Files
Enterprise-Knowledge-Base/cli/internal/cmdutil/authretry.go
T
nullkey f2e8e3f56c refactor(cli): drop aiclient package; align AGENTS.md with mainstream
Survey of 10 mainstream CLIs (gh, lark, stripe, vercel, supabase, aws,
azure, gcloud, openai/codex, github-copilot-cli) showed env-gated
per-command --help blurbs are a Stripe-only pattern; gh uses env detect
for telemetry only, and lark relies on installed agent Skills + MCP.
Our cmd/mcp/serve already covers the dominant 2025/26 path, so
internal/aiclient/ (136 LOC + 38 callsites) is net maintenance burden
without precedent.

- Drop internal/aiclient/ entirely (annotations + detect + tests)
- Remove 38 SetAgentHelp callsites + agentAwareHelpFunc / SetHelpFunc
  wiring in cmd/root.go
- Migrate 4 command-level rules to standard Long help (visible to all,
  not env-gated): doc upload mode mutex, kb edit at-least-one,
  kb pin idempotent, search chunks channel mutex
- Rewrite AGENTS.md as a developer guide (gh-style 6 H2 / 167 lines):
  audience preamble + Build / Architecture / Command Structure /
  Testing / Code Style / Error Handling. Drops sections absent in
  surveyed projects (Commit & PR Conventions, Who Uses This CLI)
- Clean 14 internal doc refs (ADR-N, spec §X, v0.X) in source comments
  and docs that pointed at docs/superpowers/ — that directory is
  local-only / uncommitted, so refs are dead for outside readers
- Drop forward-looking "once v0.2 ships" from README
2026-05-15 12:03:56 +08:00

137 lines
4.2 KiB
Go

package cmdutil
import (
"context"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
sdk "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/client"
)
// AuthRetryTransport wraps a base http.RoundTripper with transparent
// recovery from a single 401 response. On a 401 from an authenticated
// (non-/auth/*) endpoint, it invokes refreshFn to obtain a new bearer
// token, replays the original request with the new Authorization header,
// and returns the replayed response.
//
// Behavior:
// - 2xx / 4xx / 5xx other than 401: pass through unchanged.
// - 401 on /api/v1/auth/login or /api/v1/auth/refresh: pass through
// (otherwise a stale refresh token causes infinite recursion).
// - 401 with no initial token configured (api-key contexts): pass through
// - api-key credentials have no refresh semantic.
// - 401 with non-replayable request body (req.GetBody == nil): pass
// through. The SDK always uses bytes.Buffer bodies; this is a safety
// net for hand-built requests.
//
// Concurrency: multiple goroutines may hit 401 simultaneously. The first
// one through acquires the mutex and refreshes; subsequent waiters observe
// the updated currentToken and replay without re-refreshing (singleflight).
//
// The transport intentionally shadows the SDK's bearerToken (set via
// WithBearerToken). After a refresh, the SDK is unaware of the new token -
// the transport's per-request override is the single source of truth for
// the Authorization header. Tokens persisted to the secrets store happen
// inside refreshFn (see cmdutil.RefreshAndPersist).
type AuthRetryTransport struct {
base http.RoundTripper
mu sync.Mutex
currentToken string
refreshFn func(context.Context) (string, error)
}
// NewAuthRetryTransport builds a retry transport. initialToken seeds the
// in-memory token state so the first request's Authorization header
// agrees with whatever the SDK was constructed with.
//
// Pass an empty initialToken to indicate "no bearer credential configured"
// (e.g. an api-key context). In that mode the transport never invokes
// refreshFn - a 401 is propagated as-is.
func NewAuthRetryTransport(base http.RoundTripper, initialToken string, refreshFn func(context.Context) (string, error)) *AuthRetryTransport {
if base == nil {
base = http.DefaultTransport
}
return &AuthRetryTransport{
base: base,
currentToken: initialToken,
refreshFn: refreshFn,
}
}
// RoundTrip implements http.RoundTripper.
func (t *AuthRetryTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
t.mu.Lock()
token := t.currentToken
t.mu.Unlock()
if token != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
}
resp, err := t.base.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil || resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
return resp, err
}
if token == "" {
return resp, nil
}
if isAuthEndpoint(req.URL.Path) {
return resp, nil
}
if req.Body != nil && req.GetBody == nil {
return resp, nil
}
// Singleflight: re-check whether another goroutine already refreshed.
t.mu.Lock()
if t.currentToken != token {
token = t.currentToken
t.mu.Unlock()
} else {
newToken, refreshErr := t.refreshFn(req.Context())
if refreshErr != nil {
t.mu.Unlock()
drainAndClose(resp)
return nil, refreshErr
}
t.currentToken = newToken
token = newToken
t.mu.Unlock()
}
drainAndClose(resp)
replay := req.Clone(req.Context())
if req.GetBody != nil {
body, gberr := req.GetBody()
if gberr != nil {
return nil, gberr
}
replay.Body = body
}
replay.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
return t.base.RoundTrip(replay)
}
// isAuthEndpoint reports whether path is one of the auth endpoints where
// 401 retry would either recurse (refresh) or duplicate work (login). The
// path constants are sourced from the SDK so the CLI and SDK can never
// drift on the canonical paths.
func isAuthEndpoint(path string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(path, sdk.PathAuthLogin) ||
strings.HasPrefix(path, sdk.PathAuthRefresh)
}
// drainAndClose consumes the response body so the underlying connection
// can be reused, then closes it. Errors are ignored because the response
// is being discarded anyway.
func drainAndClose(resp *http.Response) {
if resp == nil || resp.Body == nil {
return
}
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}