a39805aa89
Empty cli/ Go module with Factory + Options skeleton that all v0.x commands plug into. Foundation packages (10 internal/): - cmdutil: Factory(3 closure: Config/Client/Prompter) + Options + Errors with namespaced ErrorCode + typed predicates (IsAuthError / IsNotFound / IsTransient / IsAuthExpired) + Exporter + AddJSONFlags + ExitCode/PrintError - iostreams: package singleton with TTY detection; ColorEnabled honors NO_COLOR / TERM=dumb on demand - agent: mode + detect + annotations (Stripe pkg/useragent pattern; CLAUDECODE / CURSOR_AGENT / CODEX_* / AIDER_* / CONTINUE_* / OPENCODE_* / GEMINICODER env detection) - build: ldflags-injected version/commit/date - safepaths: separator-aware path-traversal protection - config: yaml.v3 schema + atomic save 0600 (XDG-style) - format: success/failure envelope (code/hint/request_id/risk/retryable/ console_url) with typed RiskLevel - prompt: Prompter interface + AgentPrompter (rejects in agent mode) - secrets: file 0600 store with weknora:<context>:<key> namespace - testutil: XDGTempDir(t) test helper Smoke command: weknora version (-/--json). Build/test/vet matrix in .github/workflows/cli.yml across linux x macos x windows x Go 1.24. Factory.Client returns CodeLocalUnimplemented until PR-3 wires the SDK adapter; PR-1 commands (version) don't need it.
73 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
73 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
// Package safepaths provides path-traversal protection for file inputs to
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// commands such as `weknora doc upload`.
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//
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// Two primary checks:
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// - Validate(path): reject empty, ".", "..", or paths containing embedded ".." segments.
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// - WithinRoot(path, root): both are made absolute and compared with a
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// separator-aware prefix check, so a directory named "..foo" cannot
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// masquerade as escaping ".." (the lexical strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..")
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// trap).
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//
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// Symlinks are NOT resolved; callers needing realpath semantics must
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// pre-resolve. Modeled on the same pattern as `internal/utils/security.go`
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// SafePathUnderBase in the server module.
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package safepaths
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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)
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// ErrPathEscapes signals that the given path resolves outside the allowed root.
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var ErrPathEscapes = errors.New("path escapes allowed root")
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// ErrEmptyPath signals an empty input.
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var ErrEmptyPath = errors.New("path is empty")
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// ErrSuspiciousPath signals a "."/".." or embedded ".." traversal.
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var ErrSuspiciousPath = errors.New("path contains suspicious traversal segment")
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// Validate cleans path and rejects empty inputs, "." / "..", or any path that
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// contains an embedded ".." segment after cleaning. It does not resolve symlinks.
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func Validate(path string) (string, error) {
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if path == "" {
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return "", ErrEmptyPath
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}
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cleaned := filepath.Clean(path)
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if cleaned == "" || cleaned == "." || cleaned == ".." {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrSuspiciousPath, path)
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}
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for _, seg := range strings.Split(cleaned, string(filepath.Separator)) {
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if seg == ".." {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrSuspiciousPath, path)
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}
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}
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return cleaned, nil
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}
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// WithinRoot reports whether path lies inside root after both are made
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// absolute. Comparison is separator-aware: a path "/srv/data..foo" is NOT
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// treated as escaping "/srv/data" just because "..foo" textually starts
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// with "..".
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func WithinRoot(path, root string) error {
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absPath, err := filepath.Abs(path)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("resolve path: %w", err)
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}
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absRoot, err := filepath.Abs(root)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("resolve root: %w", err)
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}
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// Equal paths count as "within"; otherwise require a separator-bounded prefix.
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if absPath == absRoot {
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return nil
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}
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withSep := absRoot + string(filepath.Separator)
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if !strings.HasPrefix(absPath, withSep) {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s not under %s", ErrPathEscapes, absPath, absRoot)
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}
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return nil
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}
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