Allow platform system administrators to update builtin model parameters
and credentials from the management UI while keeping secrets masked in API
responses. UI edits clear YAML ownership so startup reconciliation no
longer overwrites runtime overrides.
Introduce a new `max_concurrency` parameter to the model configuration, allowing control over the maximum number of concurrent background tasks (ingestion/enrichment) per model. This feature is applicable to chat, embedding, and VLM models, with a value of 0 or undefined falling back to the global default. Update UI components and localization files to support this new setting, ensuring a seamless user experience.
Introduce unit tests for the tenant API key validation logic, ensuring that scoped keys require capabilities, while full-access keys are validated without them. The tests cover various scenarios, reinforcing the expected behavior of the API key validation function.
Use c.Request.Context() in authenticateAPIKeyRequest so scoped keys are
actually restricted, update dto tests for removed tenant.api_key, and add
a regression test for the attach-context contract.
Strip model base URLs from viewer-accessible initialization config
responses and merge redacted parser secrets before engine check overrides
so admin test flows keep working after masked GET responses.
Apply the same tenant/integration secret policy to auth login, OIDC
callback, switch-tenant, and invite-register payloads, and return masked
config objects from Admin-only tenant KV PUT handlers.
Prevent low-privileged tenant members from reading raw API keys and
infrastructure credentials via tenant profile, KV config, model/MCP/web
search listings, and KB initialization config responses.
Select the auth header for the configured strategy only, instead of
emitting both X-API-Key and Authorization whenever the fields happened
to be set (which double-authed after switching strategies). AuthType=""
keeps the legacy infer-from-fields behavior for pre-existing rows.
Add a configurable api_key_header (non-secret, defaults to X-API-Key) so
services expecting the key in a different header work without plaintext
custom headers.
On connection test, upgrade a bare 401 that advertises RFC 9728
protected-resource metadata into an explicit OAuthRequired signal so the
UI can guide the user to switch to OAuth 2.0. Surface the server's
description from the initialize handshake in the test result.
Scope auth headers to feed fetches, use feed-scoped external IDs and
content-based incremental fingerprints, tolerate partial feed failures,
store feed URLs in settings, and fix credential configured detection.
Support connecting to MCP servers that require OAuth2, with a Cursor-like
zero-config flow: the user provides only a URL and the system performs
metadata discovery, dynamic client registration (DCR), and the
authorization code flow with PKCE on first connect.
- Persist per-user access/refresh tokens and per-service DCR client
credentials, encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM)
- Store the PKCE verifier/state during the flow via Redis with an
in-memory fallback for Lite mode
- Cache MCP clients per (service, user) so tokens stay user-isolated
- Add endpoints for authorize-url, callback, status, and token revoke;
the callback is allowlisted for unauthenticated access
- Surface a structured "authorization required" hint when a tool call
hits an unauthorized MCP service
- Frontend: add an auth-type selector with OAuth config, inline
authorization status/actions, and render the connection test result
inline in the editor drawer instead of a stacked centered dialog
Replace the legacy "redacted placeholder + Clear* boolean" pattern with
dedicated per-resource credential subresources across MCP services,
Models, Web search providers, and Data sources.
Why
---
The previous design had three problems:
1. Main PUT body carried secret fields. The frontend echoed back a
redacted "***" placeholder, and a fragile MergeUpdate / IsRedactedOrEmpty
defense in the service layer tried to detect "user did not change this"
vs "user wants to clear this". A regression in that defense (or a new
frontend forgetting it) silently overwrites the stored secret with the
placeholder.
2. The "remove this credential" UX was a red checkbox under a pre-filled
password input. Three intents (preserve / replace / clear) collapsed
onto one field, and credential changes were bundled with unrelated
config edits in the same submit. Users wiped working keys by mistake.
3. Secret presence was inferred from "did the response come back with a
'***' placeholder", which couples the contract to a magic string.
Design
------
Each of the four resources now exposes:
PUT /{resource}/{id}/credentials # write one or more fields
DELETE /{resource}/{id}/credentials/{field} # clear a single field
"Is this configured?" metadata travels on the main resource response as
a typed map (dto.MCPServiceResponse.Credentials etc.) — no separate GET
endpoint. The frontend reads the configured boolean from the main GET
and never sees secret values at all.
Main PUT endpoints now ignore any secret fields in the request body and
log a deprecation warning if they appear, so legacy clients fail loudly
rather than overwriting silently.
Frontend
--------
- New reusable <CredentialResource> component renders a three-state card
(unconfigured / configured / editing) and drives the dedicated
endpoints. Used by MCP, Model, Web search; DataSource has a bespoke
card with the same behaviour because its credentials are a single
atomic per-connector map.
- Cancel from edit mode now restores state synchronously from the meta
prop. The previous async refresh() was a no-op while state was still
'editing', leaving the input frozen open.
- Remove is single-click + toast. The danger-themed button is the
deterrent; a modal confirm adds friction without adding safety (the
plaintext is irrecoverable client-side either way — recovery means
re-typing).
DTOs (internal/handler/dto/) are deliberately separate from the GORM
models so "no secret in response" is a compile-time invariant: a future
contributor cannot leak a secret without explicitly adding the field to
the DTO, which is review-able in a single diff.
Storage is unchanged — credentials still live in the existing jsonb /
parameters columns. No schema migration.
Cleanup
-------
- types.MCPService / types.Model / types.WebSearchProviderEntity /
types.DataSourceConfig: drop ClearAPIKey / ClearToken / ClearAppSecret
/ ClearCredentials boolean fields, MergeUpdate(), RedactSensitiveData().
- utils/types/secret.go: drop PreserveIfRedacted / IsRedactedOrEmpty.
RedactedSecretPlaceholder constant is retained because VectorStore
still uses the old pattern and is out of scope here.
- Frontend hasExistingApiKey / clearApiKey / convertToLegacyFormat
redaction handling removed; i18n keys renamed secret -> credential.
wizardchen