a0dd989c81
Compared the auth subtree (login/logout/list/status/refresh/token)
against gh CLI's auth implementation. Three gaps closed:
1. `auth login --with-token` validates the API key against `/auth/me`
before persisting (mirrors gh's pre-persist GetCurrentLogin probe).
A typo'd / expired / wrong-host key fails fast with
`auth.bad_credential` (exit 3) and nothing is written to the
keyring. Side benefit: api-key contexts now carry the resolved
`user` + `tenant_id` at rest, so `auth list` reflects who owns
the key — previously these columns were blank for `--with-token`
contexts because we never queried the server.
2. `auth login` prints a stderr advisory when the secrets store falls
back to the 0600 plaintext file (keychain unavailable — typical on
headless CI, WSL without DBus, agent containers). `weknora doctor`
carried the same info in its credential_storage check, but users
who go straight to `auth login` could miss it. gh has the same
silent-fallback gap; we're stricter here.
3. AGENTS.md adds an "Auth security contract" section documenting:
- Credential storage (keychain primary, 0600 file fallback)
- `--with-token` reads stdin (not flag value), pre-validated
- No env-var token bypass — by design, to avoid the
`/proc/<pid>/environ` / `ps -E` leak surface that
`GH_TOKEN`-style env vars expose
- `auth status` / `auth list` never emit token values
- `auth refresh --json` returns only `{context}` (never the
new tokens)
- `auth token` stdout has no trailing newline + TTY stderr hint
- `auth logout` is local-only (no server-side revocation)
Verified against gh CLI behavior (cli.github.com manual + cli/cli
trunk source):
| dimension | gh | weknora v0.4 |
|---------------------------------|----------------|--------------|
| pre-persist token validation | ✓ | ✓ (new) |
| OS keychain primary | go-keyring | go-keyring |
| stderr warning on file fallback | ✗ silent | ✓ (new) |
| `auth status` default token | masked prefix | not shown |
| `auth token` TTY warning | ✗ | ✓ |
| env-var token bypass | ✓ (GH_TOKEN) | ✗ by design |
| process-args / `ps` leak surface| ✗ stdin only | ✗ stdin only |
296 lines
11 KiB
Go
296 lines
11 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"strings"
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"github.com/spf13/cobra"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/aiclient"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/cmdutil"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/config"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/iostreams"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/secrets"
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sdk "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/client"
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)
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// authLoginFields enumerates the fields surfaced for `--json` discovery on
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// `auth login`. The post-login summary has no token values — they stay in the
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// keyring; agents who need to verify the credential should re-run
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// `auth status`.
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var authLoginFields = []string{
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"context", "host", "mode", "user", "tenant_id",
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}
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// LoginOptions is the configuration captured from flags + prompts.
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type LoginOptions struct {
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Host string // --host
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Context string // --name: context name to write into config.yaml
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WithToken bool // --with-token: read api key from stdin instead of prompting password
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APIKey string // populated by --with-token from stdin
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Email string
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Password string
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StdinReader io.Reader // override for tests
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}
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// LoginService is the narrow SDK surface auth login depends on.
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// *sdk.Client satisfies it implicitly via the new Login(ctx, LoginRequest)
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// signature added in client/auth.go.
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type LoginService interface {
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Login(ctx context.Context, req sdk.LoginRequest) (*sdk.LoginResponse, error)
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}
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// apiKeyValidator probes /auth/me with the supplied API key so a bad key
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// fails fast at `auth login --with-token` time rather than on the next
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// authenticated call. Mirrors gh CLI's pre-persist token verification.
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//
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// Returns the resolved user (used to populate context.User / TenantID at
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// rest, so later `auth list` reflects who owns the key).
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type apiKeyValidator func(ctx context.Context, host, apiKey string) (*sdk.AuthUser, error)
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// defaultAPIKeyValidator builds a one-shot SDK client with the supplied key
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// and calls /auth/me. Side-effect-free; no persistence.
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var defaultAPIKeyValidator apiKeyValidator = func(ctx context.Context, host, apiKey string) (*sdk.AuthUser, error) {
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resp, err := sdk.NewClient(host, sdk.WithAPIKey(apiKey)).GetCurrentUser(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if !resp.Success || resp.Data.User == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("server rejected the API key (no user returned)")
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}
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return resp.Data.User, nil
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}
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// NewCmdLogin builds the `weknora auth login` command. runF is the testable
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// entrypoint (left nil for production; see cli/cmd/auth/login_test.go).
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func NewCmdLogin(f *cmdutil.Factory, runF func(context.Context, *LoginOptions, *cmdutil.JSONOptions, *cmdutil.Factory, LoginService) error) *cobra.Command {
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opts := &LoginOptions{}
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cmd := &cobra.Command{
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Use: "login",
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Short: "Authenticate against a WeKnora server and persist credentials",
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Long: `Log in by email + password (interactive prompt) or pipe an API key with --with-token.
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Credentials are persisted to the OS keyring when available; otherwise to a
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0600 file under $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weknora/secrets. The named context becomes
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the current_context in ~/.config/weknora/config.yaml.`,
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Args: cobra.NoArgs,
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RunE: func(c *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
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jopts, err := cmdutil.CheckJSONFlags(c)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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run := runF
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if run == nil {
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run = runLogin
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}
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svc := loginServiceFor(opts.Host)
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if opts.StdinReader == nil {
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opts.StdinReader = iostreams.IO.In
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}
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return run(c.Context(), opts, jopts, f, svc)
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},
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}
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cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Host, "host", "", "WeKnora server URL, e.g. https://kb.example.com")
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cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Context, "name", "default", "Context name to register in config.yaml")
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cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.WithToken, "with-token", false, "Read an API key from stdin instead of prompting for password")
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cmdutil.AddJSONFlags(cmd, authLoginFields)
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_ = cmd.MarkFlagRequired("host")
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aiclient.SetAgentHelp(cmd, "Authenticates and stores credentials. --with-token reads an API key from stdin (no password prompt, agent-safe). Otherwise email/password prompts fire — non-TTY callers must pipe `--with-token` or pre-set --name. Errors: auth.bad_credential on wrong password; input.invalid_argument on bad --host; input.missing_flag when --with-token has empty stdin.")
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return cmd
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}
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// loginServiceFor returns a fresh SDK client targeting host. login.go cannot
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// reuse Factory.Client because that closure requires an existing context.
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func loginServiceFor(host string) LoginService {
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if host == "" {
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return nil
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}
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return sdk.NewClient(host)
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}
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func runLogin(ctx context.Context, opts *LoginOptions, jopts *cmdutil.JSONOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, svc LoginService) error {
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if err := validateHost(opts.Host); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if opts.WithToken {
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key, err := readStdinTrimmed(opts.StdinReader)
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if err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalFileIO, err, "read stdin")
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}
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if key == "" {
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return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeInputMissingFlag, "--with-token requires an API key piped to stdin")
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}
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opts.APIKey = key
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// Validate against the server before persisting so a typo'd /
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// expired / wrong-host key fails fast (gh CLI parity). The probe
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// is /auth/me — read-only, side-effect-free.
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user, err := defaultAPIKeyValidator(ctx, opts.Host, key)
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if err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeAuthBadCredential, err, "validate API key")
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}
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return persistAPIKey(opts, jopts, f, user)
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}
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// Interactive: prompt for email + password.
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if svc == nil {
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return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeServerError, "login: no SDK client (host missing?)")
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}
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if opts.Email == "" || opts.Password == "" {
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p := f.Prompter()
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if opts.Email == "" {
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email, err := p.Input("Email", "")
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if err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeInputMissingFlag, err, "email prompt")
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}
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opts.Email = email
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}
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if opts.Password == "" {
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pw, err := p.Password("Password")
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if err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeInputMissingFlag, err, "password prompt")
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}
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opts.Password = pw
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}
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}
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resp, err := svc.Login(ctx, sdk.LoginRequest{Email: opts.Email, Password: opts.Password})
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if err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeAuthBadCredential, err, "login")
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}
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if !resp.Success || resp.Token == "" {
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return cmdutil.NewError(cmdutil.CodeAuthBadCredential, fmt.Sprintf("login refused: %s", resp.Message))
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}
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return persistJWT(opts, jopts, f, resp)
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}
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// persistAPIKey saves the --with-token API key and writes the context.
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// user is the principal returned by /auth/me during pre-persist validation,
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// used to populate context.User / TenantID so `auth list` reflects who
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// owns the key.
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func persistAPIKey(opts *LoginOptions, jopts *cmdutil.JSONOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, user *sdk.AuthUser) error {
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store, err := f.Secrets()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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warnOnFileFallback(store)
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if err := store.Set(opts.Context, "api_key", opts.APIKey); err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalKeychainDenied, err, "save api key")
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}
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ctx := &config.Context{
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Host: opts.Host,
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APIKeyRef: store.Ref(opts.Context, "api_key"),
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}
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if user != nil {
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ctx.User = user.Email
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ctx.TenantID = user.TenantID
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}
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return saveContextRef(opts, jopts, f, ctx, user)
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}
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// persistJWT saves access + refresh tokens and writes the context.
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func persistJWT(opts *LoginOptions, jopts *cmdutil.JSONOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, resp *sdk.LoginResponse) error {
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store, err := f.Secrets()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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warnOnFileFallback(store)
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if err := store.Set(opts.Context, "access", resp.Token); err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalKeychainDenied, err, "save access token")
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}
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if resp.RefreshToken != "" {
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if err := store.Set(opts.Context, "refresh", resp.RefreshToken); err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalKeychainDenied, err, "save refresh token")
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}
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}
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c := &config.Context{
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Host: opts.Host,
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TokenRef: store.Ref(opts.Context, "access"),
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RefreshRef: store.Ref(opts.Context, "refresh"),
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}
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if resp.User != nil {
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c.User = resp.User.Email
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c.TenantID = resp.User.TenantID
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}
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return saveContextRef(opts, jopts, f, c, resp.User)
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}
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// loginResult is the typed payload emitted by `--json`. mode is derived from
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// whether the server returned a user (password flow) vs API-key flow.
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type loginResult struct {
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Context string `json:"context"`
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Host string `json:"host"`
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Mode string `json:"mode"` // ModeBearer or ModeAPIKey
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User string `json:"user,omitempty"`
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TenantID uint64 `json:"tenant_id,omitempty"`
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}
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// saveContextRef writes the context to config.yaml and prints success.
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func saveContextRef(opts *LoginOptions, jopts *cmdutil.JSONOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, ctx *config.Context, user *sdk.AuthUser) error {
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cfg, err := f.Config()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if cfg.Contexts == nil {
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cfg.Contexts = map[string]config.Context{}
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}
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cfg.Contexts[opts.Context] = *ctx
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cfg.CurrentContext = opts.Context
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if err := config.Save(cfg); err != nil {
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return cmdutil.Wrapf(cmdutil.CodeLocalFileIO, err, "save config")
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}
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if jopts.Enabled() {
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result := loginResult{Context: opts.Context, Host: opts.Host, Mode: ModeAPIKey}
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if user != nil {
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result.Mode = ModeBearer
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result.User = user.Email
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result.TenantID = user.TenantID
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}
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return jopts.Emit(iostreams.IO.Out, result)
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}
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who := opts.Context
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if user != nil {
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who = user.Email
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}
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fmt.Fprintf(iostreams.IO.Out, "✓ Logged in to %s as %s (context=%s)\n", opts.Host, who, opts.Context)
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return nil
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}
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// validateHost rejects empty / non-http URLs early so we surface a clean
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// flag error instead of failing inside the SDK transport.
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func validateHost(host string) error {
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_, err := cmdutil.NormalizeHost(host)
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return err
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}
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// warnOnFileFallback prints a one-shot stderr advisory when the secrets
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// store fell back to the plaintext 0600 file backend (keychain unavailable
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// — typical on headless CI, WSL without DBus, agent containers). Helps
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// users notice that credentials are NOT in the OS keychain before they're
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// surprised by it later. doctor's credential_storage check carries the
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// same info but agents that bypass doctor would otherwise miss it.
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func warnOnFileFallback(store secrets.Store) {
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if _, isFile := store.(*secrets.FileStore); !isFile {
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return
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}
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fmt.Fprintln(iostreams.IO.Err, "warning: OS keychain unavailable — credentials will be saved to a 0600 file under $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/weknora/secrets/.")
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fmt.Fprintln(iostreams.IO.Err, " install / unlock the keyring (or use `weknora doctor` to inspect) for OS-backed storage.")
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}
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// readStdinTrimmed reads all of r and returns the result with surrounding
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// whitespace stripped. Empty result is returned as-is for the caller to
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// validate.
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func readStdinTrimmed(r io.Reader) (string, error) {
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if r == nil {
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return "", nil
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}
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b, err := io.ReadAll(r)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), nil
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}
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