ad150c7126
Sweep every CLI output path through the v0.7 envelope contract.
FormatOptions.Emit signature changes to (w, data, meta *output.Meta)
so list commands surface meta.count / has_more in the wire envelope.
TTY indent decision plumbed via FormatOptions.TTY (set by
ResolveDefault). --format and --jq promoted to persistent root flags
so unknown-subcommand paths still reach the typed-envelope guard
(per-command registration would have rejected --format on unknown
commands as cobra-prose exit 2). WEKNORA_FORMAT env-var fallback
honored before TTY-resolved default. AddFormatFlag retained for the
per-command --jq field-hint Long-text addendum.
~55 production Emit call sites swept across cli/cmd/**: list paths
populate meta.count; mutation paths pass nil meta; envelope.profile
threaded via globalProfile. Existing JSON-shape tests migrated to
decode the envelope wrapper.
Multi-target batch operations get a unified shape via new helpers:
- output.BatchItem + output.WriteBatchEnvelope (§4.5 per-item ok
pattern; data:[{id, ok, result?|error?}], meta:{count, successes*,
failures*}; Successes/Failures *int so explicit zero survives
omitempty in all-fail case).
- cmdutil.RunBatch + cmdutil.EmitBatch + cmdutil.DeletedAtNow +
cmdutil.ClassifyContextErr collapse the three previously-duplicated
multi-delete pipelines (doc / chunk / session) into one call site
pattern. doc upload --recursive uses the same helpers with a per-
file resultFn. Summary error sets Silent:true so the stderr
envelope path doesn't duplicate the stdout batch detail (exit 1
preserved via Code → ExitCode).
ConfirmDestructive / ConfirmDestructiveBatch extended with action +
retryCmd parameters. Every destructive command (kb delete, kb edit,
doc delete, doc delete --all, agent delete, agent edit, session
delete, chunk delete, auth logout, api -X DELETE) now attaches
error.risk.{level:"destructive", action:"<noun.verb>"} +
error.retry_command on the exit-10 envelope. kb edit / agent edit
also gain the destructive guard wiring (CHANGELOG listed them as
gated but they were silently executing without -y).
MCP tool handlers' 31 error paths return CallToolResult with
IsError + Content text fallback + StructuredContent (envelope.error
shape via cmdutil.ErrorToDetail). Handler Out type changed from
typed *sdk.X to any so the go-sdk auto-marshal doesn't overwrite
StructuredContent with a zero-struct on error returns. Success path
manually populates CallToolResult.StructuredContent via successResult
helper.
weknora api cleanup:
- -d/--data flag removed; body via --input <file> or --input -
(stdin) only. Aligns with gh / curl convention.
- HTTP method whitelist removed; any non-empty method accepted.
- HTTP Retry-After header → cmdutil.Error.RetryAfterSeconds →
envelope.error.retry_after_seconds.
- runAPIPaginated raw-passthrough fallback now wraps response in
envelope so --paginate never emits bare JSON to stdout.
Test sweep: ~60 cmd/** tests migrated to decode envelope shape.
9 wire-contract goldens updated under cli/acceptance/testdata/wire/.
Spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-weknora-cli-v0.7-design.md §4 / §5
308 lines
11 KiB
Go
308 lines
11 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"strings"
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"github.com/spf13/cobra"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/cmdutil"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/config"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/iostreams"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/secrets"
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sdk "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/client"
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)
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// authLoginFields enumerates the fields surfaced for `--format json` discovery on
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// `auth login`. The post-login summary has no token values - they stay in the
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// keyring; agents who need to verify the credential should re-run
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// `auth status`.
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var authLoginFields = []string{
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"profile", "host", "mode", "user", "tenant_id",
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}
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// LoginOptions is the configuration captured from flags + prompts.
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type LoginOptions struct {
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Host string // --host
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Context string // --name: context name to write into config.yaml
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WithToken bool // --with-token: read api key from stdin instead of prompting password
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APIKey string // populated by --with-token from stdin
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Email string
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Password string
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StdinReader io.Reader // override for tests
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}
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// LoginService is the narrow SDK surface auth login depends on.
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// *sdk.Client satisfies it implicitly via the new Login(ctx, LoginRequest)
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// signature added in client/auth.go.
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type LoginService interface {
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Login(ctx context.Context, req sdk.LoginRequest) (*sdk.LoginResponse, error)
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}
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// apiKeyValidator probes /auth/me with the supplied API key so a bad key
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// fails fast at `auth login --with-token` time rather than on the next
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// authenticated call.
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//
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// Returns the resolved user (used to populate context.User / TenantID at
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// rest, so later `auth list` reflects who owns the key).
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type apiKeyValidator func(ctx context.Context, host, apiKey string) (*sdk.AuthUser, error)
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// defaultAPIKeyValidator builds a one-shot SDK client with the supplied key
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// and calls /auth/me. Side-effect-free; no persistence.
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var defaultAPIKeyValidator apiKeyValidator = func(ctx context.Context, host, apiKey string) (*sdk.AuthUser, error) {
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resp, err := sdk.NewClient(host, sdk.WithAPIKey(apiKey)).GetCurrentUser(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if !resp.Success || resp.Data.User == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("server rejected the API key (no user returned)")
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}
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return resp.Data.User, nil
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}
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// NewCmdLogin builds the `weknora auth login` command. runF is the testable
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// entrypoint (left nil for production; see cli/cmd/auth/login_test.go).
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func NewCmdLogin(f *cmdutil.Factory, runF func(context.Context, *LoginOptions, *cmdutil.FormatOptions, *cmdutil.Factory, LoginService) error) *cobra.Command {
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opts := &LoginOptions{}
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cmd := &cobra.Command{
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Use: "login",
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Short: "Authenticate against a WeKnora server and persist credentials",
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Long: `Log in by email + password (interactive prompt) or pipe an API key with --with-token.
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Credentials are persisted to the OS keyring when available; otherwise to a
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0600 file under $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weknora/secrets. The named context becomes
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the current_context in ~/.config/weknora/config.yaml.`,
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Args: cobra.NoArgs,
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RunE: func(c *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
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fopts, err := cmdutil.CheckFormatFlag(c)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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fopts.ResolveDefault(iostreams.IO.IsStdoutTTY())
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run := runF
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if run == nil {
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run = runLogin
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}
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svc := loginServiceFor(opts.Host)
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if opts.StdinReader == nil {
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opts.StdinReader = iostreams.IO.In
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}
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return run(c.Context(), opts, fopts, f, svc)
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},
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}
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cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Host, "host", "", "WeKnora server URL, e.g. https://kb.example.com")
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cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Context, "name", "default", "Profile name to register in config.yaml")
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cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.WithToken, "with-token", false, "Read an API key from stdin instead of prompting for password")
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cmdutil.AddFormatFlag(cmd, authLoginFields...)
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_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("host")
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return cmd
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}
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// loginServiceFor returns a fresh SDK client targeting host. login.go cannot
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// reuse Factory.Client because that closure requires an existing context.
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func loginServiceFor(host string) LoginService {
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if host == "" {
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return nil
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}
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return sdk.NewClient(host)
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}
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func runLogin(ctx context.Context, opts *LoginOptions, fopts *cmdutil.FormatOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, svc LoginService) error {
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if err := validateHost(opts.Host); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if opts.WithToken {
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key, err := readStdinTrimmed(opts.StdinReader)
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if err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalFileIO, err, "read stdin")
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}
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if key == "" {
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return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeInputMissingFlag, "--with-token requires an API key piped to stdin")
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}
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opts.APIKey = key
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// Validate against the server before persisting so a typo'd /
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// expired / wrong-host key fails fast at login time. The probe
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// is /auth/me - read-only, side-effect-free.
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user, err := defaultAPIKeyValidator(ctx, opts.Host, key)
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if err != nil {
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// Transport errors (connection refused, DNS failure) must not be
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// surfaced as auth.bad_credential — the key may be fine but the
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// host is unreachable. Classify via WrapHTTP so network errors
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// get CodeNetworkError and the hint points at `weknora doctor`.
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if cmdutil.ClassifyHTTPError(err) == cmdutil.CodeNetworkError {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeNetworkError, err, "validate API key: check host reachability")
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}
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeAuthBadCredential, err, "validate API key")
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}
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return persistAPIKey(opts, fopts, f, user)
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}
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// Interactive: prompt for email + password.
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if svc == nil {
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return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeServerError, "login: no SDK client (host missing?)")
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}
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if opts.Email == "" || opts.Password == "" {
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p := f.Prompter()
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if opts.Email == "" {
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email, err := p.Input("Email", "")
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if err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeInputMissingFlag, err, "email prompt")
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}
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opts.Email = email
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}
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if opts.Password == "" {
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pw, err := p.Password("Password")
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if err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeInputMissingFlag, err, "password prompt")
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}
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opts.Password = pw
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}
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}
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resp, err := svc.Login(ctx, sdk.LoginRequest{Email: opts.Email, Password: opts.Password})
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if err != nil {
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// Transport errors (connection refused, DNS failure) must not be
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// surfaced as auth.bad_credential — credentials may be fine but the
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// host is unreachable. Classify so network errors get CodeNetworkError.
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if cmdutil.ClassifyHTTPError(err) == cmdutil.CodeNetworkError {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeNetworkError, err, "login: check host reachability")
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}
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeAuthBadCredential, err, "login")
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}
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if !resp.Success || resp.Token == "" {
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return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeAuthBadCredential, fmt.Sprintf("login refused: %s", resp.Message))
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}
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return persistJWT(opts, fopts, f, resp)
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}
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// persistAPIKey saves the --with-token API key and writes the context.
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// user is the principal returned by /auth/me during pre-persist validation,
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// used to populate context.User / TenantID so `auth list` reflects who
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// owns the key.
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func persistAPIKey(opts *LoginOptions, fopts *cmdutil.FormatOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, user *sdk.AuthUser) error {
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store, err := f.Secrets()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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warnOnFileFallback(store)
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if err := store.Set(opts.Context, "api_key", opts.APIKey); err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalKeychainDenied, err, "save api key")
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}
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ctx := &config.Context{
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Host: opts.Host,
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APIKeyRef: store.Ref(opts.Context, "api_key"),
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}
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if user != nil {
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ctx.User = user.Email
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ctx.TenantID = user.TenantID
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}
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return saveContextRef(opts, fopts, f, ctx, user)
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}
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// persistJWT saves access + refresh tokens and writes the context.
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func persistJWT(opts *LoginOptions, fopts *cmdutil.FormatOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, resp *sdk.LoginResponse) error {
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store, err := f.Secrets()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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warnOnFileFallback(store)
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if err := store.Set(opts.Context, "access", resp.Token); err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalKeychainDenied, err, "save access token")
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}
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if resp.RefreshToken != "" {
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if err := store.Set(opts.Context, "refresh", resp.RefreshToken); err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalKeychainDenied, err, "save refresh token")
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}
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}
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c := &config.Context{
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Host: opts.Host,
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TokenRef: store.Ref(opts.Context, "access"),
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RefreshRef: store.Ref(opts.Context, "refresh"),
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}
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if resp.User != nil {
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c.User = resp.User.Email
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c.TenantID = resp.User.TenantID
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}
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return saveContextRef(opts, fopts, f, c, resp.User)
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}
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// loginResult is the typed payload emitted by `--format json`. mode is derived from
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// whether the server returned a user (password flow) vs API-key flow.
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type loginResult struct {
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Profile string `json:"profile"`
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Host string `json:"host"`
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Mode string `json:"mode"` // ModeBearer or ModeAPIKey
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User string `json:"user,omitempty"`
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TenantID uint64 `json:"tenant_id,omitempty"`
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}
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// saveContextRef writes the context to config.yaml and prints success.
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func saveContextRef(opts *LoginOptions, fopts *cmdutil.FormatOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, ctx *config.Context, user *sdk.AuthUser) error {
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cfg, err := f.Config()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if cfg.Contexts == nil {
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cfg.Contexts = map[string]config.Context{}
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}
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cfg.Contexts[opts.Context] = *ctx
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cfg.CurrentContext = opts.Context
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if err := config.Save(cfg); err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalFileIO, err, "save config")
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}
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if fopts.WantsJSON() {
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result := loginResult{Profile: opts.Context, Host: opts.Host, Mode: ModeAPIKey}
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if user != nil {
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result.Mode = ModeBearer
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result.User = user.Email
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result.TenantID = user.TenantID
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}
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return fopts.Emit(iostreams.IO.Out, result, nil)
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}
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who := opts.Context
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if user != nil {
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who = user.Email
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}
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fmt.Fprintf(iostreams.IO.Out, "✓ Logged in to %s as %s (context=%s)\n", opts.Host, who, opts.Context)
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return nil
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}
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// validateHost rejects empty / non-http URLs early so we surface a clean
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// flag error instead of failing inside the SDK transport.
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func validateHost(host string) error {
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_, err := cmdutil.NormalizeHost(host)
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return err
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}
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// warnOnFileFallback prints a one-shot stderr advisory when the secrets
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// store fell back to the plaintext 0600 file backend (keychain unavailable
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// - typical on headless CI, WSL without DBus, agent containers). Helps
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// users notice that credentials are NOT in the OS keychain before they're
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// surprised by it later. doctor's credential_storage check carries the
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// same info but agents that bypass doctor would otherwise miss it.
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func warnOnFileFallback(store secrets.Store) {
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if _, isFile := store.(*secrets.FileStore); !isFile {
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return
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}
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fmt.Fprintln(iostreams.IO.Err, "warning: OS keychain unavailable - credentials will be saved to a 0600 file under $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weknora/secrets/.")
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fmt.Fprintln(iostreams.IO.Err, " install / unlock the keyring (or use `weknora doctor` to inspect) for OS-backed storage.")
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}
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// readStdinTrimmed reads all of r and returns the result with surrounding
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// whitespace stripped. Empty result is returned as-is for the caller to
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// validate.
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func readStdinTrimmed(r io.Reader) (string, error) {
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if r == nil {
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return "", nil
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}
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b, err := io.ReadAll(r)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), nil
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}
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