fix(rbac): role-aware UI gates leaked write affordances after tenant switch

When an Owner of tenant A invited user B as a Viewer, B could log in,
switch the active tenant from B's home to A via the user menu, and
still see every write button — Create KB, Upload Document, Edit/Delete
agent — because the role-gate plumbing on the client was wired to the
wrong tenant. The server's RBAC enforcement (PR 2 / PR 5) still blocked
the actual mutations with 403, so no data leaked, but the UI presented
authority the user did not have, which is a confusing and embarrassing
defect.

Five distinct root causes, all on the client / server boundary:

1. `currentTenantRole` (frontend/src/stores/auth.ts) read
   `tenant.value.id` — the user's *home* tenant — instead of the active
   tenant id. After switching to A, the helper still returned B's home
   role (Owner), so every `hasRole(...)` gate in the codebase silently
   short-circuited. Fix: read `selectedTenantId` first, fall back to
   `tenant.id`.

2. `setMemberships` was only called once, on /auth/login. Hard reloads
   (which the tenant switcher triggers) re-ran `getCurrentUser()` via
   `App.vue` and `router/index.ts`, but those callers discarded the
   `memberships` field of the response, so the auth store kept the
   login-time snapshot forever. Role changes between sessions stayed
   invisible. Fix: extract memberships in both /auth/me consumers and
   feed them into `setMemberships`.

3. `KnowledgeBase.vue`'s `isOwner` compared `kb.tenant_id` to the
   active tenant id, so any KB inside the current tenant was treated
   as "owned by the caller" — bypassing every role gate below. Fix:
   compare against `kb.creator_id` (the field PR 5 introduced) and
   require an actual creator match. `canEdit` / `canManage` now layer
   `hasRole('admin')` on top so a non-creator with sufficient role can
   still manage.

4. `KnowledgeBaseList.vue` and `AgentList.vue` rendered the per-card
   more-menu (Settings, Delete, Edit) unconditionally. With the
   ownership column from PR 5 this is straightforward to gate on the
   client: Settings/Delete now require creator-match or `hasRole('admin')`
   per the server's `OwnedKBOrAdmin` / `OwnedAgentOrAdmin` matrix.

5. The axios interceptor (frontend/src/utils/request.ts) had a
   "selectedTenantId === defaultTenantId → don't attach X-Tenant-ID"
   short-circuit. Any code that wrote the active tenant into
   `weknora_tenant` (UserMenu's loadUserInfo, OIDC sync, router
   hydrate) made the two values equal, after which the header silently
   stopped attaching and subsequent navigation requests landed on the
   home tenant. Fix: drop the short-circuit; always attach when
   selectedTenantId is set.

Server-side, /auth/me read `user.TenantID` (the immutable home tenant
id stamped at signup) when fetching the tenant for the response, so
the `tenant` field always pointed at home even after the auth
middleware had already resolved an active tenant from X-Tenant-ID.
The frontend then re-keyed `authStore.tenant` to the home tenant on
every refresh, undoing the switch. Fix: read the active tenant id from
context (`types.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)`) and only fall back to
user.TenantID when context is unset.

The server-side enforcement was correct throughout — every fix here is
purely about not lying to the user with the rendered UI.
This commit is contained in:
wizardchen
2026-05-14 21:55:22 +08:00
committed by lyingbug
parent 766a6c482f
commit 1a46fcf8ca
9 changed files with 162 additions and 52 deletions
+13 -1
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ export const useAuthStore = defineStore('auth', () => {
// role-aware UI gating; PR 2 wires backend enforcement, PR 3 uses
// this for menu/button visibility.
//
// It MUST read effectiveTenantId, not tenant.value.id. tenant.value is
// the user's home tenant (set once on login from /auth/me's tenant
// field); selectedTenantId is the active override applied by the
// tenant switcher. Reading the wrong field used to leak Owner-level
// UI to a Viewer who switched into a tenant where they were a Viewer
// — every gate above (`hasRole(...)`) returned the home-tenant role.
//
// SECURITY: This value is read from localStorage (`weknora_memberships`)
// and therefore MUST be treated as UI-rendering-only — any user can
// tamper with localStorage and grant themselves "owner" here. All real
@@ -67,7 +74,12 @@ export const useAuthStore = defineStore('auth', () => {
// the role from tenant_members on every request). Never branch
// security-sensitive logic on this value alone.
const currentTenantRole = computed(() => {
const tid = tenant.value?.id ? String(tenant.value.id) : ''
const tid =
selectedTenantId.value !== null && selectedTenantId.value !== undefined
? String(selectedTenantId.value)
: tenant.value?.id
? String(tenant.value.id)
: ''
if (!tid) return ''
const match = memberships.value.find((m) => String(m.tenant_id) === tid)
return match?.role || ''