fix(security): support IPv6 in SSRF validation via whitelist mechanism

- Keep strict mode blocking all direct IPs (IPv4 and IPv6 uniformly)
- Unify all SSRF call sites to use ValidateURLForSSRF (whitelist-aware)
- Add Teredo (2001:0000::/32) and 6to4 (2002::/16) tunnel detection
- Make redirect handler and DNS pinning respect SSRF_WHITELIST
- Unexport isSSRFSafeURL to prevent future callers bypassing whitelist
- Add scheme validation for whitelisted redirect targets
- Document IPv6 whitelist syntax in .env.example
- Add comprehensive IPv6 test coverage
This commit is contained in:
nullkey
2026-03-31 18:52:25 +08:00
committed by lyingbug
parent a5ca9a2784
commit 0b64ef9bd1
9 changed files with 231 additions and 52 deletions
+9 -9
View File
@@ -473,9 +473,9 @@ func (s *knowledgeService) CreateKnowledgeFromURL(ctx context.Context,
return nil, ErrInvalidURL
}
// SSRF protection: validate URL is safe to fetch
if safe, reason := secutils.IsSSRFSafeURL(url); !safe {
logger.Errorf(ctx, "URL rejected for SSRF protection: %s, reason: %s", url, reason)
// SSRF protection: validate URL is safe to fetch (uses centralised entry-point with whitelist support)
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(url); err != nil {
logger.Errorf(ctx, "URL rejected for SSRF protection: %s, err: %v", url, err)
return nil, ErrInvalidURL
}
@@ -659,8 +659,8 @@ func (s *knowledgeService) createKnowledgeFromFileURL(
logger.Error(ctx, "Invalid or unsafe file URL format")
return nil, ErrInvalidURL
}
if safe, reason := secutils.IsSSRFSafeURL(fileURL); !safe {
logger.Errorf(ctx, "File URL rejected for SSRF protection: %s, reason: %s", fileURL, reason)
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(fileURL); err != nil {
logger.Errorf(ctx, "File URL rejected for SSRF protection: %s, err: %v", fileURL, err)
return nil, ErrInvalidURL
}
@@ -7458,8 +7458,8 @@ func (s *knowledgeService) ProcessDocument(ctx context.Context, t *asynq.Task) e
if payload.FileURL != "" {
// file_url import: SSRF re-check (防 DNS 重绑定), download, persist, then delegate to convert()
if safe, reason := secutils.IsSSRFSafeURL(payload.FileURL); !safe {
logger.Errorf(ctx, "File URL rejected for SSRF protection in ProcessDocument: %s, reason: %s", payload.FileURL, reason)
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(payload.FileURL); err != nil {
logger.Errorf(ctx, "File URL rejected for SSRF protection in ProcessDocument: %s, err: %v", payload.FileURL, err)
knowledge.ParseStatus = "failed"
knowledge.ErrorMessage = "File URL is not allowed for security reasons"
knowledge.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
@@ -7668,8 +7668,8 @@ func (s *knowledgeService) convert(
overrides := s.getParserEngineOverridesFromContext(ctx)
if isURL {
if safe, reason := secutils.IsSSRFSafeURL(payload.URL); !safe {
logger.Errorf(ctx, "URL rejected for SSRF protection: %s, reason: %s", payload.URL, reason)
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(payload.URL); err != nil {
logger.Errorf(ctx, "URL rejected for SSRF protection: %s, err: %v", payload.URL, err)
knowledge.ParseStatus = "failed"
knowledge.ErrorMessage = "URL is not allowed for security reasons"
knowledge.UpdatedAt = time.Now()