fix(security): support IPv6 in SSRF validation via whitelist mechanism
- Keep strict mode blocking all direct IPs (IPv4 and IPv6 uniformly) - Unify all SSRF call sites to use ValidateURLForSSRF (whitelist-aware) - Add Teredo (2001:0000::/32) and 6to4 (2002::/16) tunnel detection - Make redirect handler and DNS pinning respect SSRF_WHITELIST - Unexport isSSRFSafeURL to prevent future callers bypassing whitelist - Add scheme validation for whitelisted redirect targets - Document IPv6 whitelist syntax in .env.example - Add comprehensive IPv6 test coverage
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
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package utils
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import (
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"net"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestIsSSRFSafeURL(t *testing.T) {
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func TestSSRFSafeURL(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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tests := []struct {
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@@ -44,6 +46,7 @@ func TestIsSSRFSafeURL(t *testing.T) {
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wantOK: false,
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wantReasonSub: "hostname suffix .internal is restricted",
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},
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// --- All direct IPs are blocked by isSSRFSafeURL (strict mode) ---
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{
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name: "direct IPv4 blocked",
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rawURL: "https://8.8.8.8/dns-query",
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@@ -51,11 +54,36 @@ func TestIsSSRFSafeURL(t *testing.T) {
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wantReasonSub: "direct IP address access is not allowed",
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},
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{
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name: "direct IPv6 blocked",
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name: "direct public IPv6 blocked",
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rawURL: "https://[2001:4860:4860::8888]/dns-query",
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wantOK: false,
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wantReasonSub: "direct IP address access is not allowed",
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},
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{
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name: "loopback IPv6 blocked",
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rawURL: "https://[::1]/admin",
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wantOK: false,
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wantReasonSub: "is restricted",
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},
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{
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name: "link-local IPv6 blocked",
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rawURL: "https://[fe80::1]/admin",
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wantOK: false,
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wantReasonSub: "direct IP address access is not allowed",
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},
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{
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name: "ULA IPv6 blocked",
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rawURL: "https://[fd12:3456:789a::1]/admin",
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wantOK: false,
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wantReasonSub: "direct IP address access is not allowed",
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},
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{
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name: "IPv4-mapped IPv6 blocked",
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rawURL: "https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/admin",
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wantOK: false,
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wantReasonSub: "direct IP address access is not allowed",
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},
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// --- IP obfuscation ---
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{
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name: "IP-like decimal hostname blocked",
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rawURL: "https://2130706433/",
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@@ -68,6 +96,7 @@ func TestIsSSRFSafeURL(t *testing.T) {
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wantOK: false,
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wantReasonSub: "IP-like hostname format is not allowed",
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},
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// --- Port blocking ---
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{
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name: "blocked internal service port",
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rawURL: "https://example.com:3306/db",
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@@ -81,21 +110,21 @@ func TestIsSSRFSafeURL(t *testing.T) {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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ok, reason := IsSSRFSafeURL(tt.rawURL)
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ok, reason := isSSRFSafeURL(tt.rawURL)
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if ok != tt.wantOK {
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t.Fatalf("IsSSRFSafeURL(%q) ok = %v, want %v, reason = %q", tt.rawURL, ok, tt.wantOK, reason)
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t.Fatalf("isSSRFSafeURL(%q) ok = %v, want %v, reason = %q", tt.rawURL, ok, tt.wantOK, reason)
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}
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if tt.wantReasonSub != "" && !strings.Contains(reason, tt.wantReasonSub) {
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t.Fatalf("IsSSRFSafeURL(%q) reason = %q, want contains %q", tt.rawURL, reason, tt.wantReasonSub)
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t.Fatalf("isSSRFSafeURL(%q) reason = %q, want contains %q", tt.rawURL, reason, tt.wantReasonSub)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestIsSSRFSafeURL_AllowPublicDomain(t *testing.T) {
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func TestSSRFSafeURL_AllowPublicDomain(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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ok, reason := IsSSRFSafeURL("https://example.com/path")
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ok, reason := isSSRFSafeURL("https://example.com/path")
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if !ok {
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// This path depends on runtime DNS/network. If DNS is unavailable, skip to keep CI stable.
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if strings.Contains(reason, "DNS resolution failed") {
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@@ -104,3 +133,127 @@ func TestIsSSRFSafeURL_AllowPublicDomain(t *testing.T) {
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t.Fatalf("expected public domain to be allowed, got ok=%v reason=%q", ok, reason)
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}
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}
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// TestValidateURLForSSRF_IPv6Whitelist verifies that whitelisted IPv6 addresses
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// bypass the strict IP block in isSSRFSafeURL.
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func TestValidateURLForSSRF_IPv6Whitelist(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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whitelist string
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rawURL string
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wantErr bool
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}{
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{
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name: "exact IPv6 whitelisted",
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whitelist: "2001:4860:4860::8888",
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rawURL: "https://[2001:4860:4860::8888]/dns-query",
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wantErr: false,
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},
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{
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name: "IPv6 CIDR whitelisted",
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whitelist: "2001:db8::/32",
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rawURL: "https://[2001:db8::1]/page",
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wantErr: false,
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},
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{
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name: "IPv6 not in whitelist still blocked",
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whitelist: "2001:db8::/32",
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rawURL: "https://[2001:4860:4860::8888]/dns-query",
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wantErr: true,
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},
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{
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name: "IPv4 whitelisted",
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whitelist: "8.8.8.8",
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rawURL: "https://8.8.8.8/dns-query",
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wantErr: false,
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},
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{
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name: "wildcard domain whitelisted",
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whitelist: "*.example.com",
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rawURL: "https://api.example.com/v1",
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wantErr: false,
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},
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{
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name: "wildcard domain root whitelisted",
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whitelist: "*.example.com",
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rawURL: "https://example.com/v1",
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wantErr: false,
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},
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{
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name: "bare host without scheme normalised",
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whitelist: "internal.service",
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rawURL: "internal.service:8080/path",
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wantErr: false,
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},
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{
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name: "empty whitelist blocks direct IP",
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whitelist: "",
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rawURL: "https://8.8.8.8/dns-query",
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wantErr: true,
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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// Reset whitelist singleton so we can set a new value
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resetSSRFWhitelistForTest()
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os.Setenv("SSRF_WHITELIST", tt.whitelist)
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defer func() {
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os.Unsetenv("SSRF_WHITELIST")
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resetSSRFWhitelistForTest()
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}()
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err := ValidateURLForSSRF(tt.rawURL)
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if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
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t.Fatalf("ValidateURLForSSRF(%q) with whitelist=%q: err = %v, wantErr = %v",
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tt.rawURL, tt.whitelist, err, tt.wantErr)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestIsRestrictedIP_IPv6 tests IPv6-specific restricted range detection.
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func TestIsRestrictedIP_IPv6(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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ip string
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wantBlock bool
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wantReason string
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}{
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{"loopback", "::1", true, "loopback"},
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{"unspecified", "::", true, "unspecified"},
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{"link-local", "fe80::1", true, "link-local"},
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{"ULA", "fd12:3456:789a::1", true, ""},
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{"site-local", "fec0::1", true, "site-local"},
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{"Teredo", "2001:0000:4136:e378:8000:63bf:3fff:fdd2", true, "Teredo"},
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{"6to4 private", "2002:c0a8:0101::1", true, "6to4"},
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{"6to4 public", "2002:0808:0808::1", false, ""},
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{"public IPv6", "2001:4860:4860::8888", false, ""},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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tt := tt
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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ip := parseIPForTest(t, tt.ip)
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blocked, reason := isRestrictedIP(ip)
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if blocked != tt.wantBlock {
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t.Fatalf("isRestrictedIP(%s) = %v, want %v (reason: %s)", tt.ip, blocked, tt.wantBlock, reason)
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}
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if tt.wantReason != "" && !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(reason), strings.ToLower(tt.wantReason)) {
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t.Fatalf("isRestrictedIP(%s) reason = %q, want contains %q", tt.ip, reason, tt.wantReason)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func parseIPForTest(t *testing.T, s string) net.IP {
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t.Helper()
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ip := net.ParseIP(s)
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if ip == nil {
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t.Fatalf("invalid test IP: %s", s)
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}
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return ip
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}
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