Files
Enterprise-Knowledge-Base/cli/cmd/auth/login.go
T
nullkey a0dd989c81 refactor(cli): auth security audit — gh CLI parity hardening
Compared the auth subtree (login/logout/list/status/refresh/token)
against gh CLI's auth implementation. Three gaps closed:

1. `auth login --with-token` validates the API key against `/auth/me`
   before persisting (mirrors gh's pre-persist GetCurrentLogin probe).
   A typo'd / expired / wrong-host key fails fast with
   `auth.bad_credential` (exit 3) and nothing is written to the
   keyring. Side benefit: api-key contexts now carry the resolved
   `user` + `tenant_id` at rest, so `auth list` reflects who owns
   the key — previously these columns were blank for `--with-token`
   contexts because we never queried the server.

2. `auth login` prints a stderr advisory when the secrets store falls
   back to the 0600 plaintext file (keychain unavailable — typical on
   headless CI, WSL without DBus, agent containers). `weknora doctor`
   carried the same info in its credential_storage check, but users
   who go straight to `auth login` could miss it. gh has the same
   silent-fallback gap; we're stricter here.

3. AGENTS.md adds an "Auth security contract" section documenting:
   - Credential storage (keychain primary, 0600 file fallback)
   - `--with-token` reads stdin (not flag value), pre-validated
   - No env-var token bypass — by design, to avoid the
     `/proc/<pid>/environ` / `ps -E` leak surface that
     `GH_TOKEN`-style env vars expose
   - `auth status` / `auth list` never emit token values
   - `auth refresh --json` returns only `{context}` (never the
     new tokens)
   - `auth token` stdout has no trailing newline + TTY stderr hint
   - `auth logout` is local-only (no server-side revocation)

Verified against gh CLI behavior (cli.github.com manual + cli/cli
trunk source):

| dimension                       | gh             | weknora v0.4 |
|---------------------------------|----------------|--------------|
| pre-persist token validation    | ✓              | ✓ (new)      |
| OS keychain primary             | go-keyring     | go-keyring   |
| stderr warning on file fallback | ✗ silent       | ✓ (new)      |
| `auth status` default token     | masked prefix  | not shown    |
| `auth token` TTY warning        | ✗              | ✓            |
| env-var token bypass            | ✓ (GH_TOKEN)   | ✗ by design  |
| process-args / `ps` leak surface| ✗ stdin only   | ✗ stdin only |
2026-05-15 12:03:56 +08:00

296 lines
11 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/aiclient"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/config"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/iostreams"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/secrets"
sdk "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/client"
)
// authLoginFields enumerates the fields surfaced for `--json` discovery on
// `auth login`. The post-login summary has no token values — they stay in the
// keyring; agents who need to verify the credential should re-run
// `auth status`.
var authLoginFields = []string{
"context", "host", "mode", "user", "tenant_id",
}
// LoginOptions is the configuration captured from flags + prompts.
type LoginOptions struct {
Host string // --host
Context string // --name: context name to write into config.yaml
WithToken bool // --with-token: read api key from stdin instead of prompting password
APIKey string // populated by --with-token from stdin
Email string
Password string
StdinReader io.Reader // override for tests
}
// LoginService is the narrow SDK surface auth login depends on.
// *sdk.Client satisfies it implicitly via the new Login(ctx, LoginRequest)
// signature added in client/auth.go.
type LoginService interface {
Login(ctx context.Context, req sdk.LoginRequest) (*sdk.LoginResponse, error)
}
// apiKeyValidator probes /auth/me with the supplied API key so a bad key
// fails fast at `auth login --with-token` time rather than on the next
// authenticated call. Mirrors gh CLI's pre-persist token verification.
//
// Returns the resolved user (used to populate context.User / TenantID at
// rest, so later `auth list` reflects who owns the key).
type apiKeyValidator func(ctx context.Context, host, apiKey string) (*sdk.AuthUser, error)
// defaultAPIKeyValidator builds a one-shot SDK client with the supplied key
// and calls /auth/me. Side-effect-free; no persistence.
var defaultAPIKeyValidator apiKeyValidator = func(ctx context.Context, host, apiKey string) (*sdk.AuthUser, error) {
resp, err := sdk.NewClient(host, sdk.WithAPIKey(apiKey)).GetCurrentUser(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !resp.Success || resp.Data.User == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("server rejected the API key (no user returned)")
}
return resp.Data.User, nil
}
// NewCmdLogin builds the `weknora auth login` command. runF is the testable
// entrypoint (left nil for production; see cli/cmd/auth/login_test.go).
func NewCmdLogin(f *cmdutil.Factory, runF func(context.Context, *LoginOptions, *cmdutil.JSONOptions, *cmdutil.Factory, LoginService) error) *cobra.Command {
opts := &LoginOptions{}
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "login",
Short: "Authenticate against a WeKnora server and persist credentials",
Long: `Log in by email + password (interactive prompt) or pipe an API key with --with-token.
Credentials are persisted to the OS keyring when available; otherwise to a
0600 file under $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weknora/secrets. The named context becomes
the current_context in ~/.config/weknora/config.yaml.`,
Args: cobra.NoArgs,
RunE: func(c *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
jopts, err := cmdutil.CheckJSONFlags(c)
if err != nil {
return err
}
run := runF
if run == nil {
run = runLogin
}
svc := loginServiceFor(opts.Host)
if opts.StdinReader == nil {
opts.StdinReader = iostreams.IO.In
}
return run(c.Context(), opts, jopts, f, svc)
},
}
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Host, "host", "", "WeKnora server URL, e.g. https://kb.example.com")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Context, "name", "default", "Context name to register in config.yaml")
cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.WithToken, "with-token", false, "Read an API key from stdin instead of prompting for password")
cmdutil.AddJSONFlags(cmd, authLoginFields)
_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("host")
aiclient.SetAgentHelp(cmd, "Authenticates and stores credentials. --with-token reads an API key from stdin (no password prompt, agent-safe). Otherwise email/password prompts fire — non-TTY callers must pipe `--with-token` or pre-set --name. Errors: auth.bad_credential on wrong password; input.invalid_argument on bad --host; input.missing_flag when --with-token has empty stdin.")
return cmd
}
// loginServiceFor returns a fresh SDK client targeting host. login.go cannot
// reuse Factory.Client because that closure requires an existing context.
func loginServiceFor(host string) LoginService {
if host == "" {
return nil
}
return sdk.NewClient(host)
}
func runLogin(ctx context.Context, opts *LoginOptions, jopts *cmdutil.JSONOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, svc LoginService) error {
if err := validateHost(opts.Host); err != nil {
return err
}
if opts.WithToken {
key, err := readStdinTrimmed(opts.StdinReader)
if err != nil {
return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalFileIO, err, "read stdin")
}
if key == "" {
return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeInputMissingFlag, "--with-token requires an API key piped to stdin")
}
opts.APIKey = key
// Validate against the server before persisting so a typo'd /
// expired / wrong-host key fails fast (gh CLI parity). The probe
// is /auth/me — read-only, side-effect-free.
user, err := defaultAPIKeyValidator(ctx, opts.Host, key)
if err != nil {
return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeAuthBadCredential, err, "validate API key")
}
return persistAPIKey(opts, jopts, f, user)
}
// Interactive: prompt for email + password.
if svc == nil {
return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeServerError, "login: no SDK client (host missing?)")
}
if opts.Email == "" || opts.Password == "" {
p := f.Prompter()
if opts.Email == "" {
email, err := p.Input("Email", "")
if err != nil {
return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeInputMissingFlag, err, "email prompt")
}
opts.Email = email
}
if opts.Password == "" {
pw, err := p.Password("Password")
if err != nil {
return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeInputMissingFlag, err, "password prompt")
}
opts.Password = pw
}
}
resp, err := svc.Login(ctx, sdk.LoginRequest{Email: opts.Email, Password: opts.Password})
if err != nil {
return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeAuthBadCredential, err, "login")
}
if !resp.Success || resp.Token == "" {
return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeAuthBadCredential, fmt.Sprintf("login refused: %s", resp.Message))
}
return persistJWT(opts, jopts, f, resp)
}
// persistAPIKey saves the --with-token API key and writes the context.
// user is the principal returned by /auth/me during pre-persist validation,
// used to populate context.User / TenantID so `auth list` reflects who
// owns the key.
func persistAPIKey(opts *LoginOptions, jopts *cmdutil.JSONOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, user *sdk.AuthUser) error {
store, err := f.Secrets()
if err != nil {
return err
}
warnOnFileFallback(store)
if err := store.Set(opts.Context, "api_key", opts.APIKey); err != nil {
return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalKeychainDenied, err, "save api key")
}
ctx := &config.Context{
Host: opts.Host,
APIKeyRef: store.Ref(opts.Context, "api_key"),
}
if user != nil {
ctx.User = user.Email
ctx.TenantID = user.TenantID
}
return saveContextRef(opts, jopts, f, ctx, user)
}
// persistJWT saves access + refresh tokens and writes the context.
func persistJWT(opts *LoginOptions, jopts *cmdutil.JSONOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, resp *sdk.LoginResponse) error {
store, err := f.Secrets()
if err != nil {
return err
}
warnOnFileFallback(store)
if err := store.Set(opts.Context, "access", resp.Token); err != nil {
return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalKeychainDenied, err, "save access token")
}
if resp.RefreshToken != "" {
if err := store.Set(opts.Context, "refresh", resp.RefreshToken); err != nil {
return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalKeychainDenied, err, "save refresh token")
}
}
c := &config.Context{
Host: opts.Host,
TokenRef: store.Ref(opts.Context, "access"),
RefreshRef: store.Ref(opts.Context, "refresh"),
}
if resp.User != nil {
c.User = resp.User.Email
c.TenantID = resp.User.TenantID
}
return saveContextRef(opts, jopts, f, c, resp.User)
}
// loginResult is the typed payload emitted by `--json`. mode is derived from
// whether the server returned a user (password flow) vs API-key flow.
type loginResult struct {
Context string `json:"context"`
Host string `json:"host"`
Mode string `json:"mode"` // ModeBearer or ModeAPIKey
User string `json:"user,omitempty"`
TenantID uint64 `json:"tenant_id,omitempty"`
}
// saveContextRef writes the context to config.yaml and prints success.
func saveContextRef(opts *LoginOptions, jopts *cmdutil.JSONOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, ctx *config.Context, user *sdk.AuthUser) error {
cfg, err := f.Config()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if cfg.Contexts == nil {
cfg.Contexts = map[string]config.Context{}
}
cfg.Contexts[opts.Context] = *ctx
cfg.CurrentContext = opts.Context
if err := config.Save(cfg); err != nil {
return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalFileIO, err, "save config")
}
if jopts.Enabled() {
result := loginResult{Context: opts.Context, Host: opts.Host, Mode: ModeAPIKey}
if user != nil {
result.Mode = ModeBearer
result.User = user.Email
result.TenantID = user.TenantID
}
return jopts.Emit(iostreams.IO.Out, result)
}
who := opts.Context
if user != nil {
who = user.Email
}
fmt.Fprintf(iostreams.IO.Out, "✓ Logged in to %s as %s (context=%s)\n", opts.Host, who, opts.Context)
return nil
}
// validateHost rejects empty / non-http URLs early so we surface a clean
// flag error instead of failing inside the SDK transport.
func validateHost(host string) error {
_, err := cmdutil.NormalizeHost(host)
return err
}
// warnOnFileFallback prints a one-shot stderr advisory when the secrets
// store fell back to the plaintext 0600 file backend (keychain unavailable
// — typical on headless CI, WSL without DBus, agent containers). Helps
// users notice that credentials are NOT in the OS keychain before they're
// surprised by it later. doctor's credential_storage check carries the
// same info but agents that bypass doctor would otherwise miss it.
func warnOnFileFallback(store secrets.Store) {
if _, isFile := store.(*secrets.FileStore); !isFile {
return
}
fmt.Fprintln(iostreams.IO.Err, "warning: OS keychain unavailable — credentials will be saved to a 0600 file under $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weknora/secrets/.")
fmt.Fprintln(iostreams.IO.Err, " install / unlock the keyring (or use `weknora doctor` to inspect) for OS-backed storage.")
}
// readStdinTrimmed reads all of r and returns the result with surrounding
// whitespace stripped. Empty result is returned as-is for the caller to
// validate.
func readStdinTrimmed(r io.Reader) (string, error) {
if r == nil {
return "", nil
}
b, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), nil
}