Files
Enterprise-Knowledge-Base/internal/middleware/rbac_audit_test.go
T
wizardchen 766a6c482f feat(rbac): per-tenant audit log for RBAC events (PR 6, #1303)
PR 1-5 of the multi-tenant RBAC series enforce the role matrix; what
they don't do is keep a durable record of who did what. Today the
RBAC middleware logs "[rbac] role insufficient ..." to stderr -
perishable, not searchable. Operators cannot answer "who removed
Alice from tenant T-foo on Tuesday" or "did we 403 a probing user
200 times last hour" after the fact.

This PR adds a generic per-tenant audit log that:

- Captures mutating RBAC actions (member add/remove/role-change/leave)
  durably from the tenant_member service after the repo write succeeds.
- Captures enforcement rejections (RequireRole / RequireOwnershipOrRole
  denies under EnableRBAC=true) via a gin-context-injected hook.
- Sliding-window dedup (1 minute) on (tenant, actor, action, path)
  for denied events so a probing client cannot flood audit_logs.
- Default-on - no extra env flag. Schema is generic enough for future
  KB / agent / datasource events to reuse via new action namespaces
  without another migration.

Schema (migration 000044) mirrors wiki_log_entries' shape: a single
audit_logs table with action, target_type/id, request path/method,
outcome, and a JSONB details column. Three indexes: (tenant_id, id
DESC) for the per-tenant cursor feed, actor_user_id for "what did
Alice do", (tenant_id, action) for both the action filter and the
dedup lookup. Sqlite mirror added for Lite mode.

Wiring is nil-safe: the audit field on tenantMemberService and the
gin-context lookup in rbac.go both tolerate a nil service so existing
tests construct without a stub and dormant deployments degrade
gracefully if the provider is misconfigured.

The query API is GET /tenants/:id/audit-log, gated by Admin+ on top
of the existing PathTenantMatch (denial histories should not surface
to ordinary members). Cursor-paginated by descending id (sidesteps
the duplicate-timestamp tie-breaking that BIGSERIAL trivially solves).

Frontend: TenantMembers.vue gets a t-tabs wrapper with Members
(existing) and Audit log (new) tabs; the audit tab is gated to
Admin+ to mirror the server, lazy-loads on first open, paginates via
the next_cursor pattern, and renders coloured chips per
action/outcome so an operator can scan for anomalies. i18n keys
added in all four locales.

Tests: 14 new tests across service (6), middleware (4), and handler
(4). Service tests pin the dedup window behaviour (writes again
after expiry, dedup is per-actor-per-path, degrades on lookup
error). Middleware tests pin both reject sites' audit hook and the
"dormant mode does not fire" + "nil audit does not panic"
invariants. Handler tests pin the cursor envelope and that an empty
page returns next_cursor=0.

Out of scope: per-action ACL on the audit log, retention/TTL job,
KB/agent/datasource event wiring (schema supports it - just no
emitters yet), async writes, frontend filter UI.
2026-05-18 17:28:58 +08:00

138 lines
4.5 KiB
Go

package middleware
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types"
"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types/interfaces"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// PR 6 (#1303): the rbac middleware's two reject paths now call
// AuditServiceFromContext(c).LogDenied so denials are durably
// recorded. These tests pin that wiring — without them, a future
// refactor that drops the AuditServiceProvider middleware (or breaks
// the context-stash key) would silently lose the durable audit
// without any coverage signal.
// stubDenyAudit captures LogDenied calls. Embeds the interface so any
// other method panics on use — keeps tests honest about which API
// they're exercising.
type stubDenyAudit struct {
interfaces.AuditLogService
mu sync.Mutex
calls []denyCall
}
type denyCall struct {
tenantID uint64
actorUserID string
actorRole string
required types.TenantRole
}
func (s *stubDenyAudit) LogDenied(
_ context.Context,
_ *gin.Context,
tenantID uint64,
actorUserID, actorRole string,
requiredRole types.TenantRole,
) error {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.calls = append(s.calls, denyCall{tenantID, actorUserID, actorRole, requiredRole})
return nil
}
// auditableHarness mirrors rbacTestHarness but additionally wires
// AuditServiceProvider with the supplied stub so the rejection
// paths can exercise the audit hook.
func auditableHarness(
t *testing.T, role types.TenantRole, userID string, tenantID uint64,
audit interfaces.AuditLogService, mw gin.HandlerFunc,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
r := gin.New()
r.Use(AuditServiceProvider(audit))
r.Use(func(c *gin.Context) {
ctx := context.WithValue(c.Request.Context(), types.TenantRoleContextKey, role)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.UserIDContextKey, userID)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.TenantIDContextKey, tenantID)
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx)
c.Next()
})
r.GET("/protected", mw, func(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
})
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
func TestRequireRole_RejectFiresAuditHook(t *testing.T) {
audit := &stubDenyAudit{}
w := auditableHarness(t, types.TenantRoleContributor, "u1", 7, audit,
RequireRole(types.TenantRoleAdmin, cfgRBAC(true)))
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected 403, got %d", w.Code)
}
if len(audit.calls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly one audit hook call, got %d", len(audit.calls))
}
got := audit.calls[0]
if got.tenantID != 7 || got.actorUserID != "u1" ||
got.actorRole != string(types.TenantRoleContributor) ||
got.required != types.TenantRoleAdmin {
t.Fatalf("audit hook payload mismatch: %+v", got)
}
}
func TestRequireRole_DormantModeDoesNotFireAuditHook(t *testing.T) {
// EnableRBAC=false: middleware logs but does NOT 403, so the
// durable audit must NOT fire either — the dormant rollout window
// would otherwise generate audit noise for non-rejections.
audit := &stubDenyAudit{}
w := auditableHarness(t, types.TenantRoleViewer, "u1", 7, audit,
RequireRole(types.TenantRoleOwner, cfgRBAC(false)))
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 in dormant mode, got %d", w.Code)
}
if len(audit.calls) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("dormant mode must not fire audit, got %d calls", len(audit.calls))
}
}
func TestRequireOwnershipOrRole_RejectFiresAuditHook(t *testing.T) {
// Mirror of TestRequireRole_RejectFiresAuditHook but for the
// ownership variant — the audit hook lives at a different reject
// site and must NOT skip the durable write.
audit := &stubDenyAudit{}
lookup := func(_ *gin.Context) (string, error) {
return "someone-else", nil // creator != caller, role too low
}
w := auditableHarness(t, types.TenantRoleContributor, "u1", 7, audit,
RequireOwnershipOrRole(types.TenantRoleAdmin, lookup, cfgRBAC(true)))
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected 403, got %d", w.Code)
}
if len(audit.calls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly one audit hook call, got %d", len(audit.calls))
}
}
func TestRequireRole_NilAuditServiceDoesNotPanic(t *testing.T) {
// AuditServiceProvider(nil) is a deliberate no-op; the rbac path
// must degrade to "log to stderr only" rather than crashing.
w := auditableHarness(t, types.TenantRoleContributor, "u1", 7, nil,
RequireRole(types.TenantRoleAdmin, cfgRBAC(true)))
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected 403 even with nil audit service, got %d", w.Code)
}
}