fix(crypto): fail loudly when encrypted DB fields cannot be decrypted

GORM Scan / AfterFind hooks for every AES-encrypted column followed
the same lenient pattern:

    if decrypted, err := utils.DecryptAESGCM(c.APIKey, key); err == nil {
        c.APIKey = decrypted
    }

When SYSTEM_AES_KEY was missing, rotated, or the wrong length the
decryption error was swallowed and the in-memory struct kept the raw
"enc:v1:..." ciphertext. The application then happily forwarded the
ciphertext upstream as the actual API key / password, surfacing as
401/403/SignatureDoesNotMatch from third-party vendors. Worse, a
ciphertext snippet of a customer credential was leaking into the
external provider's request logs.

Introduce utils.DecryptStoredSecret that:
  - returns "" / legacy plaintext untouched (no false positives for
    pre-encryption rows);
  - returns ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey when the value carries the
    enc:v1: prefix but no AES key is configured;
  - propagates any GCM auth-tag failure from a rotated key.

Wire it into the five Scan / AfterFind sites that currently swallow
the error:
  - Tenant.AfterFind (tenants.api_key)
  - CredentialsConfig.Scan (tenants.we_knora_cloud.app_secret)
  - ModelParameters.Scan (models.parameters.api_key, .app_secret)
  - ConnectionConfig.Scan (vector_store_connections.password, .api_key)
  - WebSearchProviderParameters.Scan (web_search_providers.api_key)

The error is wrapped with the originating column so the failure is
diagnosable in the logs. Operators must restore the previous
SYSTEM_AES_KEY (or rotate the affected secrets) instead of receiving
silent vendor 401s.

Add table-driven tests covering empty input, legacy plaintext,
round-trip, missing key, wrong-length key, and rotated key. The
strict path explicitly asserts that ciphertext does NOT leak in the
returned plaintext on any error path.
This commit is contained in:
wizardchen
2026-04-30 12:22:34 +08:00
committed by lyingbug
parent 097c9d0ad5
commit 3b23713c54
6 changed files with 141 additions and 36 deletions
+10 -11
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package types
import (
"database/sql/driver"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/utils"
@@ -139,18 +140,16 @@ func (c *ModelParameters) Scan(value interface{}) error {
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, c); err != nil {
return err
}
if key := utils.GetAESKey(); key != nil {
if c.APIKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := utils.DecryptAESGCM(c.APIKey, key); err == nil {
c.APIKey = decrypted
}
}
if c.AppSecret != "" {
if decrypted, err := utils.DecryptAESGCM(c.AppSecret, key); err == nil {
c.AppSecret = decrypted
}
}
apiKey, err := utils.DecryptStoredSecret(c.APIKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt model parameters api_key: %w", err)
}
c.APIKey = apiKey
appSecret, err := utils.DecryptStoredSecret(c.AppSecret)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt model parameters app_secret: %w", err)
}
c.AppSecret = appSecret
return nil
}
+13 -10
View File
@@ -150,13 +150,16 @@ func (t *Tenant) BeforeSave(tx *gorm.DB) error {
}
// AfterFind decrypts APIKey after loading from database.
// Legacy plaintext (without enc:v1: prefix) is returned as-is.
// Legacy plaintext (without enc:v1: prefix) is returned as-is. When the value
// is encrypted but SYSTEM_AES_KEY is missing/rotated and the data cannot be
// decrypted, the error is propagated so the read fails loudly instead of
// returning ciphertext to callers.
func (t *Tenant) AfterFind(tx *gorm.DB) error {
if key := utils.GetAESKey(); key != nil && t.APIKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := utils.DecryptAESGCM(t.APIKey, key); err == nil {
t.APIKey = decrypted
}
decrypted, err := utils.DecryptStoredSecret(t.APIKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt tenants.api_key (id=%d): %w", t.ID, err)
}
t.APIKey = decrypted
return nil
}
@@ -299,12 +302,12 @@ func (c *CredentialsConfig) Scan(value interface{}) error {
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, c); err != nil {
return err
}
if c.WeKnoraCloud != nil && c.WeKnoraCloud.AppSecret != "" {
if key := utils.GetAESKey(); key != nil {
if decrypted, err := utils.DecryptAESGCM(c.WeKnoraCloud.AppSecret, key); err == nil {
c.WeKnoraCloud.AppSecret = decrypted
}
if c.WeKnoraCloud != nil {
decrypted, err := utils.DecryptStoredSecret(c.WeKnoraCloud.AppSecret)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt tenant credentials we_knora_cloud.app_secret: %w", err)
}
c.WeKnoraCloud.AppSecret = decrypted
}
return nil
}
+9 -11
View File
@@ -151,18 +151,16 @@ func (c *ConnectionConfig) Scan(value interface{}) error {
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, c); err != nil {
return err
}
if key := utils.GetAESKey(); key != nil {
if c.Password != "" {
if decrypted, err := utils.DecryptAESGCM(c.Password, key); err == nil {
c.Password = decrypted
}
}
if c.APIKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := utils.DecryptAESGCM(c.APIKey, key); err == nil {
c.APIKey = decrypted
}
}
password, err := utils.DecryptStoredSecret(c.Password)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt vector store connection password: %w", err)
}
c.Password = password
apiKey, err := utils.DecryptStoredSecret(c.APIKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt vector store connection api_key: %w", err)
}
c.APIKey = apiKey
return nil
}
+5 -4
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package types
import (
"database/sql/driver"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/utils"
@@ -101,11 +102,11 @@ func (p *WebSearchProviderParameters) Scan(value interface{}) error {
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, p); err != nil {
return err
}
if key := utils.GetAESKey(); key != nil && p.APIKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := utils.DecryptAESGCM(p.APIKey, key); err == nil {
p.APIKey = decrypted
}
apiKey, err := utils.DecryptStoredSecret(p.APIKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt web search provider api_key: %w", err)
}
p.APIKey = apiKey
return nil
}
+40
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ func EncryptAESGCM(plaintext string, key []byte) (string, error) {
return EncPrefix + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(combined), nil
}
// ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey is returned by DecryptStoredSecret when the value
// carries the enc:v1: prefix but no AES key is available to decrypt it. This
// signals an operator misconfiguration (typically a rotated or unset
// SYSTEM_AES_KEY) and must propagate so the system fails loudly instead of
// silently using ciphertext as a credential.
var ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey = errors.New("encrypted data found but SYSTEM_AES_KEY is not set or has wrong length")
// DecryptAESGCM decrypts an AES-256-GCM encrypted string.
// If the string lacks the enc:v1: prefix, it's treated as legacy plaintext and returned as-is.
func DecryptAESGCM(encrypted string, key []byte) (string, error) {
@@ -87,3 +94,36 @@ func DecryptAESGCM(encrypted string, key []byte) (string, error) {
}
return string(plaintext), nil
}
// DecryptStoredSecret decrypts a value loaded from the database with strict
// error propagation. Use this from GORM Scan/AfterFind hooks for any field that
// stores AES-encrypted secrets (API keys, passwords, app secrets).
//
// Behaviour:
// - empty input -> empty output, no error.
// - no enc:v1: prefix -> returned as-is (legacy plaintext column), no error.
// - has enc:v1: prefix and SYSTEM_AES_KEY is missing or wrong length ->
// returns ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey. Callers MUST propagate this so the
// load fails loudly instead of silently surfacing ciphertext as a credential.
// - has enc:v1: prefix and key is set -> decrypts, returns any decryption
// error verbatim (e.g. base64 decode failure, GCM auth tag mismatch from a
// rotated key).
//
// The previous lenient pattern (`if decrypted, err := ...; err == nil { ... }`)
// hid the rotated-key case and caused the encrypted ciphertext to be sent
// upstream as the actual API key, surfacing as 401/403 from third-party
// vendors. Always prefer this helper over calling DecryptAESGCM directly when
// loading from the database.
func DecryptStoredSecret(encrypted string) (string, error) {
if encrypted == "" {
return "", nil
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(encrypted, EncPrefix) {
return encrypted, nil
}
key := GetAESKey()
if key == nil {
return "", ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey
}
return DecryptAESGCM(encrypted, key)
}
+64
View File
@@ -74,6 +74,70 @@ func TestDecryptAESGCM(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func TestDecryptStoredSecret(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("returns empty string as-is", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SYSTEM_AES_KEY", testAESKey)
out, err := DecryptStoredSecret("")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "", out)
})
t.Run("legacy plaintext (no enc:v1: prefix) returned as-is", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SYSTEM_AES_KEY", testAESKey)
out, err := DecryptStoredSecret("sk-legacy-plaintext")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "sk-legacy-plaintext", out)
})
t.Run("legacy plaintext is returned even when key is unset", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SYSTEM_AES_KEY", "")
out, err := DecryptStoredSecret("sk-legacy-plaintext")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "sk-legacy-plaintext", out)
})
t.Run("round-trip with valid key", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SYSTEM_AES_KEY", testAESKey)
encrypted, err := EncryptAESGCM("sk-secret", []byte(testAESKey))
require.NoError(t, err)
out, err := DecryptStoredSecret(encrypted)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "sk-secret", out)
})
t.Run("encrypted value with missing key returns ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey", func(t *testing.T) {
encrypted, err := EncryptAESGCM("sk-secret", []byte(testAESKey))
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Setenv("SYSTEM_AES_KEY", "")
out, err := DecryptStoredSecret(encrypted)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey)
assert.Equal(t, "", out, "ciphertext must NOT leak when decryption is impossible")
})
t.Run("encrypted value with wrong-length key returns ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey", func(t *testing.T) {
encrypted, err := EncryptAESGCM("sk-secret", []byte(testAESKey))
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Setenv("SYSTEM_AES_KEY", "too-short")
out, err := DecryptStoredSecret(encrypted)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey)
assert.Equal(t, "", out)
})
t.Run("encrypted value with rotated key returns auth-tag error", func(t *testing.T) {
encrypted, err := EncryptAESGCM("sk-secret", []byte(testAESKey))
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Setenv("SYSTEM_AES_KEY", "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456")
out, err := DecryptStoredSecret(encrypted)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.NotErrorIs(t, err, ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey, "should be a real auth failure, not the missing-key sentinel")
assert.Equal(t, "", out, "ciphertext must NOT leak when decryption fails")
})
}
func TestGetAESKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("returns key when SYSTEM_AES_KEY is 32 bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SYSTEM_AES_KEY", testAESKey)