refactor(api-keys): simplify authorization to a single-role gate
Redesign tenant API key authorization around one dimension (role) plus a central default-deny gate, replacing the previous role + KB-scoped flag model. - Add APIKeyGate as the single authority for API-key authorization: routes declare one policy (MinRole) via apiKeyGroup/apiKeyRoute helpers; undeclared routes are denied by default. JWT principals short-circuit the gate and the JWT-centric RBAC guards short-circuit for API-key principals. - Roles: viewer/contributor/admin are knowledge-base data-plane only (KB scope is a pure downstream data filter); owner is a full-access tenant tier that unlocks tenant-level infrastructure routes and is required for every method. - Drop the KBScoped policy flag and the KB-restricted-vs-tenant branching. - Security hardening: never disclose HMAC secret (return presence only), abort writes on API-key encryption failure, deny KB-restricted keys on /files, and backfill legacy key hashes at startup instead of O(N) plaintext scans. - Frontend: two-level create dialog (access type -> permission level), rename role labels to reflect actual scope, sync en/zh/ko/ru locales. - Fix startup self-check false-positive on trailing-slash routes and normalize gin paths before comparison; add regression tests.
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@@ -260,11 +260,9 @@ func authenticateAPIKeyRequest(
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if c.IsAborted() {
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return false
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}
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if err := rejectTenantAPIKeyManagementPath(c.Request.Context(), c.Request.URL.Path); err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "Forbidden: API key scope does not allow this operation"})
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c.Abort()
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return false
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}
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// Per-route API-key authorization (role + KB scope + default-deny) is
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// enforced by middleware.APIKeyRouteAuthorizer on the /api/v1 group.
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// Key-management and any other undeclared route is denied there.
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return true
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}
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