feat(cli): add agent-first affordance — envelope, exit-10, --dry-run
Borrows the lark-cli agent-affordance model (https://github.com/larksuite/cli/blob/main/AGENTS.md + skills/lark-shared/SKILL.md) so weknora is designed to be agent-friendly: error messages, output format, and flag design follow conventions agents can rely on. cli/AGENTS.md (operational reference for LLM agents invoking weknora): Public document covering envelope schema, exit-code protocol (0/1/2/10/130), stdout/stderr separation, and behavioral rules. Sensitive commands (\`context use\`, \`kb delete\`, \`doc delete\`, \`init\`) gain "AI agents:" paragraphs in their cobra Long descriptions so guidance shows in --help. format.Envelope schema additions: Risk per-operation classification (read / write / high-risk-write + action description), populated by write commands on both success and failure paths. Notice system advisories (CLI update available, server-CLI version skew); type defined, emit sites land in v0.3. DryRun marker for envelopes returned from --dry-run preview paths. RiskLevel constants realigned to lark's taxonomy: read / write / high-risk-write (was: read / mutating / destructive — not yet wired by any command). cmdutil.Error gains OperationRisk; PrintErrorEnvelope auto-attaches it to envelope.Risk so destructive failure paths surface uniformly. Exit-10 confirmation protocol: New ErrorCode \`input.confirmation_required\` mapped to exit code 10 in cmdutil.ExitCode. ConfirmDestructive now returns this code (with OperationRisk attached) when stdout is non-TTY or --json was set, with -y/--yes absent. Previous behavior — silent proceed in non-TTY — was unsafe: scripts and agents could delete resources with no explicit approval. Three test cases re-pinned around the new contract. This is a wire-contract change for any caller who relied on silent proceed; v0.0/v0.1 had no destructive commands, so the blast radius is contained to v0.2 itself. --dry-run global flag: cmd write paths (kb create/delete, doc upload/delete, api POST/PUT/PATCH/ DELETE) check cmdutil.IsDryRun(cmd) and skip the SDK call, emitting an envelope with dry_run=true plus a Risk classification. Read commands ignore --dry-run by design (no side effect to preview). Human-mode prints \`[dry-run] would <action>\` to stdout. Command discovery: agents introspect via the existing \`--help\` surface (consistent with gh / kubectl / aws / gcloud / terraform — none of them ship a CLI-tree self-description command). An earlier draft added a \`weknora schema\` reflection command; dropped after a mainstream survey found it has no stable analog (lark-cli's schema describes Lark API methods, not its own CLI tree). Tests: 27 cli packages pass at this commit. Added two new tests covering envelope.risk and envelope._notice serialization.
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@@ -1,35 +1,50 @@
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package cmdutil
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/iostreams"
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"github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/cli/internal/prompt"
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)
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// ConfirmDestructive prompts the user to confirm a destructive operation
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// (e.g. delete) when the call is interactive, and proceeds without
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// prompting otherwise. Behavior matrix:
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// ConfirmDestructive guards a destructive operation (delete, force-overwrite)
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// behind explicit user approval. Behavior matrix:
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//
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// yes=true → proceed (skip prompt; explicit user opt-in via -y)
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// non-TTY stdout → proceed (no UI to ask; safer to follow the call
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// than to break scripts/CI that don't pass
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// -y every time)
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// jsonOut=true → proceed (envelope mode is by definition scripted,
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// a prompt would deadlock the consumer)
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// yes=true → proceed (explicit user opt-in via -y/--yes)
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// non-TTY OR jsonOut → return CodeInputConfirmationRequired (exit 10);
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// no UI to prompt, agent/CI must re-invoke with -y
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// after the human explicitly approves
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// TTY + interactive → prompt; user-yes proceeds, user-no returns
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// CodeUserAborted ("Aborted." to stderr)
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// prompter error → returns CodeInputMissingFlag (rare; AgentPrompter
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// path or stdin closed mid-prompt)
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// prompter error → returns CodeInputMissingFlag (rare; stdin closed
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// mid-prompt)
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//
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// `yes` should be sourced from the persistent global -y/--yes flag (see
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// addGlobalFlags in cli/cmd/root.go). Mirrors gh's `--yes` semantics on
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// destructive commands: gh repo delete --yes
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// (https://cli.github.com/manual/gh_repo_delete).
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// The non-TTY branch is the lark-cli skill protocol: high-risk writes
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// always require explicit confirmation in scripted contexts, never silent
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// proceed. See cli/AGENTS.md "Exit codes" and
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// https://github.com/larksuite/cli/blob/main/skills/lark-shared/SKILL.md.
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//
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// `yes` should be sourced from the persistent global -y/--yes flag.
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//
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// On exit-10 path, the returned *Error carries OperationRisk so the envelope
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// printer attaches `risk: {level: "high-risk-write", action: ...}`.
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func ConfirmDestructive(p prompt.Prompter, yes, jsonOut bool, what, id string) error {
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if yes || !iostreams.IO.IsStdoutTTY() || jsonOut {
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if yes {
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return nil
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}
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risk := &OperationRisk{Level: "high-risk-write", Action: fmt.Sprintf("delete %s %s", what, id)}
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if !iostreams.IO.IsStdoutTTY() || jsonOut {
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e := NewError(
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CodeInputConfirmationRequired,
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fmt.Sprintf("delete %s %s requires explicit confirmation: re-run with -y/--yes", what, id),
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)
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var typed *Error
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if errors.As(e, &typed) {
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typed.OperationRisk = risk
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}
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return e
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}
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ok, err := p.Confirm(fmt.Sprintf("Delete %s %s? This cannot be undone.", what, id), false)
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if err != nil {
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return Wrapf(CodeInputMissingFlag, err, "confirm delete")
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