fix: resolve critical vulnerability V-001

Automatically generated security fix
This commit is contained in:
orbisai0security
2026-01-08 09:05:01 +00:00
committed by wizardchen
parent 3fc9ce33b4
commit 14ac60128b
2 changed files with 94 additions and 0 deletions
+66
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import asyncio
import io
import ipaddress
import logging
import os
import re
import time
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import requests
from PIL import Image
@@ -30,6 +32,60 @@ class BaseParser(ABC):
_ocr_engine = None
_ocr_engine_failed = False
@staticmethod
def _is_safe_url(url: str) -> bool:
"""Validate URL to prevent SSRF attacks
Args:
url: URL to validate
Returns:
True if URL is safe to fetch, False otherwise
"""
try:
parsed_url = urlparse(url)
# Only allow http and https schemes
if parsed_url.scheme not in ['http', 'https']:
logger.warning(f"Rejected URL with invalid scheme: {parsed_url.scheme}")
return False
# Extract hostname
hostname = parsed_url.hostname
if not hostname:
logger.warning("No hostname found in URL")
return False
# Try to parse as IP address
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
# Reject private, loopback, link-local, multicast addresses
if (ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or
ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or
ip.is_reserved):
logger.warning(f"Rejected URL with restricted IP: {ip}")
return False
except ValueError:
# Not an IP address, validate hostname
# Reject localhost and common internal hostnames
hostname_lower = hostname.lower()
restricted_hostnames = [
'localhost',
'127.0.0.1',
'::1',
'metadata.google.internal',
'metadata.tencentyun.com',
'169.254.169.254', # AWS metadata endpoint
]
if hostname_lower in restricted_hostnames or hostname_lower.endswith('.local'):
logger.warning(f"Rejected URL with restricted hostname: {hostname}")
return False
return True
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Error validating URL: {str(e)}")
return False
@classmethod
def get_ocr_engine(cls, backend_type="paddle", **kwargs):
"""Get OCR engine instance
@@ -681,6 +737,11 @@ class BaseParser(ABC):
if is_storage_url:
logger.info(f"Image already on COS: {img_url}, no need to re-upload")
try:
# Validate URL to prevent SSRF attacks
if not self._is_safe_url(img_url):
logger.error(f"URL failed validation check: {img_url}")
return img_url, img_url, None
# Still need to get image object for OCR processing
# Get proxy settings from environment variables
http_proxy = os.environ.get("EXTERNAL_HTTP_PROXY")
@@ -727,6 +788,11 @@ class BaseParser(ABC):
# Normal remote URL download handling
else:
# Validate URL to prevent SSRF attacks
if not self._is_safe_url(img_url):
logger.error(f"URL failed validation check: {img_url}")
return img_url, img_url, None
# Get proxy settings from environment variables
http_proxy = os.environ.get("EXTERNAL_HTTP_PROXY")
https_proxy = os.environ.get("EXTERNAL_HTTPS_PROXY")