feat(security): enhance SSRF protection in RemoteAPIChat

- Replaced the default DialContext with SSRFSafeDialContext in the raw HTTP client to improve security against DNS rebinding attacks.
- Added SSRF validation for BaseURL and endpoint in NewRemoteAPIChat and chat methods, ensuring safer URL handling.
- Updated security utility functions to provide consistent SSRF checks across the application.
This commit is contained in:
wizardchen
2026-03-26 11:07:19 +08:00
committed by lyingbug
parent 41fcdf1a83
commit fd5278d62d
2 changed files with 27 additions and 5 deletions
+14 -2
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -20,9 +19,10 @@ import (
// rawHTTPClient is a shared HTTP client for raw HTTP LLM calls with connection-level timeouts.
// No overall Timeout is set so streaming calls are controlled by context cancellation only.
// Uses SSRFSafeDialContext to prevent DNS rebinding attacks at the connection layer.
var rawHTTPClient = &http.Client{
Transport: &http.Transport{
DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}).DialContext,
DialContext: secutils.SSRFSafeDialContext,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 5,
@@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ type RemoteAPIChat struct {
// NewRemoteAPIChat 创建远程 API 聊天实例
func NewRemoteAPIChat(chatConfig *ChatConfig) (*RemoteAPIChat, error) {
if chatConfig.BaseURL != "" {
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(chatConfig.BaseURL); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("baseURL SSRF check failed: %w", err)
}
}
apiKey := chatConfig.APIKey
config := openai.DefaultConfig(apiKey)
if baseURL := chatConfig.BaseURL; baseURL != "" {
@@ -295,6 +301,9 @@ func (c *RemoteAPIChat) chatWithRawHTTP(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, cu
if endpoint == "" {
endpoint = c.baseURL + "/chat/completions"
}
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(endpoint); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("endpoint SSRF check failed: %w", err)
}
httpReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoint, bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
@@ -438,6 +447,9 @@ func (c *RemoteAPIChat) chatStreamWithRawHTTP(ctx context.Context, endpoint stri
if endpoint == "" {
endpoint = c.baseURL + "/chat/completions"
}
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(endpoint); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("endpoint SSRF check failed: %w", err)
}
httpReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoint, bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
+13 -3
View File
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ func NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(config SSRFSafeHTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
DisableKeepAlives: config.DisableKeepAlives,
DisableCompression: config.DisableCompression,
// Dial with SSRF protection - validates resolved IPs before connecting
DialContext: ssrfSafeDialContext,
DialContext: SSRFSafeDialContext,
}
return &http.Client{
@@ -769,16 +769,26 @@ func NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(config SSRFSafeHTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
}
}
// ssrfSafeDialContext is a custom dial function that validates the resolved IP addresses
// SSRFSafeDialContext is a custom dial function that validates the resolved IP addresses
// before establishing a connection. This provides an additional layer of SSRF protection
// against DNS rebinding attacks during the connection phase.
func ssrfSafeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
func SSRFSafeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
// Parse host and port
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid address %s: %w", addr, err)
}
// Whitelisted hosts bypass all dial-time SSRF checks, consistent with
// ValidateURLForSSRF which skips IsSSRFSafeURL for whitelisted hosts.
if IsSSRFWhitelisted(host) {
dialer := &net.Dialer{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
}
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
}
// Check if the host is a restricted hostname
hostLower := strings.ToLower(host)
for _, restricted := range restrictedHostnames {