fix(rbac): role-aware UI gates leaked write affordances after tenant switch
When an Owner of tenant A invited user B as a Viewer, B could log in,
switch the active tenant from B's home to A via the user menu, and
still see every write button — Create KB, Upload Document, Edit/Delete
agent — because the role-gate plumbing on the client was wired to the
wrong tenant. The server's RBAC enforcement (PR 2 / PR 5) still blocked
the actual mutations with 403, so no data leaked, but the UI presented
authority the user did not have, which is a confusing and embarrassing
defect.
Five distinct root causes, all on the client / server boundary:
1. `currentTenantRole` (frontend/src/stores/auth.ts) read
`tenant.value.id` — the user's *home* tenant — instead of the active
tenant id. After switching to A, the helper still returned B's home
role (Owner), so every `hasRole(...)` gate in the codebase silently
short-circuited. Fix: read `selectedTenantId` first, fall back to
`tenant.id`.
2. `setMemberships` was only called once, on /auth/login. Hard reloads
(which the tenant switcher triggers) re-ran `getCurrentUser()` via
`App.vue` and `router/index.ts`, but those callers discarded the
`memberships` field of the response, so the auth store kept the
login-time snapshot forever. Role changes between sessions stayed
invisible. Fix: extract memberships in both /auth/me consumers and
feed them into `setMemberships`.
3. `KnowledgeBase.vue`'s `isOwner` compared `kb.tenant_id` to the
active tenant id, so any KB inside the current tenant was treated
as "owned by the caller" — bypassing every role gate below. Fix:
compare against `kb.creator_id` (the field PR 5 introduced) and
require an actual creator match. `canEdit` / `canManage` now layer
`hasRole('admin')` on top so a non-creator with sufficient role can
still manage.
4. `KnowledgeBaseList.vue` and `AgentList.vue` rendered the per-card
more-menu (Settings, Delete, Edit) unconditionally. With the
ownership column from PR 5 this is straightforward to gate on the
client: Settings/Delete now require creator-match or `hasRole('admin')`
per the server's `OwnedKBOrAdmin` / `OwnedAgentOrAdmin` matrix.
5. The axios interceptor (frontend/src/utils/request.ts) had a
"selectedTenantId === defaultTenantId → don't attach X-Tenant-ID"
short-circuit. Any code that wrote the active tenant into
`weknora_tenant` (UserMenu's loadUserInfo, OIDC sync, router
hydrate) made the two values equal, after which the header silently
stopped attaching and subsequent navigation requests landed on the
home tenant. Fix: drop the short-circuit; always attach when
selectedTenantId is set.
Server-side, /auth/me read `user.TenantID` (the immutable home tenant
id stamped at signup) when fetching the tenant for the response, so
the `tenant` field always pointed at home even after the auth
middleware had already resolved an active tenant from X-Tenant-ID.
The frontend then re-keyed `authStore.tenant` to the home tenant on
every refresh, undoing the switch. Fix: read the active tenant id from
context (`types.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)`) and only fall back to
user.TenantID when context is unset.
The server-side enforcement was correct throughout — every fix here is
purely about not lying to the user with the rendered UI.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -193,21 +193,42 @@ const goToParserSettings = () => {
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}
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// Permission control: check if current user owns this KB or has edit/manage permission
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//
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// "Owner" here is "the original creator of this KB" (PR 5 introduced
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// CreatorID). The previous version compared kb.tenant_id to the active
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// tenant id, which only answers "is this KB inside our tenant" — that
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// is true even for a Viewer in someone else's tenant, so the gate
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// silently bypassed every role check below. Now we require an explicit
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// creator match, and the role-aware fallbacks below decide whether a
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// non-creator may edit / manage.
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const isOwner = computed(() => {
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if (!kbInfo.value) return false;
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// Check if the current user's tenant ID matches the KB's tenant ID
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const userTenantId = authStore.effectiveTenantId;
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return kbInfo.value.tenant_id === userTenantId;
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const creatorId = (kbInfo.value as any).creator_id || '';
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const userId = authStore.user?.id || '';
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// creator_id may be empty for legacy KBs created before PR 5; treat
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// those as tenant-owned so the role gate applies (Admin+ can manage,
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// Viewer cannot).
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if (!creatorId) return false;
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return creatorId === userId;
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});
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// Can edit: owner, admin, or editor
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// Can edit: KB creator (any role), or tenant Admin+, or org-share-grant.
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// The hasRole('contributor') branch is intentionally NOT here — being a
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// Contributor in a tenant does not by itself grant edit on someone
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// else's KB. Org shares (orgStore.canEditKB) carry their own grant.
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const canEdit = computed(() => {
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return orgStore.canEditKB(kbId.value, isOwner.value);
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if (isOwner.value) return true;
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if (authStore.hasRole('admin')) return true;
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return orgStore.canEditKB(kbId.value, false);
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});
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// Can manage (delete, settings, etc.): owner or admin
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// Can manage (delete, settings, etc.): KB creator or tenant Admin+.
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// Org shares are intentionally excluded here — sharing a KB grants
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// read/edit, never delete or settings access.
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const canManage = computed(() => {
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return orgStore.canManageKB(kbId.value, isOwner.value);
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if (isOwner.value) return true;
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if (authStore.hasRole('admin')) return true;
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return orgStore.canManageKB(kbId.value, false);
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});
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// Current KB's shared record (when accessed via organization share)
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