package middleware import ( "context" "crypto/subtle" "errors" "fmt" "log" "net/http" "slices" "strconv" "strings" "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/config" "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/logger" "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types" "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/types/interfaces" "github.com/gin-gonic/gin" ) // 无需认证的API列表 var noAuthAPI = map[string][]string{ "/health": {"GET"}, "/api/v1/auth/register": {"POST"}, "/api/v1/auth/login": {"POST"}, "/api/v1/auth/auto-setup": {"POST"}, // Share-link surfaces accept a plaintext invite token from anonymous // callers (an invitee who hasn't registered yet). They are registered // as public routes in RegisterAuthRoutes and rate-limited by IP, so the // global Auth middleware must let them through — otherwise opening a // share link while logged out 401s and the frontend bounces the user to // /login instead of the register page (issue #1617). "/api/v1/auth/invitations/lookup": {"POST"}, "/api/v1/auth/register-by-invite": {"POST"}, "/api/v1/auth/config": {"GET"}, "/api/v1/auth/oidc/config": {"GET"}, "/api/v1/auth/oidc/url": {"GET"}, "/api/v1/auth/oidc/callback": {"GET"}, "/api/v1/auth/refresh": {"POST"}, // IM platforms (Feishu, Slack, etc.) commonly issue a HEAD request // before GET to validate Content-Type / Content-Length when rendering // image previews — both verbs must be allowed for image links to work. "/api/v1/files/presigned": {"GET", "HEAD"}, } // 检查请求是否在无需认证的API列表中 func isNoAuthAPI(path string, method string) bool { for api, methods := range noAuthAPI { // 如果以*结尾,按照前缀匹配,否则按照全路径匹配 if strings.HasSuffix(api, "*") { if strings.HasPrefix(path, strings.TrimSuffix(api, "*")) && slices.Contains(methods, method) { return true } } else if path == api && slices.Contains(methods, method) { return true } } return false } // Auth 认证中间件 func Auth( tenantService interfaces.TenantService, userService interfaces.UserService, memberService interfaces.TenantMemberService, cfg *config.Config, ) gin.HandlerFunc { return func(c *gin.Context) { // ignore OPTIONS request if c.Request.Method == "OPTIONS" { c.Next() return } // 检查请求是否在无需认证的API列表中 if isNoAuthAPI(c.Request.URL.Path, c.Request.Method) { c.Next() return } // 尝试JWT Token认证 authHeader := c.GetHeader("Authorization") if authHeader != "" && strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") { token := strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") user, jwtTenantID, err := userService.ValidateToken(c.Request.Context(), token) if err == nil && user != nil { // JWT Token认证成功 // 默认 target = JWT 里的 tenant_id(来自登录或 /auth/switch-tenant), // 兼容 ValidateToken 的 fallback:claim 缺失时 jwtTenantID == user.TenantID。 targetTenantID := jwtTenantID if targetTenantID == 0 { targetTenantID = user.TenantID } crossTenantSwitch := targetTenantID != user.TenantID tenantHeader := c.GetHeader("X-Tenant-ID") if tenantHeader != "" { // 解析目标租户ID。畸形 / 零值必须显式拒绝:静默忽略会让坏掉的 // 前端/SDK 悄悄写错租户,反而看不到问题。与 RequirePathTenantMatch // 中对 :id 的校验保持一致(非空、可解析、>0)。 parsedTenantID, err := strconv.ParseUint(tenantHeader, 10, 64) if err != nil || parsedTenantID == 0 { logger.Warnf(c.Request.Context(), "Invalid X-Tenant-ID header from user=%s: %q (err=%v)", user.ID, tenantHeader, err) c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{ "error": "Invalid X-Tenant-ID header", }) c.Abort() return } // 检查用户是否有权限访问目标租户:自家租户、跨租户超管、或 // 有 active membership 行——三选一,由 IsTenantAccessible // 统一判定。 if IsTenantAccessible(c.Request.Context(), user, parsedTenantID, memberService, cfg) { // 验证目标租户是否存在 targetTenant, err := tenantService.GetTenantByID(c.Request.Context(), parsedTenantID) if err == nil && targetTenant != nil { targetTenantID = parsedTenantID crossTenantSwitch = parsedTenantID != user.TenantID log.Printf("User %s switching to tenant %d", user.ID, targetTenantID) } else { log.Printf("Error getting target tenant by ID: %v, tenantID: %d", err, parsedTenantID) c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{ "error": "Invalid target tenant ID", }) c.Abort() return } } else { // 用户没有权限访问目标租户 log.Printf("User %s attempted to access tenant %d without permission", user.ID, parsedTenantID) c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{ "error": "Forbidden: insufficient permissions to access target tenant", }) c.Abort() return } } // 获取租户信息(使用目标租户ID) tenant, err := tenantService.GetTenantByID(c.Request.Context(), targetTenantID) if err != nil { log.Printf("Error getting tenant by ID: %v, tenantID: %d, userID: %s", err, targetTenantID, user.ID) c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{ "error": "Unauthorized: invalid tenant", }) c.Abort() return } // 解析当前租户内的角色 (issue #1303) role, ok := resolveTenantRole(c.Request.Context(), memberService, user, targetTenantID, crossTenantSwitch, cfg) if !ok { // 强制 RBAC 时,缺少 active membership 即拒绝;fail-open 路径已在 // resolveTenantRole 内部处理。 logger.Warnf(c.Request.Context(), "User %s has no active membership in tenant %d", user.ID, targetTenantID) c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{ "error": "Forbidden: not a member of the target tenant", }) c.Abort() return } // 存储用户和租户信息到上下文 logger.Infof(c.Request.Context(), "[auth] resolved role=%s for user=%s in tenant=%d (jwt_tenant=%d, header=%q, cross_switch=%v)", role, user.ID, targetTenantID, jwtTenantID, tenantHeader, crossTenantSwitch) c.Set(types.TenantIDContextKey.String(), targetTenantID) c.Set(types.TenantInfoContextKey.String(), tenant) c.Set(types.UserContextKey.String(), user) c.Set(types.UserIDContextKey.String(), user.ID) c.Set(types.TenantRoleContextKey.String(), role) c.Set(types.SystemAdminContextKey.String(), user.IsSystemAdmin) ctx := c.Request.Context() ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.TenantIDContextKey, targetTenantID) ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.TenantInfoContextKey, tenant) ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.UserContextKey, user) ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.UserIDContextKey, user.ID) ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.TenantRoleContextKey, role) ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.SystemAdminContextKey, user.IsSystemAdmin) c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx) c.Next() return } } // 尝试X-API-Key认证(兼容模式) apiKey := c.GetHeader("X-API-Key") if apiKey != "" { // Get tenant information tenantID, err := tenantService.ExtractTenantIDFromAPIKey(apiKey) if err != nil { c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{ "error": "Unauthorized: invalid API key format", }) c.Abort() return } // Verify API key validity (matches the one in database) t, err := tenantService.GetTenantByID(c.Request.Context(), tenantID) if err != nil { log.Printf("Error getting tenant by ID: %v, tenantID: %d", err, tenantID) c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{ "error": "Unauthorized: invalid API key", }) c.Abort() return } if t == nil || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(t.APIKey), []byte(apiKey)) != 1 { c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{ "error": "Unauthorized: invalid API key", }) c.Abort() return } // 存储租户和用户信息到上下文 c.Set(types.TenantIDContextKey.String(), tenantID) c.Set(types.TenantInfoContextKey.String(), t) ctx := context.WithValue( context.WithValue(c.Request.Context(), types.TenantIDContextKey, tenantID), types.TenantInfoContextKey, t, ) // 通过 TenantID 关联查询用户;找不到时构造系统虚拟用户, // 确保所有依赖 UserContextKey 的下游 handler 正常工作。 user, err := userService.GetUserByTenantID(c.Request.Context(), tenantID) if err != nil || user == nil { // Synthetic user. The "system-" shape is recognised // by types.IsSyntheticUserID, which RBAC service-layer code // uses to skip recording these IDs as a resource creator. // Do NOT change the prefix or numeric suffix without // updating that helper, otherwise KB/Agent CreatorID will // silently start pointing at the synthetic user again. user = &types.User{ ID: fmt.Sprintf("system-%d", tenantID), Username: fmt.Sprintf("system-%d", tenantID), Email: fmt.Sprintf("system-%d@api-key.local", tenantID), TenantID: tenantID, IsActive: true, } log.Printf("No user found for tenant %d via API key, using synthetic system user %s", tenantID, user.ID) } // API-Key 走的是程序化全租户访问,固定授予 Admin 角色:可以做几乎所有事情, // 但保留 Owner-only 操作(删除租户、修改租户级配置)的边界。 // // 显式拒绝 SystemAdmin:API key 通常被存放在 CI / IaC / sidecar 里, // 泄露面比 JWT 大得多。即便 key 关联的 user 在 DB 里恰好是 SystemAdmin // (例如部署里只有一个用户、自己创建了 tenant 又生成了 API key), // 也绝不允许通过这条通道走平台级管理操作(promote/revoke、全局设置)。 // 平台管理必须走交互式 JWT 登录,留下可追责的人类身份。 c.Set(types.UserContextKey.String(), user) c.Set(types.UserIDContextKey.String(), user.ID) c.Set(types.TenantRoleContextKey.String(), types.TenantRoleAdmin) c.Set(types.SystemAdminContextKey.String(), false) ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.UserContextKey, user) ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.UserIDContextKey, user.ID) ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.TenantRoleContextKey, types.TenantRoleAdmin) ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, types.SystemAdminContextKey, false) c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx) c.Next() return } // 没有提供任何认证信息 c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "Unauthorized: missing authentication"}) c.Abort() } } // resolveTenantRole determines the caller's TenantRole inside targetTenantID. // // Order of resolution: // 1. Active TenantMember row → return that role. // 2. Cross-tenant superuser switch (X-Tenant-ID with CanAccessAllTenants=true) // → grant Admin in the target tenant. Org admins are intentionally not // promoted to Owner; tenant deletion / API-key rotation should always // stay with a real Owner inside the target tenant. Cross-tenant access // is also never allowed to trigger the orphan-tenant auto-promotion // below — a superuser only visits, never claims ownership. // 3. No membership but the tenant currently has zero active members AND // the caller is authenticating into their own home tenant (i.e. // targetTenantID == user.TenantID and this is not a cross-tenant // switch). This is the API-key-only orphan-tenant self-heal path: // the registrant becomes Owner of the tenant their own user record // points to. Any other path (cross-tenant switch, JWT minted for a // foreign tenant, etc.) is intentionally excluded to avoid silent // ownership grabs. // 4. Otherwise → return ok=false. Caller decides: // - When EnableRBAC=true (or cfg unavailable): treat as 403. // - When EnableRBAC=false: fail open with Admin so existing deployments // don't break in the rollout window where memberships might lag user // records. // // The boolean second return value reports whether enforcement should reject // the request. It is true whenever a usable role was found OR fail-open // applies; false only when we want callers to abort with 403. func resolveTenantRole( ctx context.Context, memberService interfaces.TenantMemberService, user *types.User, targetTenantID uint64, crossTenantSwitch bool, cfg *config.Config, ) (types.TenantRole, bool) { // 1. 正常成员关系 member, err := memberService.GetMembership(ctx, user.ID, targetTenantID) if err == nil && member != nil && member.Status == types.TenantMemberStatusActive { logger.Infof(ctx, "[auth] resolveTenantRole step1 hit: user=%s tenant=%d row_role=%s row_status=%s", user.ID, targetTenantID, member.Role, member.Status) return member.Role, true } if err != nil { logger.Warnf(ctx, "tenant_members lookup failed user=%s tenant=%d: %v", user.ID, targetTenantID, err) // Fall through; treat lookup errors the same as "no membership // found" so a transient DB hiccup doesn't lock everyone out. } else { var statusInfo string if member == nil { statusInfo = "no_row" } else { statusInfo = "row_exists status=" + string(member.Status) + " role=" + string(member.Role) } logger.Warnf(ctx, "[auth] resolveTenantRole step1 miss: user=%s tenant=%d (%s)", user.ID, targetTenantID, statusInfo) } // 2. 跨租户超管直通:CanAccessAllTenants 用户切到别的租户时不强制要求 membership。 // 注意:这里只授予临时 Admin 角色,不写入 tenant_members,避免"看一眼别人租户" // 意外升级为持久化所有权。 if crossTenantSwitch && user.CanAccessAllTenants { logger.Infof(ctx, "[auth] resolveTenantRole step2 (cross-tenant superuser) -> Admin: user=%s tenant=%d", user.ID, targetTenantID) return types.TenantRoleAdmin, true } // 3. 孤儿租户自愈:仅当用户登录的是自己的 home tenant、且该租户尚无任何活跃成员时 // 允许自动晋升为 Owner。跨租户 switch / JWT 指向他人租户的场景一律不进入此分支, // 防止越权获得他人租户的 Owner 权限。 isHomeTenant := !crossTenantSwitch && targetTenantID == user.TenantID if isHomeTenant { hasAny, anyErr := memberService.HasAnyMembers(ctx, targetTenantID) if anyErr == nil && !hasAny { if _, e := memberService.AddMember( ctx, user.ID, targetTenantID, types.TenantRoleOwner, nil, ); e == nil { logger.Infof(ctx, "[audit] Auto-promoted user %s to Owner of orphan tenant %d (home_tenant=true)", user.ID, targetTenantID, ) return types.TenantRoleOwner, true } else { logger.Warnf(ctx, "Failed to auto-promote user %s in tenant %d: %v", user.ID, targetTenantID, e) } } } // 4. 兜底:根据 EnableRBAC 决定 fail-closed 还是 fail-open if cfg != nil && cfg.Tenant.IsRBACEnforced() { logger.Warnf(ctx, "[auth] resolveTenantRole step4 fail-closed (EnableRBAC=true): user=%s tenant=%d", user.ID, targetTenantID) return "", false } logger.Warnf(ctx, "[auth] resolveTenantRole step4 fail-open (EnableRBAC=false) -> Admin: user=%s tenant=%d", user.ID, targetTenantID) // fail-open 期间保持现有行为(每个登录用户在自己租户里都是"管理员")。 return types.TenantRoleAdmin, true } // GetTenantIDFromContext helper function to get tenant ID from context func GetTenantIDFromContext(ctx context.Context) (uint64, error) { tenantID, ok := ctx.Value("tenantID").(uint64) if !ok { return 0, errors.New("tenant ID not found in context") } return tenantID, nil }