattern: favorites aren't owned by the
|
||||
// resource's creator, they're owned by the user *doing* the starring.
|
||||
func RegisterUserFavoriteRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, h *handler.UserResourceFavoriteHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
favs := r.Group("/user/favorites", g.APIKeyDeny())
|
||||
// Favorites are per-user; not declared for API keys (default-deny).
|
||||
favs := r.Group("/user/favorites")
|
||||
{
|
||||
favs.GET("", g.Viewer(), h.ListFavorites)
|
||||
favs.POST("", g.Viewer(), h.AddFavorite)
|
||||
@@ -1028,7 +1059,7 @@ func RegisterSkillRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, skillHandler *handler.SkillHandler,
|
||||
// RegisterOrganizationRoutes registers organization and sharing routes
|
||||
func RegisterOrganizationRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, orgHandler *handler.OrganizationHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
// Organization routes
|
||||
orgs := r.Group("/organizations", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
orgs := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/organizations"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Create organization (Admin+ in caller's tenant only)
|
||||
orgs.POST("", g.Admin(), orgHandler.CreateOrganization)
|
||||
@@ -1109,7 +1140,8 @@ func RegisterOrganizationRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, orgHandler *handler.Organiza
|
||||
// 分享 KB 到组织 = 让组织里所有人能读这个 KB;这跟"修改 KB 元信息"
|
||||
// 同等敏感,所以挂同款 OwnedKBOrAdmin 矩阵。Viewer 在自己租户里
|
||||
// 也不能私自把 KB 暴露出去。
|
||||
kbShares := r.Group("/knowledge-bases/:id/shares", g.APIKeyDeny())
|
||||
// KB share management is JWT-only; not declared for API keys.
|
||||
kbShares := r.Group("/knowledge-bases/:id/shares")
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Share knowledge base
|
||||
kbShares.POST("", g.OwnedKBOrAdmin(), orgHandler.ShareKnowledgeBase)
|
||||
@@ -1128,7 +1160,8 @@ func RegisterOrganizationRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, orgHandler *handler.Organiza
|
||||
// 校验(与 ListSharesByKnowledgeBase 不对称),如果路由层只挂 Viewer
|
||||
// 任何同租户成员都能枚举他人 agent 的分享去向——这里把 owner 校验
|
||||
// 兜底到路由层,匹配 POST/DELETE 的矩阵。
|
||||
agentShares := r.Group("/agents/:id/shares", g.APIKeyDeny())
|
||||
// Agent share management is JWT-only; not declared for API keys.
|
||||
agentShares := r.Group("/agents/:id/shares")
|
||||
{
|
||||
agentShares.POST("", g.OwnedAgentOrAdmin(), orgHandler.ShareAgent)
|
||||
agentShares.GET("", g.OwnedAgentOrAdmin(), orgHandler.ListAgentShares)
|
||||
@@ -1136,13 +1169,13 @@ func RegisterOrganizationRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, orgHandler *handler.Organiza
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Shared knowledge bases route — Viewer+
|
||||
r.GET("/shared-knowledge-bases", g.Viewer(), orgHandler.ListSharedKnowledgeBases)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodGet, "/shared-knowledge-bases", apiKeyOwner(), g.Viewer(), orgHandler.ListSharedKnowledgeBases)
|
||||
// Shared agents route — Viewer+
|
||||
r.GET("/shared-agents", g.Viewer(), orgHandler.ListSharedAgents)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodGet, "/shared-agents", apiKeyOwner(), g.Viewer(), orgHandler.ListSharedAgents)
|
||||
// "Disable by me" 是租户级偏好(写到 tenant_disabled_shared_agents),
|
||||
// 影响整个租户在会话下拉里看到的 agent 列表。任何 Viewer 改这个表就
|
||||
// 等于替整个租户做决定 — 必须 Admin+ 才允许调整。
|
||||
r.POST("/shared-agents/disabled", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), orgHandler.SetSharedAgentDisabledByMe)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/shared-agents/disabled", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), orgHandler.SetSharedAgentDisabledByMe)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RegisterEmbedPublicRoutes registers anonymous embed endpoints secured by publish tokens.
|
||||
@@ -1186,12 +1219,12 @@ func RegisterEmbedChannelRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, embedHandler *handler.EmbedC
|
||||
if embedHandler == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
agentEmbed := r.Group("/agents/:id/embed-channels", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
agentEmbed := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/agents/:id/embed-channels"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
agentEmbed.POST("", g.Admin(), embedHandler.CreateEmbedChannel)
|
||||
agentEmbed.GET("", g.Viewer(), embedHandler.ListEmbedChannels)
|
||||
}
|
||||
channels := r.Group("/embed-channels", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
channels := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/embed-channels"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
channels.GET("", g.Viewer(), embedHandler.ListAllEmbedChannels)
|
||||
channels.GET("/:channel_id", g.Viewer(), embedHandler.GetEmbedChannel)
|
||||
@@ -1220,14 +1253,14 @@ func RegisterIMRoutes(r *gin.Engine, imHandler *handler.IMHandler) {
|
||||
// (which can hijack a personal WeChat session) is Admin+.
|
||||
func RegisterIMChannelRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, imHandler *handler.IMHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
// Channel CRUD under agents
|
||||
agentChannels := r.Group("/agents/:id/im-channels", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
agentChannels := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/agents/:id/im-channels"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
agentChannels.POST("", g.Admin(), imHandler.CreateIMChannel)
|
||||
agentChannels.GET("", g.Viewer(), imHandler.ListIMChannels)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Channel operations by channel ID
|
||||
channels := r.Group("/im-channels", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
channels := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/im-channels"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
channels.GET("", g.Viewer(), imHandler.ListAllIMChannels)
|
||||
channels.PUT("/:id", g.Admin(), imHandler.UpdateIMChannel)
|
||||
@@ -1237,7 +1270,7 @@ func RegisterIMChannelRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, imHandler *handler.IMHandler, g
|
||||
|
||||
// WeChat QR code login (requires authentication) — Admin+: a successful
|
||||
// scan binds a personal WeChat account to the tenant.
|
||||
wechatGroup := r.Group("/wechat", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
wechatGroup := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/wechat"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
wechatGroup.POST("/qrcode", g.Admin(), imHandler.WeChatGetQRCode)
|
||||
wechatGroup.POST("/qrcode/status", g.Admin(), imHandler.WeChatPollQRCodeStatus)
|
||||
@@ -1428,6 +1461,17 @@ func newFileServeHandler(globalFileService interfaces.FileService) gin.HandlerFu
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// /files is registered on the engine root, outside the /api/v1
|
||||
// API-key gate. A KB-restricted API key must not fetch arbitrary
|
||||
// tenant files: a raw storage path cannot be attributed to the
|
||||
// key's KB allow-list, so serving it would bypass the KB scope.
|
||||
if scope, ok := types.TenantAPIKeyScopeFromContext(c.Request.Context()); ok && scope.IsKnowledgeBaseRestricted() {
|
||||
logger.Warnf(context.Background(),
|
||||
"[Router] /files denied KB-restricted API key: tenant_id=%d file_path=%q", tenant.ID, filePath)
|
||||
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "forbidden: API key scope does not allow file access"})
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := secutils.ValidateStoragePathTenant(filePath, tenant.ID); err != nil {
|
||||
logger.Warnf(context.Background(), "[Router] /files denied cross-tenant or invalid path: tenant_id=%d file_path=%q err=%v", tenant.ID, filePath, err)
|
||||
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "forbidden: file path not accessible"})
|
||||
@@ -1697,7 +1741,7 @@ func RegisterDataSourceRoutes(
|
||||
g *rbacGuards,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
// Data source routes
|
||||
ds := r.Group("/datasource", g.APIKeyAdmin())
|
||||
ds := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/datasource"), apiKeyOwner())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Get available connector types — Viewer+
|
||||
ds.GET("/types", g.Viewer(), handler.GetAvailableConnectors)
|
||||
@@ -1739,8 +1783,8 @@ func RegisterDataSourceRoutes(
|
||||
// management endpoints. SaveCredentials persists external SaaS keys
|
||||
// for the tenant (Admin+), Status is a low-risk readiness probe (Viewer+).
|
||||
func RegisterWeKnoraCloudRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.WeKnoraCloudHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
r.POST("/weknoracloud/credentials", g.Admin(), g.APIKeyAdmin(), handler.SaveCredentials)
|
||||
r.GET("/models/weknoracloud/status", g.Viewer(), handler.Status)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodPost, "/weknoracloud/credentials", apiKeyOwner(), g.Admin(), handler.SaveCredentials)
|
||||
g.apiKeyRoute(r, http.MethodGet, "/models/weknoracloud/status", apiKeyOwner(), g.Viewer(), handler.Status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RegisterWikiPageRoutes registers wiki page related routes.
|
||||
@@ -1753,7 +1797,7 @@ func RegisterWeKnoraCloudRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.WeKnoraClou
|
||||
// :kb_id resolves directly to the owning KB so a Contributor who owns
|
||||
// the KB can manage its wiki, while a non-owner Contributor gets 403.
|
||||
func RegisterWikiPageRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, wikiHandler *handler.WikiPageHandler, g *rbacGuards) {
|
||||
wiki := r.Group("/knowledgebase/:kb_id/wiki", g.APIKeyContributor())
|
||||
wiki := g.apiKeyGroup(r.Group("/knowledgebase/:kb_id/wiki"), apiKeyContributor())
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Page CRUD
|
||||
wiki.GET("/pages", g.Viewer(), g.KBAccessRead("kb_id"), wikiHandler.ListPages)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ type TenantAPIKeyRepository interface {
|
||||
RevokeAllAPIKeys(ctx context.Context, tenantID uint64) error
|
||||
UpdateAPIKeyHash(ctx context.Context, id uint64, hash string) error
|
||||
UpdateAPIKeyLastUsed(ctx context.Context, id uint64, at time.Time) error
|
||||
// ListKeysWithPlaceholderHash returns keys whose key_hash is still the
|
||||
// migration placeholder (never authenticated since the 000065 upgrade),
|
||||
// so the real SHA-256 hash can be computed and backfilled.
|
||||
ListKeysWithPlaceholderHash(ctx context.Context) ([]*types.TenantAPIKey, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type TenantAPIKeyService interface {
|
||||
@@ -94,4 +98,9 @@ type TenantAPIKeyService interface {
|
||||
ListAPIKeys(ctx context.Context, tenantID uint64) ([]*types.TenantAPIKey, error)
|
||||
RevokeAPIKey(ctx context.Context, tenantID uint64, id uint64) error
|
||||
RevokeAllAPIKeys(ctx context.Context, tenantID uint64) error
|
||||
// BackfillMissingKeyHashes computes and persists the SHA-256 key_hash
|
||||
// for legacy keys still carrying the migration placeholder, so their
|
||||
// first authentication does not fall back to an O(n) plaintext scan.
|
||||
// Returns the number of keys backfilled.
|
||||
BackfillMissingKeyHashes(ctx context.Context) (int, error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,9 +35,14 @@ func (TenantAPIKey) TableName() string {
|
||||
|
||||
func (k *TenantAPIKey) BeforeSave(tx *gorm.DB) error {
|
||||
if key := utils.GetAESKey(); key != nil && k.APIKey != "" {
|
||||
if encrypted, err := utils.EncryptAESGCM(k.APIKey, key); err == nil {
|
||||
tx.Statement.SetColumn("api_key", encrypted)
|
||||
encrypted, err := utils.EncryptAESGCM(k.APIKey, key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// Never fall through to storing the plaintext key: abort the
|
||||
// write so the caller sees the failure instead of silently
|
||||
// persisting an unencrypted secret.
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("encrypt tenant_api_keys.api_key (id=%d): %w", k.ID, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
tx.Statement.SetColumn("api_key", encrypted)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -84,6 +89,8 @@ func (s TenantAPIKeyScope) Normalize() TenantAPIKeyScope {
|
||||
// NormalizeTenantAPIKeyRole maps stored/API role strings to tenant RBAC roles.
|
||||
func NormalizeTenantAPIKeyRole(role TenantRole) TenantRole {
|
||||
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(string(role))) {
|
||||
case string(TenantRoleOwner):
|
||||
return TenantRoleOwner
|
||||
case string(TenantRoleAdmin):
|
||||
return TenantRoleAdmin
|
||||
case string(TenantRoleContributor):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@ func TestNormalizeTenantAPIKeyRole(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
{name: "viewer", in: TenantRoleViewer, want: TenantRoleViewer},
|
||||
{name: "contributor", in: TenantRoleContributor, want: TenantRoleContributor},
|
||||
{name: "admin", in: TenantRoleAdmin, want: TenantRoleAdmin},
|
||||
{name: "owner", in: TenantRoleOwner, want: TenantRoleOwner},
|
||||
{name: "empty defaults viewer", in: "", want: TenantRoleViewer},
|
||||
{name: "invalid", in: "owner", want: ""},
|
||||
{name: "invalid", in: "superuser", want: ""},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tt := range tests {
|
||||
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user