feat(crypto): AES-GCM at-rest for MCP and DataSource credentials with graceful key-rotation handling
Two encryption gaps and one fail-loud regression, fixed together because
they are inseparable in practice.
At-rest encryption gaps
-----------------------
Before this change, only Tenant.APIKey, Tenant.Credentials.WeKnoraCloud.AppSecret,
Model.Parameters.APIKey/AppSecret, and WebSearchProviderParameters.APIKey
were encrypted with SYSTEM_AES_KEY. MCP and DataSource were missed:
- MCPAuthConfig.Value/Scan went through bare json.Marshal/Unmarshal, so
api_key and token were written to mcp_services.auth_config (json) in
plaintext regardless of whether SYSTEM_AES_KEY was set.
- DataSource.Config (types.JSON) is a byte passthrough, so connector
secrets (Notion token, GitHub PAT, Feishu app_secret, ...) inside the
Credentials map were stored in plaintext too.
Now both follow the ModelParameters / WebSearchProviderParameters pattern.
Encryption operates on a local copy to avoid mutating the caller's
in-memory struct (otherwise the next read of the same *MCPAuthConfig
would surface ciphertext as if it were the API key). For DataSource the
ToJSON ↔ ParseConfig pair is the only application boundary that
materializes credentials, so encrypting there is sufficient and avoids
having to fork the generic types.JSON.
Backward compatibility
----------------------
DecryptStoredSecret returns rows without the enc:v1: prefix verbatim, so
historical plaintext records keep working. Next write re-saves them
encrypted. No migration step.
Graceful Scan-time degradation
------------------------------
The strict "fail loud on key rotation" behaviour of DecryptStoredSecret
turned into a footgun once it ran from GORM Scan: a single broken row
caused ListModels / ListMCPServices / ListDataSources to return zero
results, hiding all other rows and giving the operator no way to find
which credential needed re-entering.
New utils.DecryptStoredSecretLenient: same logic, but on failure returns
("", false). The strict variant is kept for hot paths that are about to
actually USE the credential (so a rotated key surfaces loudly there
rather than silently degrading to "missing api key").
All Scan paths switch to lenient + per-failure log line:
ModelParameters.Scan, WebSearchProviderParameters.Scan,
MCPAuthConfig.Scan, DataSource.ParseConfig, CredentialsConfig.Scan.
On lenient failure the field blanks out (never ciphertext), the row
still loads, the DTO reports configured=false so the UI shows "not
configured", and any upstream call attempted with the empty value fails
with a clear "missing api key" rather than sending ciphertext as the key.
Tenant.AfterFind (Tenant.APIKey) intentionally stays strict — it is the
primary HTTP auth credential and a silent empty value would change auth
semantics ambiguously.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -96,24 +96,28 @@ func DecryptAESGCM(encrypted string, key []byte) (string, error) {
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}
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// DecryptStoredSecret decrypts a value loaded from the database with strict
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// error propagation. Use this from GORM Scan/AfterFind hooks for any field that
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// stores AES-encrypted secrets (API keys, passwords, app secrets).
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// error propagation. Use this in hot-path code that is about to actually
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// USE the credential (e.g. building an upstream HTTP request) — a rotated
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// or missing key must surface as a loud error rather than silently
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// degrading to "no credential", because the user expects the configured
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// upstream call to either work or fail with a clear "auth misconfigured"
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// message.
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//
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// Behaviour:
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// - empty input -> empty output, no error.
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// - no enc:v1: prefix -> returned as-is (legacy plaintext column), no error.
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// - has enc:v1: prefix and SYSTEM_AES_KEY is missing or wrong length ->
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// returns ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey. Callers MUST propagate this so the
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// load fails loudly instead of silently surfacing ciphertext as a credential.
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// returns ErrEncryptedDataMissingKey.
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// - has enc:v1: prefix and key is set -> decrypts, returns any decryption
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// error verbatim (e.g. base64 decode failure, GCM auth tag mismatch from a
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// rotated key).
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//
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// The previous lenient pattern (`if decrypted, err := ...; err == nil { ... }`)
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// hid the rotated-key case and caused the encrypted ciphertext to be sent
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// upstream as the actual API key, surfacing as 401/403 from third-party
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// vendors. Always prefer this helper over calling DecryptAESGCM directly when
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// loading from the database.
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// For GORM Scan paths that load a whole row (where erroring out hides the
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// rest of the resource from the user) use DecryptStoredSecretLenient
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// instead — it lets the row load with the secret blanked out so the UI
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// can render "credential not configured" and the user can re-enter it,
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// without crashing list endpoints when the operator rotates or removes
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// SYSTEM_AES_KEY.
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func DecryptStoredSecret(encrypted string) (string, error) {
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if encrypted == "" {
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return "", nil
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@@ -127,3 +131,29 @@ func DecryptStoredSecret(encrypted string) (string, error) {
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}
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return DecryptAESGCM(encrypted, key)
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}
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// DecryptStoredSecretLenient is the load-path counterpart for use inside
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// GORM Scan / AfterFind hooks. It prefers graceful degradation over
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// failing the whole row load.
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//
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// Returns:
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// - (plaintext, true) for empty input, legacy plaintext, or successful decrypt
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// - ("", false) when the value has the enc:v1: prefix but cannot be
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// decrypted (SYSTEM_AES_KEY missing, rotated, or ciphertext corrupted).
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// The bool=false case is the operator's signal: log a warning and treat
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// the field as unconfigured. The row still loads so the rest of the
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// resource displays normally; the UI shows "credential not configured",
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// and any upstream call attempted with this empty value fails with a
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// clear "missing api key" rather than sending ciphertext as the key.
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//
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// Rationale: a single line of broken ciphertext used to crash entire list
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// endpoints (e.g. ListModels returning "" because one row failed Scan),
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// hiding all other models from the user. Lenient load + loud per-row log
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// is strictly more recoverable than fail-fast Scan.
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func DecryptStoredSecretLenient(encrypted string) (plaintext string, ok bool) {
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plain, err := DecryptStoredSecret(encrypted)
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if err != nil {
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return "", false
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}
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return plain, true
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}
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