- Added RevokeSystemAdmin functionality to the user service and repository, ensuring atomic checks for self-revoke and last admin scenarios.
- Updated the system handler to utilize the new revocation method, improving error handling for various edge cases.
- Enhanced the bootstrap process to prevent unintended promotions when system admins already exist.
- Refactored related comments and documentation for clarity on the new behavior and safeguards in place.
- Added WEKNORA_BOOTSTRAP_SYSTEM_ADMIN_EMAIL environment variable to promote a specified user to system admin on startup.
- Introduced a new bootstrap process in `bootstrap.go` to handle the promotion logic.
- Updated `.env.example` to document the new environment variable and its behavior.
- Created new views for managing system administrators and system settings, including listing, promoting, and revoking admin privileges.
- Enhanced the frontend to reflect the new system admin features, including UI elements for admin management and settings configuration.
- Updated API interfaces to support system admin functionalities, ensuring proper data handling and user management.
Refactor the tenant RBAC configuration to change the default value from false to true, enabling role enforcement by default. This change allows operators to opt into a logging-only rollout window by explicitly setting the configuration to false.
Updates include:
- Modifications to .env.example and docker-compose.yml to reflect the new default.
- Adjustments in rbac.md documentation to clarify the new default behavior and the opt-in process.
- Code changes across various files to utilize the new pointer-based configuration for EnableRBAC, ensuring nil safety and clearer intent.
No functional changes were introduced; the adjustments primarily enhance clarity and maintainability of the RBAC feature.
PR 1-5 of the multi-tenant RBAC series enforce the role matrix; what
they don't do is keep a durable record of who did what. Today the
RBAC middleware logs "[rbac] role insufficient ..." to stderr -
perishable, not searchable. Operators cannot answer "who removed
Alice from tenant T-foo on Tuesday" or "did we 403 a probing user
200 times last hour" after the fact.
This PR adds a generic per-tenant audit log that:
- Captures mutating RBAC actions (member add/remove/role-change/leave)
durably from the tenant_member service after the repo write succeeds.
- Captures enforcement rejections (RequireRole / RequireOwnershipOrRole
denies under EnableRBAC=true) via a gin-context-injected hook.
- Sliding-window dedup (1 minute) on (tenant, actor, action, path)
for denied events so a probing client cannot flood audit_logs.
- Default-on - no extra env flag. Schema is generic enough for future
KB / agent / datasource events to reuse via new action namespaces
without another migration.
Schema (migration 000044) mirrors wiki_log_entries' shape: a single
audit_logs table with action, target_type/id, request path/method,
outcome, and a JSONB details column. Three indexes: (tenant_id, id
DESC) for the per-tenant cursor feed, actor_user_id for "what did
Alice do", (tenant_id, action) for both the action filter and the
dedup lookup. Sqlite mirror added for Lite mode.
Wiring is nil-safe: the audit field on tenantMemberService and the
gin-context lookup in rbac.go both tolerate a nil service so existing
tests construct without a stub and dormant deployments degrade
gracefully if the provider is misconfigured.
The query API is GET /tenants/:id/audit-log, gated by Admin+ on top
of the existing PathTenantMatch (denial histories should not surface
to ordinary members). Cursor-paginated by descending id (sidesteps
the duplicate-timestamp tie-breaking that BIGSERIAL trivially solves).
Frontend: TenantMembers.vue gets a t-tabs wrapper with Members
(existing) and Audit log (new) tabs; the audit tab is gated to
Admin+ to mirror the server, lazy-loads on first open, paginates via
the next_cursor pattern, and renders coloured chips per
action/outcome so an operator can scan for anomalies. i18n keys
added in all four locales.
Tests: 14 new tests across service (6), middleware (4), and handler
(4). Service tests pin the dedup window behaviour (writes again
after expiry, dedup is per-actor-per-path, degrades on lookup
error). Middleware tests pin both reject sites' audit hook and the
"dormant mode does not fire" + "nil audit does not panic"
invariants. Handler tests pin the cursor envelope and that an empty
page returns next_cursor=0.
Out of scope: per-action ACL on the audit log, retention/TTL job,
KB/agent/datasource event wiring (schema supports it - just no
emitters yet), async writes, frontend filter UI.
Tenant-access decisions previously lived in four places with subtly
different shapes: canAccessTenant in middleware/auth.go, an unexported
isCrossTenantSuperuser in middleware/rbac.go, authorizeTenantAccess +
two opening if-blocks in handler/tenant.go, and resolveTenantIDFromPath
in handler/tenant_member.go. Each variant had its own logging, its
own treatment of the cluster-wide EnableCrossTenantAccess flag, and
its own subtle difference in what "URL :id matches active tenant"
meant.
Collapse all four into middleware/access.go:
- IsCrossTenantSuperuser(ctx, cfg): exported, flag-aware. Both the
per-user CanAccessAllTenants attribute AND
cfg.Tenant.EnableCrossTenantAccess must be true; either alone
rejects, so flipping the cluster flag off operationally revokes
every superuser without a token re-issue.
- IsTenantAccessible(ctx, user, target, memberService, cfg): home
tenant + superuser path + active tenant_members row. Replaces the
old superuser-only canAccessTenant; the X-Tenant-ID gate now also
honours ordinary multi-tenant memberships.
- RequireCrossTenantAccess(cfg): route guard for /tenants/all and
/tenants/search, replacing the 12-line if-blocks at the top of
ListAllTenants and SearchTenants.
- RequirePathTenantMatch(cfg): route guard for /tenants/:id/...,
replacing authorizeTenantAccess (4 callers in tenant.go) and
resolveTenantIDFromPath's superuser carve-out (5 endpoints in
tenant_member.go). The router declares it once on the /tenants/:id
group so the rule lives next to the route definitions.
router/rbac.go grows two factory methods (CrossTenant,
PathTenantMatch) so RegisterTenantRoutes stays declarative and reads
the same as the existing g.Viewer() / g.Owner() / g.OwnedKBOrAdmin()
guards. The /tenants/:id endpoints now group under one
PathTenantMatch() middleware instead of each handler re-deriving the
check.
Handler cleanups follow naturally: tenant.go drops
authorizeTenantAccess and the cross-tenant if-blocks; tenant_member.go
drops the cfg field and shrinks resolveTenantIDFromPath to a thin
parser. NewTenantMemberHandler loses its *config.Config argument;
container/container.go's dig wiring picks up the simpler signature
automatically.
middleware/access_test.go covers all four exports with truth-table
cases (flag/attribute/membership combinations, lookup errors, missing
context). tenant_member_test.go's existing handler-level cross-tenant
assertions still pass because memberTestRouter now mounts
RequirePathTenantMatch the same way the production router does.
Net -41 lines across 8 changed files + 2 new files; no behaviour
change other than the X-Tenant-ID gate accepting active memberships
(which was the original PR 4 goal that motivated this refactor).
- Add TestRequireRole_CrossTenantSuperuserBypass: pin the
CanAccessAllTenants -> Owner-gate bypass behaviour for RequireRole,
matching the existing coverage on RequireOwnershipOrRole. Catches
reorderings of the fast paths that would re-lock org-level
superusers out of foreign-tenant Owner-only routes.
- Add TestAgentCreatorLookup_CrossTenantIsHiddenAsNotFound: lock down
the defence-in-depth tenant re-check inside AgentCreatorLookup so a
future refactor that loosens the service-layer scope (or wires a
cross-tenant variant by mistake) cannot leak access via the
ownership shortcut.
- Reword RequireOwnershipOrRole step 7-8 doc comment so "role check
already failed" is unambiguous (it refers to step 1 above).
- Annotate the synthetic-system-user construction in middleware/auth.go
with a back-pointer to types.IsSyntheticUserID so anyone changing
the prefix or numeric suffix knows to update the helper too.
Middleware
- RequireOwnershipOrRole now skips the creator lookup entirely when
EnableRBAC is off, eliminating a hidden per-request DB roundtrip in
the rollout window.
- New ErrResourceNotFound sentinel lets lookups signal "not visible to
this tenant"; the middleware passes the request through so handlers
can return a real 404 instead of a misleading 403.
- Transient lookup failures now surface as 503 (was 403) so monitoring
can tell denied-by-policy from cannot-verify-right-now.
- Cross-tenant superusers (CanAccessAllTenants) bypass tenant role gates,
restoring DELETE /tenants/:id and ResetAPIKey for org operators that
resolve to Admin in foreign tenants.
- Construction-time warning fires once when cfg is nil/incomplete, so a
wiring bug that disables enforcement globally is visible at boot.
Route coverage
- Add role guards to FAQ, KnowledgeTag, WikiPage, Skill, WebSearch,
WebSearchProvider, WeKnoraCloud, Session, Chat, and Message route
groups so the matrix actually matches the PR description.
Service layer
- KB and agent creators are no longer recorded as the synthetic
system-<tenantID> user used by the X-API-Key path; resources stay
tenant-owned. New types.IsSyntheticUserID helper centralises the
prefix check.
- KBCreatorLookup and AgentCreatorLookup re-check tenant scope so a
same-ID resource in another tenant cannot piggyback through the
ownership shortcut.
Docs
- CustomAgent.RunnableByViewer comment now matches enforcement: it only
blocks Viewer-driven agent-mode runs, not plain RAG/Wiki QA.
Tests
- New cases for the 503/404 paths, lookup-skip behaviour, cross-tenant
superuser bypass, the lookup helpers (not-found, cross-tenant,
built-in agent, missing tenant context), and IsSyntheticUserID.
Build on PR 1's tenant_members schema by enforcing the role matrix on
every authenticated route and at agent run time. Enforcement is gated
behind cfg.Tenant.EnableRBAC so the change ships dormant — the same
code paths log the would-be rejection during the rollout window and
start blocking once operators flip the flag.
Middleware (internal/middleware/rbac.go):
- RequireRole(min, cfg): role-only gate using TenantRole.HasPermission.
- RequireOwnershipOrRole(min, lookup, cfg): allows the original creator
through even when their role is below min, otherwise falls back to
the role check. Lookup errors fail closed; an empty creator_id is
treated as tenant-owned and requires the role.
- Both honour cfg.Tenant.EnableRBAC for the rollout window.
Creator lookups (internal/handler/rbac_lookups.go):
- KBCreatorLookup resolves :id -> KnowledgeBase.CreatorID.
- AgentCreatorLookup resolves :id -> CustomAgent.CreatedBy; built-in
agents (IsBuiltin=true) return ("", nil) so they remain Admin+ only.
- Compile-time guards keep the methods aligned with CreatorLookup.
Route guards (internal/router/rbac.go + router.go):
- rbacGuards bundles the matrix into Viewer/Contributor/Admin/Owner
helpers plus OwnedKBOrAdmin / OwnedAgentOrAdmin. Each Register*
function takes *rbacGuards so route lines remain readable.
- KB / Agent / Knowledge / Chunk / Tenant / Model / MCPService /
VectorStore / DataSource / IMChannel routes annotated per the PR 1
design doc matrix. Tenant-wide infra (models, vector stores, MCP,
data sources, IM channels) reads as Viewer+ and writes as Admin+;
per-resource mutations on KB / Agent route through the
ownership-or-Admin guard.
Resource ownership (services):
- CreateKnowledgeBase / CopyKnowledgeBase populate CreatorID from the
authenticated user, so the OwnedKBOrAdmin guard has a creator to
match.
- CreateAgent / CopyAgent populate CreatedBy similarly. Built-in
agents stay tenant-owned.
Agent run-time gate (internal/handler/session/qa.go):
- AgentQA refuses to launch the agent engine for Viewers when the
target agent has RunnableByViewer=false. Same EnableRBAC gating as
the middleware so it's a no-op until enforcement is turned on.
Tests:
- 12 unit tests cover RequireRole / RequireOwnershipOrRole, including
the fail-open and fail-closed branches and the lookup-error path.