refactor(api-keys): simplify authorization to a single-role gate
Redesign tenant API key authorization around one dimension (role) plus a central default-deny gate, replacing the previous role + KB-scoped flag model. - Add APIKeyGate as the single authority for API-key authorization: routes declare one policy (MinRole) via apiKeyGroup/apiKeyRoute helpers; undeclared routes are denied by default. JWT principals short-circuit the gate and the JWT-centric RBAC guards short-circuit for API-key principals. - Roles: viewer/contributor/admin are knowledge-base data-plane only (KB scope is a pure downstream data filter); owner is a full-access tenant tier that unlocks tenant-level infrastructure routes and is required for every method. - Drop the KBScoped policy flag and the KB-restricted-vs-tenant branching. - Security hardening: never disclose HMAC secret (return presence only), abort writes on API-key encryption failure, deny KB-restricted keys on /files, and backfill legacy key hashes at startup instead of O(N) plaintext scans. - Frontend: two-level create dialog (access type -> permission level), rename role labels to reflect actual scope, sync en/zh/ko/ru locales. - Fix startup self-check false-positive on trailing-slash routes and normalize gin paths before comparison; add regression tests.
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@@ -77,6 +77,24 @@ func (r *tenantAPIKeyRepository) UpdateAPIKeyHash(ctx context.Context, id uint64
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Update("key_hash", hash).Error
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}
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// placeholderKeyHashPrefix mirrors the value written by migration
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// 000065_tenant_api_keys.up.sql ('migrated-tenant-' || id). Rows still
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// carrying it have never been authenticated since the upgrade, so their
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// key_hash is not the real SHA-256 of the API key yet.
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const placeholderKeyHashPrefix = "migrated-tenant-"
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func (r *tenantAPIKeyRepository) ListKeysWithPlaceholderHash(
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ctx context.Context,
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) ([]*types.TenantAPIKey, error) {
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var keys []*types.TenantAPIKey
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// AfterFind decrypts api_key, so callers get the plaintext token needed
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// to compute the real hash.
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err := r.db.WithContext(ctx).
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Where("key_hash LIKE ? AND revoked_at IS NULL", placeholderKeyHashPrefix+"%").
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Find(&keys).Error
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return keys, err
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}
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func (r *tenantAPIKeyRepository) UpdateAPIKeyLastUsed(ctx context.Context, id uint64, at time.Time) error {
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return r.db.WithContext(ctx).
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Model(&types.TenantAPIKey{}).
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