fix(rbac): role-aware UI gates leaked write affordances after tenant switch
When an Owner of tenant A invited user B as a Viewer, B could log in,
switch the active tenant from B's home to A via the user menu, and
still see every write button — Create KB, Upload Document, Edit/Delete
agent — because the role-gate plumbing on the client was wired to the
wrong tenant. The server's RBAC enforcement (PR 2 / PR 5) still blocked
the actual mutations with 403, so no data leaked, but the UI presented
authority the user did not have, which is a confusing and embarrassing
defect.
Five distinct root causes, all on the client / server boundary:
1. `currentTenantRole` (frontend/src/stores/auth.ts) read
`tenant.value.id` — the user's *home* tenant — instead of the active
tenant id. After switching to A, the helper still returned B's home
role (Owner), so every `hasRole(...)` gate in the codebase silently
short-circuited. Fix: read `selectedTenantId` first, fall back to
`tenant.id`.
2. `setMemberships` was only called once, on /auth/login. Hard reloads
(which the tenant switcher triggers) re-ran `getCurrentUser()` via
`App.vue` and `router/index.ts`, but those callers discarded the
`memberships` field of the response, so the auth store kept the
login-time snapshot forever. Role changes between sessions stayed
invisible. Fix: extract memberships in both /auth/me consumers and
feed them into `setMemberships`.
3. `KnowledgeBase.vue`'s `isOwner` compared `kb.tenant_id` to the
active tenant id, so any KB inside the current tenant was treated
as "owned by the caller" — bypassing every role gate below. Fix:
compare against `kb.creator_id` (the field PR 5 introduced) and
require an actual creator match. `canEdit` / `canManage` now layer
`hasRole('admin')` on top so a non-creator with sufficient role can
still manage.
4. `KnowledgeBaseList.vue` and `AgentList.vue` rendered the per-card
more-menu (Settings, Delete, Edit) unconditionally. With the
ownership column from PR 5 this is straightforward to gate on the
client: Settings/Delete now require creator-match or `hasRole('admin')`
per the server's `OwnedKBOrAdmin` / `OwnedAgentOrAdmin` matrix.
5. The axios interceptor (frontend/src/utils/request.ts) had a
"selectedTenantId === defaultTenantId → don't attach X-Tenant-ID"
short-circuit. Any code that wrote the active tenant into
`weknora_tenant` (UserMenu's loadUserInfo, OIDC sync, router
hydrate) made the two values equal, after which the header silently
stopped attaching and subsequent navigation requests landed on the
home tenant. Fix: drop the short-circuit; always attach when
selectedTenantId is set.
Server-side, /auth/me read `user.TenantID` (the immutable home tenant
id stamped at signup) when fetching the tenant for the response, so
the `tenant` field always pointed at home even after the auth
middleware had already resolved an active tenant from X-Tenant-ID.
The frontend then re-keyed `authStore.tenant` to the home tenant on
every refresh, undoing the switch. Fix: read the active tenant id from
context (`types.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)`) and only fall back to
user.TenantID when context is unset.
The server-side enforcement was correct throughout — every fix here is
purely about not lying to the user with the rendered UI.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ export const useAuthStore = defineStore('auth', () => {
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// role-aware UI gating; PR 2 wires backend enforcement, PR 3 uses
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// this for menu/button visibility.
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//
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// It MUST read effectiveTenantId, not tenant.value.id. tenant.value is
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// the user's home tenant (set once on login from /auth/me's tenant
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// field); selectedTenantId is the active override applied by the
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// tenant switcher. Reading the wrong field used to leak Owner-level
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// UI to a Viewer who switched into a tenant where they were a Viewer
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// — every gate above (`hasRole(...)`) returned the home-tenant role.
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//
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// SECURITY: This value is read from localStorage (`weknora_memberships`)
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// and therefore MUST be treated as UI-rendering-only — any user can
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// tamper with localStorage and grant themselves "owner" here. All real
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@@ -67,7 +74,12 @@ export const useAuthStore = defineStore('auth', () => {
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// the role from tenant_members on every request). Never branch
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// security-sensitive logic on this value alone.
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const currentTenantRole = computed(() => {
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const tid = tenant.value?.id ? String(tenant.value.id) : ''
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const tid =
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selectedTenantId.value !== null && selectedTenantId.value !== undefined
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? String(selectedTenantId.value)
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: tenant.value?.id
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? String(tenant.value.id)
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: ''
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if (!tid) return ''
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const match = memberships.value.find((m) => String(m.tenant_id) === tid)
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return match?.role || ''
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