fix(security): support IPv6 in SSRF validation via whitelist mechanism

- Keep strict mode blocking all direct IPs (IPv4 and IPv6 uniformly)
- Unify all SSRF call sites to use ValidateURLForSSRF (whitelist-aware)
- Add Teredo (2001:0000::/32) and 6to4 (2002::/16) tunnel detection
- Make redirect handler and DNS pinning respect SSRF_WHITELIST
- Unexport isSSRFSafeURL to prevent future callers bypassing whitelist
- Add scheme validation for whitelisted redirect targets
- Document IPv6 whitelist syntax in .env.example
- Add comprehensive IPv6 test coverage
This commit is contained in:
nullkey
2026-03-31 18:52:25 +08:00
committed by lyingbug
parent a5ca9a2784
commit 0b64ef9bd1
9 changed files with 231 additions and 52 deletions
@@ -667,9 +667,9 @@ func (r *ImageResolver) ResolveRemoteImages(
continue
}
// --- SSRF check ---
if safe, reason := secutils.IsSSRFSafeURL(imgURL); !safe {
log.Printf("WARN: remote image blocked by SSRF check (%s): %s", reason, imgURL)
// --- SSRF check (centralised entry-point with whitelist support) ---
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(imgURL); err != nil {
log.Printf("WARN: remote image blocked by SSRF check (%v): %s", err, imgURL)
continue
}