fix(initialization): surface upstream and SSRF errors verbatim in test-connection responses
Test-connection's "连接失败" was nearly useless for debugging because two layers conspired to swallow the actual upstream error: Backend swallow --------------- checkChatModelConnection and CheckASRModel pattern-matched on the upstream error string (401 / 404 / timeout / ...) and replaced it with a fixed Chinese hint. The original SDK message (request URL, response body, provider's error code description) was discarded. Refactor: extract classifyConnectionError(errMsg) — returns just the short Chinese hint. Callers combine "<hint>:<raw err>" so the hint indicates "where to start looking" and the raw error shows "what actually happened". The status-400 special-case (endpoint reachable, parameter mismatch only) still returns success. Frontend swallow ---------------- ModelEditorDialog.testConnection ignored result.message on success paths (fine), but also overwrote it with a generic i18n string on failure paths and 4xx rejections — even though axios's interceptor already lifts the backend's error.message to error.message. Failure branch now uses error?.message || result.message as the toast content; i18n fallback only when neither is present. SSRF allowlist hint ------------------- SSRF validation failures previously returned "Base URL 未通过安全校验: <reason>" with no mention of how to recover (the allowlist is server-side, not configurable in the UI). Operators hit it and were stuck. New utils.FormatSSRFError(label, rawURL, err) wraps the error with guidance to add the host to SSRF_WHITELIST_EXTRA (the operator-facing append-only escape hatch — SSRF_WHITELIST itself is the project's baseline). The hint echoes the failed host so it can be copy-pasted straight into the env var: Base URL 未通过安全校验:DNS resolution failed for hostname test.local.com ... 如该地址确实可信,请联系运维在服务端环境变量 SSRF_WHITELIST_EXTRA 中加入该主机(支持精确域名 / *.example.com 通配 / IP / CIDR),示例:SSRF_WHITELIST_EXTRA=test.local.com, *.example.com,10.0.0.0/8 All SSRF call sites switch to the helper: initialization (CheckRemoteModel / TestEmbedding / CheckRerank / CheckASR / TestMultimodal / batch validation), model CRUD, mcp_service CRUD, knowledge URL ingest, system ReconnectDocReader.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -974,6 +974,51 @@ func resetSSRFWhitelistForTest() {
|
||||
ssrfWhitelist = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// FormatSSRFError takes the error returned by ValidateURLForSSRF and wraps
|
||||
// it with operator guidance — specifically how to add a host to the SSRF
|
||||
// allow-list. Without this hint, users hit "Base URL 未通过安全校验" with
|
||||
// no idea how to recover (the allowlist is configured server-side, not
|
||||
// in the UI). The hint references SSRF_WHITELIST_EXTRA rather than
|
||||
// SSRF_WHITELIST because the latter is the project's baseline list and
|
||||
// EXTRA is the operator's append-only escape hatch.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// `label` is a short noun describing the URL field that failed, e.g.
|
||||
// "Base URL" or "VLM Base URL". The function returns an empty string for
|
||||
// a nil err so callers can use it inline without guarding.
|
||||
func FormatSSRFError(label, rawURL string, err error) string {
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
host := rawURL
|
||||
if parsed, perr := parseHostForHint(rawURL); perr == nil && parsed != "" {
|
||||
host = parsed
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf(
|
||||
"%s 未通过安全校验:%v。如该地址确实可信,请联系运维在服务端环境变量 "+
|
||||
"SSRF_WHITELIST_EXTRA 中加入该主机(支持精确域名 / *.example.com 通配 / IP / CIDR),"+
|
||||
"示例:SSRF_WHITELIST_EXTRA=%s,*.example.com,10.0.0.0/8",
|
||||
label, err, host,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseHostForHint extracts a hostname from rawURL purely so we can echo
|
||||
// it back inside the SSRF hint. Best-effort — returns ("", err) for
|
||||
// completely unparseable input and the caller falls back to the raw URL.
|
||||
func parseHostForHint(rawURL string) (string, error) {
|
||||
if rawURL == "" {
|
||||
return "", fmt.Errorf("empty url")
|
||||
}
|
||||
norm := rawURL
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(norm, "://") {
|
||||
norm = "https://" + norm
|
||||
}
|
||||
u, err := url.Parse(norm)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return "", err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return u.Hostname(), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidateURLForSSRF is the centralised entry-point that all handlers should
|
||||
// call to validate a user-supplied URL. It first checks the SSRF_WHITELIST;
|
||||
// whitelisted hosts skip the full isSSRFSafeURL check.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user