refactor(api-keys): simplify authorization to a single-role gate

Redesign tenant API key authorization around one dimension (role) plus a
central default-deny gate, replacing the previous role + KB-scoped flag model.

- Add APIKeyGate as the single authority for API-key authorization: routes
  declare one policy (MinRole) via apiKeyGroup/apiKeyRoute helpers; undeclared
  routes are denied by default. JWT principals short-circuit the gate and the
  JWT-centric RBAC guards short-circuit for API-key principals.
- Roles: viewer/contributor/admin are knowledge-base data-plane only (KB scope
  is a pure downstream data filter); owner is a full-access tenant tier that
  unlocks tenant-level infrastructure routes and is required for every method.
- Drop the KBScoped policy flag and the KB-restricted-vs-tenant branching.
- Security hardening: never disclose HMAC secret (return presence only), abort
  writes on API-key encryption failure, deny KB-restricted keys on /files, and
  backfill legacy key hashes at startup instead of O(N) plaintext scans.
- Frontend: two-level create dialog (access type -> permission level), rename
  role labels to reflect actual scope, sync en/zh/ko/ru locales.
- Fix startup self-check false-positive on trailing-slash routes and normalize
  gin paths before comparison; add regression tests.
This commit is contained in:
wizardchen
2026-07-06 17:34:52 +08:00
committed by lyingbug
parent fedb6c3f7e
commit d2ffc1b973
26 changed files with 1045 additions and 500 deletions
+17 -5
View File
@@ -116,8 +116,9 @@ type apiPrincipalConfigResponse struct {
DirectHeaderName string `json:"direct_header_name"`
SignedTokenHeaderName string `json:"signed_token_header_name"`
RequireDirectHeader bool `json:"require_direct_header"`
HasHMACSecret bool `json:"has_hmac_secret"`
HMACSecret string `json:"hmac_secret,omitempty"`
// HasHMACSecret reports whether a signing secret is configured. The
// plaintext secret is NEVER returned — clients only learn presence.
HasHMACSecret bool `json:"has_hmac_secret"`
}
type apiPrincipalTestTokenRequest struct {
@@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ const (
defaultAPIPrincipalTestTokenTTL = 15 * time.Minute
maxAPIPrincipalTestTokenTTL = time.Hour
maxAPIPrincipalExternalUserIDLen = 128
// apiPrincipalSecretRedacted is the placeholder an update request may
// send in place of the HMAC secret to signal "leave the stored secret
// unchanged". The plaintext secret is never returned by GET, so the
// client cannot echo the real value back.
apiPrincipalSecretRedacted = "***"
)
// defaultMaxOwnedTenantsPerUser is the cap applied when
@@ -705,7 +711,7 @@ func validateTenantAPIKeyRequest(
return errors.NewValidationError("name is required")
}
if role := types.NormalizeTenantAPIKeyRole(types.TenantRole(strings.TrimSpace(req.Role))); req.Role != "" && role == "" {
return errors.NewValidationError("role must be viewer, contributor, or admin")
return errors.NewValidationError("role must be one of viewer, contributor, admin, or owner")
}
for _, kbID := range req.KnowledgeBaseIDs {
kbID = strings.TrimSpace(kbID)
@@ -737,7 +743,6 @@ func apiPrincipalConfigForResponse(cfg *types.APIPrincipalConfig) apiPrincipalCo
SignedTokenHeaderName: defaultAPIPrincipalTokenHeader,
RequireDirectHeader: cfg.RequireDirectHeader,
HasHMACSecret: strings.TrimSpace(cfg.HMACSecret) != "",
HMACSecret: strings.TrimSpace(cfg.HMACSecret),
}
}
@@ -826,7 +831,14 @@ func (h *TenantHandler) UpdateAPIPrincipalConfig(c *gin.Context) {
}
hmacSecret := existingSecret
if req.HMACSecret != nil {
hmacSecret = strings.TrimSpace(*req.HMACSecret)
provided := strings.TrimSpace(*req.HMACSecret)
// GET no longer discloses the plaintext secret, so a client that
// edits the config re-submits the redaction placeholder to mean
// "keep the existing secret". Treat it as a no-op instead of
// overwriting the real secret with "***".
if provided != apiPrincipalSecretRedacted {
hmacSecret = provided
}
}
cfg := &types.APIPrincipalConfig{
Mode: req.Mode,