feat(security): enhance SSRF protection in RemoteAPIChat
- Replaced the default DialContext with SSRFSafeDialContext in the raw HTTP client to improve security against DNS rebinding attacks. - Added SSRF validation for BaseURL and endpoint in NewRemoteAPIChat and chat methods, ensuring safer URL handling. - Updated security utility functions to provide consistent SSRF checks across the application.
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@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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@@ -20,9 +19,10 @@ import (
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// rawHTTPClient is a shared HTTP client for raw HTTP LLM calls with connection-level timeouts.
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// No overall Timeout is set so streaming calls are controlled by context cancellation only.
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// Uses SSRFSafeDialContext to prevent DNS rebinding attacks at the connection layer.
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var rawHTTPClient = &http.Client{
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Transport: &http.Transport{
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DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}).DialContext,
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DialContext: secutils.SSRFSafeDialContext,
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TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
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IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
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MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 5,
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@@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ type RemoteAPIChat struct {
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// NewRemoteAPIChat 创建远程 API 聊天实例
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func NewRemoteAPIChat(chatConfig *ChatConfig) (*RemoteAPIChat, error) {
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if chatConfig.BaseURL != "" {
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if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(chatConfig.BaseURL); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("baseURL SSRF check failed: %w", err)
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}
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}
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apiKey := chatConfig.APIKey
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config := openai.DefaultConfig(apiKey)
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if baseURL := chatConfig.BaseURL; baseURL != "" {
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@@ -295,6 +301,9 @@ func (c *RemoteAPIChat) chatWithRawHTTP(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, cu
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if endpoint == "" {
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endpoint = c.baseURL + "/chat/completions"
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}
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if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(endpoint); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("endpoint SSRF check failed: %w", err)
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}
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httpReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoint, bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
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@@ -438,6 +447,9 @@ func (c *RemoteAPIChat) chatStreamWithRawHTTP(ctx context.Context, endpoint stri
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if endpoint == "" {
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endpoint = c.baseURL + "/chat/completions"
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}
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if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(endpoint); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("endpoint SSRF check failed: %w", err)
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}
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httpReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoint, bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
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@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ func NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(config SSRFSafeHTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
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DisableKeepAlives: config.DisableKeepAlives,
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DisableCompression: config.DisableCompression,
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// Dial with SSRF protection - validates resolved IPs before connecting
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DialContext: ssrfSafeDialContext,
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DialContext: SSRFSafeDialContext,
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}
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return &http.Client{
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@@ -769,16 +769,26 @@ func NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(config SSRFSafeHTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
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}
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}
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// ssrfSafeDialContext is a custom dial function that validates the resolved IP addresses
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// SSRFSafeDialContext is a custom dial function that validates the resolved IP addresses
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// before establishing a connection. This provides an additional layer of SSRF protection
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// against DNS rebinding attacks during the connection phase.
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func ssrfSafeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
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func SSRFSafeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
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// Parse host and port
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid address %s: %w", addr, err)
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}
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// Whitelisted hosts bypass all dial-time SSRF checks, consistent with
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// ValidateURLForSSRF which skips IsSSRFSafeURL for whitelisted hosts.
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if IsSSRFWhitelisted(host) {
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dialer := &net.Dialer{
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Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
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KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
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}
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return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
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}
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// Check if the host is a restricted hostname
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hostLower := strings.ToLower(host)
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for _, restricted := range restrictedHostnames {
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