Files
Enterprise-Knowledge-Base/cli/internal/safepaths/safepaths.go
T
nullkey a39805aa89 feat(cli): scaffold weknora CLI module foundation (PR-1)
Empty cli/ Go module with Factory + Options skeleton that all v0.x commands
plug into.

Foundation packages (10 internal/):
- cmdutil: Factory(3 closure: Config/Client/Prompter) + Options + Errors
  with namespaced ErrorCode + typed predicates (IsAuthError / IsNotFound /
  IsTransient / IsAuthExpired) + Exporter + AddJSONFlags + ExitCode/PrintError
- iostreams: package singleton with TTY detection; ColorEnabled honors
  NO_COLOR / TERM=dumb on demand
- agent: mode + detect + annotations (Stripe pkg/useragent pattern;
  CLAUDECODE / CURSOR_AGENT / CODEX_* / AIDER_* / CONTINUE_* /
  OPENCODE_* / GEMINICODER env detection)
- build: ldflags-injected version/commit/date
- safepaths: separator-aware path-traversal protection
- config: yaml.v3 schema + atomic save 0600 (XDG-style)
- format: success/failure envelope (code/hint/request_id/risk/retryable/
  console_url) with typed RiskLevel
- prompt: Prompter interface + AgentPrompter (rejects in agent mode)
- secrets: file 0600 store with weknora:<context>:<key> namespace
- testutil: XDGTempDir(t) test helper

Smoke command: weknora version (-/--json). Build/test/vet matrix in
.github/workflows/cli.yml across linux x macos x windows x Go 1.24.

Factory.Client returns CodeLocalUnimplemented until PR-3 wires the SDK
adapter; PR-1 commands (version) don't need it.
2026-05-07 23:19:46 +08:00

73 lines
2.4 KiB
Go

// Package safepaths provides path-traversal protection for file inputs to
// commands such as `weknora doc upload`.
//
// Two primary checks:
// - Validate(path): reject empty, ".", "..", or paths containing embedded ".." segments.
// - WithinRoot(path, root): both are made absolute and compared with a
// separator-aware prefix check, so a directory named "..foo" cannot
// masquerade as escaping ".." (the lexical strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..")
// trap).
//
// Symlinks are NOT resolved; callers needing realpath semantics must
// pre-resolve. Modeled on the same pattern as `internal/utils/security.go`
// SafePathUnderBase in the server module.
package safepaths
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
// ErrPathEscapes signals that the given path resolves outside the allowed root.
var ErrPathEscapes = errors.New("path escapes allowed root")
// ErrEmptyPath signals an empty input.
var ErrEmptyPath = errors.New("path is empty")
// ErrSuspiciousPath signals a "."/".." or embedded ".." traversal.
var ErrSuspiciousPath = errors.New("path contains suspicious traversal segment")
// Validate cleans path and rejects empty inputs, "." / "..", or any path that
// contains an embedded ".." segment after cleaning. It does not resolve symlinks.
func Validate(path string) (string, error) {
if path == "" {
return "", ErrEmptyPath
}
cleaned := filepath.Clean(path)
if cleaned == "" || cleaned == "." || cleaned == ".." {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrSuspiciousPath, path)
}
for _, seg := range strings.Split(cleaned, string(filepath.Separator)) {
if seg == ".." {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrSuspiciousPath, path)
}
}
return cleaned, nil
}
// WithinRoot reports whether path lies inside root after both are made
// absolute. Comparison is separator-aware: a path "/srv/data..foo" is NOT
// treated as escaping "/srv/data" just because "..foo" textually starts
// with "..".
func WithinRoot(path, root string) error {
absPath, err := filepath.Abs(path)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("resolve path: %w", err)
}
absRoot, err := filepath.Abs(root)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("resolve root: %w", err)
}
// Equal paths count as "within"; otherwise require a separator-bounded prefix.
if absPath == absRoot {
return nil
}
withSep := absRoot + string(filepath.Separator)
if !strings.HasPrefix(absPath, withSep) {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s not under %s", ErrPathEscapes, absPath, absRoot)
}
return nil
}