fix: tighten SSRF protection for URL imports
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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services:
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# 只启动依赖的基础设施服务
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postgres:
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image: paradedb/paradedb:v0.18.9-pg17
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image: paradedb/paradedb:v0.21.4-pg17
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container_name: WeKnora-postgres-dev
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ports:
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- "${DB_PORT:-5432}:5432"
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@@ -6389,7 +6389,16 @@ func (s *knowledgeService) ProcessDocument(ctx context.Context, t *asynq.Task) e
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// 处理不同类型的导入:文件、URL、文本段落
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var chunks []*proto.Chunk
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if payload.URL != "" {
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// URL导入
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// URL导入 - 再次进行 SSRF 验证(防止 DNS 重绑定攻击)
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if safe, reason := secutils.IsSSRFSafeURL(payload.URL); !safe {
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logger.Errorf(ctx, "URL rejected for SSRF protection in ProcessDocument: %s, reason: %s", payload.URL, reason)
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knowledge.ParseStatus = "failed"
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knowledge.ErrorMessage = "URL is not allowed for security reasons"
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knowledge.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
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s.repo.UpdateKnowledge(ctx, knowledge)
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return nil
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}
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urlResp, err := s.docReaderClient.ReadFromURL(ctx, &proto.ReadFromURLRequest{
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Url: payload.URL,
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Title: knowledge.Title,
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@@ -354,15 +354,21 @@ func IsSSRFSafeURL(rawURL string) (bool, string) {
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// Perform DNS resolution to check the resolved IP
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// This prevents DNS rebinding attacks where a domain resolves to internal IPs
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ips, err := net.LookupIP(hostname)
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if err == nil {
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for _, resolvedIP := range ips {
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if restricted, reason := isRestrictedIP(resolvedIP); restricted {
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return false, fmt.Sprintf("hostname %s resolves to restricted IP %s: %s", hostname, resolvedIP.String(), reason)
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}
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if err != nil {
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// DNS resolution failed - reject the URL for security
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// This prevents attacks where:
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// 1. The domain is only resolvable within internal network (intranet domains)
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// 2. Different DNS servers between validation and actual request
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// 3. Attacker-controlled DNS that selectively responds
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return false, fmt.Sprintf("DNS resolution failed for hostname %s: cannot verify if it resolves to safe IP", hostname)
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}
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// Check if any resolved IP is restricted
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for _, resolvedIP := range ips {
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if restricted, reason := isRestrictedIP(resolvedIP); restricted {
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return false, fmt.Sprintf("hostname %s resolves to restricted IP %s: %s", hostname, resolvedIP.String(), reason)
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}
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}
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// If DNS resolution fails, we allow the URL (the actual request will fail anyway)
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// This prevents blocking legitimate URLs when DNS is temporarily unavailable
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// Check for suspicious port numbers
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port := parsed.Port()
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