3611a8607d
* feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode When the auth.registration_mode toggle flips to invite_only, the public /auth/register endpoint returns 403 — but until now there was no channel for unregistered users to actually join a tenant. The existing invitation table required a registered invitee, so new emails could not enter the system at all. This change introduces a share-link model: - Owner generates a multi-use registration link with a per-tenant role - Recipient opens the link, registers with their own email, and is added to the tenant on the same request - Token is stored in plaintext (not hashed) so the management UI can re-display the URL on demand without a "copy now or revoke" trap. Threat model is bounded by 7-day TTL, revocability, and the fact that all the link grants is membership in one tenant. - accepted_count tracks how many users joined through the link so the Owner can tell whether a link is fresh or has already been spread Per-user invitations (registered email -> in-app inbox accept) are unchanged. Share-link rows use empty invitee_user_id as discriminator; the partial unique index on (tenant_id, invitee_user_id) was relaxed to skip empty values so multiple share links can coexist per tenant. Frontend reuses Login.vue for /register?token=xxx instead of a parallel page, and adds icon-only revoke / remove actions plus a distinct "active" status tag for share-link rows. Migration 000054 adds the token column, the accepted_count column, and the relaxed pending unique index in a single step. * feat(auth): update invitation token handling and add rate limiting - Refactor the invitation token retrieval to use POST instead of GET, enhancing security by preventing the plaintext token from appearing in logs and browser history. - Update the API endpoint from `/auth/invitations/:token` to `/auth/invitations/lookup` to reflect the new method. - Introduce a rate limiter for unauthenticated share-link endpoints to mitigate brute-force attacks and abuse, ensuring a maximum of 30 requests per minute per IP. - Adjust the registration flow to maintain user experience while securing the invitation process.
31 lines
1.4 KiB
SQL
31 lines
1.4 KiB
SQL
-- Reverse of 000054_invitation_share_links.
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DO $$ BEGIN RAISE NOTICE '[Migration 000054] Reverting share-link columns on tenant_invitations'; END $$;
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DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_tenant_invitations_token;
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DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_tenant_invitations_unique_pending;
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-- Share-link rows have invitee_user_id='' and the up migration's index
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-- explicitly excludes those values; the legacy index does not. If we
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-- recreate the legacy unique index while multiple share-link rows
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-- coexist on a tenant, the CREATE will abort with duplicate-key. Drop
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-- the share-link rows before rebuilding so the rollback is idempotent
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-- regardless of how many share links the tenant has issued. This is
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-- intentionally destructive — share-link rows have no per-user state
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-- worth preserving (no specific invitee, no pending acceptance), and
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-- the only alternative would be leaving orphaned rows the legacy
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-- schema can't represent.
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DELETE FROM tenant_invitations
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WHERE invitee_user_id = ''
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AND deleted_at IS NULL;
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CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tenant_invitations_unique_pending
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ON tenant_invitations(tenant_id, invitee_user_id)
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WHERE status = 'pending' AND deleted_at IS NULL;
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ALTER TABLE tenant_invitations
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DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS accepted_count,
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DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS token,
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ALTER COLUMN invitee_user_id DROP DEFAULT;
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DO $$ BEGIN RAISE NOTICE '[Migration 000054] tenant_invitations reverted'; END $$;
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